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Original problem definition / Oppgavetekst 
The necessity for organizations to be innovative while at the same time being 
effective creates a paradox, according to organizational theory. The concept of 
ambidexterity is widely accepted among scholars as the method used to achieve, 
and balance, both innovation and effectiveness. 
 
We will study how innovation and effectiveness is balanced in the Norwegian digital 
service company Making Waves by creating and executing a case study. The case 
study will include interviews and observation, and it will be based on knowledge we 
have accumulated through a previously conducted literature review. 
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Abstract 
The research question in this thesis is “How does Making Waves balance exploration 
and exploitation?” which is based on our desire to study a Norwegian service 
company with an innovative edge and long-term profitability. Our thesis is written 
within the field of innovation management. 
 
The most central theories covered in this thesis are related to exploration, 
exploitation, and ambidexterity, which is the ability of organizations to balance 
exploration and exploitation. We have created a model of four different ways a 
company can approach ambidexterity: architectural, contextual, combinatorial, and 
management approaches.  
 
We have employed a qualitative research strategy, and designed a single-case study 
of the Norwegian consultancy company Making Waves. We interviewed 18 
employees, from top management to non-management, and used a method for 
analysis inspired by open coding and grounded theory. Our theoretical foundation is 
a literature review we conduced in the fall of 2012. Based on the theoretical 
foundation and the empirical data, we have created a set of propositions that we 
used to shed light on specific elements of our research question. 
 
From the analysis of our empirical data, we created three main categories that we 
used in the discussion: Company culture, knowledge management, and strategic 
orientation. We presented empirical data within these three categories, and 
explained how Making Waves uses the four approaches to ambidexterity. We also 
established that Making Waves can be defined as a value shop, which enabled us to 
theorise about which other companies that might benefit from our results.  
 
We have used the insight we gained from the discussion of our propositions to 
answer the research question. The overall answer to the question is that Making 
Waves balances exploration and exploitation by having managers that combine 
architectural and contextual approaches to ambidexterity. More specifically, we found 
that Making Waves achieves ambidexterity through customer projects, and that they 
rely more and more on architectural approaches as they are growing. The CEO of 
Making Waves is directly involved in the contextual approaches, which he affects 
through his leadership style. The management in Making Waves does not prefer 
exploitative projects to explorative projects, and they do not use the performance 
management aspect of contextual approaches. We also found that Making Waves do 
not use spatial separation as an architectural measure when being ambidextrous. 
 
The most important implications of our research are that value shops seem to 
employ more architectural approaches to ambidexterity by default when they grow in 
terms of number of employees, that the CEOs of companies with flat structures 
strongly affect contextual approaches to ambidexterity, and that thorough knowledge 
management is essential for achieving ambidexterity in value shops. We also believe 
that a combined view on ambidexterity and management theory would benefit both 
fields. 
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Sammendrag 
Forskningsspørsmålet i denne oppgaven er ”Hvordan balanserer Making Waves 
exploration og exploitation?”, som er basert på et ønske om å studere et lønnsomt og 
innovativt norsk selskap i tjenestesektoren. Oppgaven er skrevet innen feltet 
innovasjonsledelse. 
 
De mest sentrale teoriene i denne oppgaven er knyttet til konseptene exploration, 
exploitation og konseptet ambidekstri, som er en bedrifts evne til å balansere 
exploration og exploitation. Vi har laget en modell med fire ulike tilnærminger en 
bedrift kan ha til ambidekstri: arkitektoniske, kontekstuelle, kombinatoriske, og 
ledelsesmessige tilnærminger. 
 
Vi har jobbet etter en kvalitativ forskningsmetode, og har designet et single-case-
studie av det norske konsulentselskapet Making Waves. Vi intervjuet 18 ansatte, fra 
toppledelsen til dem uten lederansvar, og brukte en analysemetode inspirert av åpen 
koding og grounded theory. Det teoretiske fundamentet har vi fra et litteraturstudie vi 
utførte høsten 2012. Vi lagde et sett med proposisjoner basert på litteraturstudiet og 
intervjuene, som vi brukte til å belyse ulike sider ved forskningsspørsmålet. 
 
Vi lagde tre kategorier til diskusjonskapitlene, basert på analysen av intervjuene: 
Selskapskultur, kunnskapsledelse og strategisk orientering. Vi presenterte empiri 
innen disse kategoriene, og forklarte hvordan Making Waves bruker de fire 
tilnærmingene til ambidekstri. Vi har også fastslått at Making Waves kan 
kategoriseres som en value shop, som gjorde det mulig å anta hvilke andre 
selskaper som kan ha nytte av resultatene våre. 
 
Vi har brukt det vi fant ut gjennom diskusjonen av proposisjonene til å besvare 
forskningsspørsmålet. Det overordnede svaret på forskningsspørsmålet er at Making 
Waves balanserer exploration og exploitation ved å ha ledere som kombinerer 
arkitektoniske og kontekstuelle tilnærminger til ambidekstri. Mer spesifikt fant vi ut at 
Making Waves oppnår ambidekstri gjennom kundeprosjekter, og at de bruker flere 
og flere arkitektoniske tilnærminger jo større de blir. Topplederen i Making Waves er 
direkte involvert i de kontekstuelle tilnærmingene, og påvirker dem med måten han 
leder på. Ledelsen i Making Waves foretrekker ikke exploitation-prosjekter foran 
exploration-prosjekter, og bruker ikke prestasjonsledelse som en del av de 
kontekstuelle tilnærmingene. Vi oppdaget også at Making Waves ikke bruker spatial 
separation som en arkitektonisk tilnærming til ambidekstri. 
 
De viktigste implikasjonene av oppgaven vår er at value shops tilsynelatende 
automatisk bruker flere og flere arkitektoniske tilnærminger jo flere ansatte de har, at 
toppledere i selskaper med flat struktur påvirker de kontekstuelle tilnærmingene i stor 
grad, og at omfattende kunnskapsledelse er essensielt for å oppnå ambidekstri i 
value shop-bedrifter. Vi mener også at et samlet syn på ambidekstri og ledelsesteori 
vil gagne begge fagfeltene.  
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1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter will explain the historical and theoretical context of 
innovation, which is the backdrop for our problem statement. We will describe how 
our problem statement was developed, and clarify the term “value shop” that we use 
to classify our case company Making Waves. We will also provide a short 
presentation of Making Waves, and present the purpose of our thesis. The chapter 
will conclude with a description of the report structure, which will hopefully help the 
reader navigate through our thesis. 
1.1 Historical context 
History is replete with stories of great companies that eventually failed. RCA 
Corporation, Kodak, and Motorola, were all profitable trendsetters at some point in 
the 20th century, but are now either out of business or shadows of their former 
selves. All three companies had at some point been very innovative, but eventually 
failed to adapt to the changing business environment. Change in the business 
environment is often induced by technological advances, such as the shift from 
analogue to digital film, the rise of the Internet, and more distantly, the second 
industrial revolution.  
 
The second industrial revolution was also known as the technological revolution, and 
it brought about mass production and the production line (Broadberry, 2010). The 
result was a global increase in productivity (Skorstad, 2002). Technological and 
scientific advances drove this development, but the creation of new organizational 
principles was equally important. Division of labour made economics of scale 
possible through mass production and by organizing people and machines 
(Hobsbawm and Wrigley, 1999). The practice of organizing work based on efficiency 
led to the rise of methods such as lean production and total quality management in 
the middle of the 20th century (Klev and Levin, 2009). Companies that employed 
these methods saw their production soar.  
 
But history shows that a company’s efficiency has not been enough to secure its 
survival over time; the generation of new ideas and the capability of adapting to 
change is also essential (Christensen et al., 2007). Even Ford Motor Company, a 
pioneer in mass production, had to temporarily shut down their company in the 1920s 
due to low sales numbers, because Henry Ford had refused to make any major 
changes to the Model-T car since its launch in 1908 (Sorensen et al., 2006). This is 
epitomized by Ford’s famous quote: “Any customer can have a car painted any 
colour that he wants, so long as it is black” (Ford and Crowther, 1922, p.72). 
 
Companies must be both efficient and able to generate new ideas to be successful. 
This is especially true in the current business environment, where the Internet has 
toppled trusted business models, and created new ones. Cloud computing, big data, 
artificial intelligence, and crowd-sourced financing methods are all new trends that 
we expect to have a large impact in the future.  
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In an ever-changing world, with more rapid technological shifts and increasingly 
complex organizations, the pressure to master both efficiency and the generation of 
new ideas has increased (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). In the context of 
organizational theory the act of being able to generate new ideas is called 
exploration, and being efficient is called exploitation. Exploration has to do with 
seeking new knowledge, and exploitation has to do with refining existing knowledge, 
and a company that is able to be both explorative and exploitative is called an 
ambidextrous company. The next subchapter will describe the theoretical context 
that ambidexterity has its origins from, starting with the broad topic of innovation and 
the subtopic innovation management.  
1.2 Theoretical context 
After placing ambidexterity in an historical context, we will now place it in a 
theoretical context. Our research is within the field of innovation, and innovation 
management, and in this subchapter we will describe how exploration, exploitation 
and ambidexterity are underlying themes of innovation management.  
1.2.1 Innovation 
Innovation is the primary renewal process in any organization. It means to create 
something new, implicating that this new concept is both smarter and more efficient 
than the existing concept (Godø, 2008). Innovation can be new additions to a product 
or service, or changes related to how a product or service is created and delivered 
(Bessant et al., 2005), and it is a critical factor for long-time survival and economic 
growth (Trott, 2008). Baumol (2002) defines innovation as “the recognition of 
opportunities for profitable change and the pursuit of those opportunities all the way 
through to their adoption in practice”. Christensen (1997) states that innovation refers 
to a change in technology, and provides a wide definition of technology which 
“extends beyond engineering and manufacturing to encompass a range of marketing, 
investment and managerial processes” (Christensen, 1997, p.xiii).  
 
An important academic discussion related to innovation has been to what degree 
innovation is driven forth by people intentionally, or determined by an external factor 
such as the marketplace. Schumpeter (1934) viewed innovation as a desired 
development activated by an agent he termed “the entrepreneur”. The entrepreneur 
breaks the market equilibrium by seeking radical changes caused by new 
combinations of resources (Landström, 1999). Innovation is driven forth intentionally 
by a person, a manager or a company (Schumpeter, 1934). Kirzner (1999) opposes 
this view, and claims that the market is already in a state of imbalance because 
individuals don’t all have the same knowledge or information. The imperfections in 
the market create opportunities, and Kirzner (1999) describes the entrepreneur as 
one who searches for and identifies these imperfections and leverages them to 
create innovations (Landström, 1999). Kirzner sees innovation as something that 
stems from disequilibrium in the market. Even though Schumpeter and Kirzner 
disagree on where innovations come from, they both emphasize that an action of a 
person or organization is necessary to bring forth innovation.  
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Innovation can be divided into different categories, based on different criteria. It can 
be categorized by where the innovation takes place, as with process and product 
innovation (Marabelli et al., 2012). Process innovation is related to production and 
delivery processes of a good or service, and product innovation is related to the 
actual product/service that the customer buys, making it externally driven by 
customer demand and market needs (Marabelli et al., 2012). Christensen (1997) 
divides innovation into main two categories based the impact they have on the 
marketplace. He presents the terms “disruptive” and “sustaining” innovations, and 
explains that disruptive innovations create a new market, and eventually disrupts an 
existing one, and that sustaining innovations change existing markets (Christensen, 
1997). Christensen’s concept of disruptive innovations has a lot in common with 
Schumpeter's view on innovation and his term “creative destruction” (Christensen, 
1997, Godø, 2008). Tidd and Bessant (2011) and Godø (2008) make a distinction 
between innovations and inventions, by saying that inventions without a market is not 
an innovation. They also categorize innovation based on what is done in the 
organization, and present innovation as either radical or incremental. Incremental 
innovations have to do with “doing what we do better” and radical innovations have to 
do with “doing something different” (Tidd and Bessant, 2011). We have chosen to 
use Tidd and Bessant’s (2011) terms and definitions in our thesis.  
 
Innovation researchers, such as the ones mentioned above, agree that innovation 
relates to changes in products, services or process with the intent of creating greater 
value for customers, which in turn can be transformed into greater value for a 
company. There also seems to be consensus that these changes have to be driven 
forth by someone, such as an individual, a group of individuals or an organization. 
Organizational change is driven forth by management, which means that efficient 
innovation management is essential for any company striving to achieve innovation 
(Bessant et al., 2005). In the next subchapter, we will present the concept of 
innovation management.  
1.2.2 Innovation management 
Our thesis belongs within a subtopic of innovation, namely the topic of innovation 
management. We will in this subchapter describe the innovation process, and the 
difficulties of managing it. Then we will present the activities of exploration and 
exploitation as activities that can lead to innovation, if managed properly.  
 
Few would negate the importance of innovation, but many have questioned if the 
enormously complex process of innovation is something an organization can actually 
manage (Tidd and Bessant, 2011). There have been made several attempts at 
creating a comprehensible model of the innovation process, but it is a difficult task. 
Trott (2008) claims that the innovation process is so complex that most attempts of 
trying to simplify it into a model have only led to misunderstandings. One usually has 
to combine two or more models to present a complete overview. Tidd (2001) and 
Adams et al. (2006) claim that the search for one fixed way to manage innovations is 
a lost cause. In spite of their scepticism, they propose important tools for 
understanding the complexity of innovation management.  
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Specific characteristics that are important aspects of innovation management are 
according to Tidd (2001), the sources of innovation, technological and market 
opportunity, and organization. Adams et al. (2006) claim that inputs, strategy, 
organization, culture, portfolio, project management, commercialization and 
knowledge management are important factors of innovation management. 
Knowledge management plays a vital role in our thesis, and we will therefore provide 
a definition. We choose to rely on Alvesson and Kärreman (2001)’s definition of 
knowledge management as the practice of managing people and information as well 
as the practice of facilitating knowledge creation.  
 
There does not exist a well-defined model of the innovation process that scholars 
agree on, but several suggestions for how a company can innovate have been 
presented in the last decade. Open innovation is a recent concept in the innovation 
management theory, where the idea is that companies should use external ideas as 
well as internal ideas when looking for ways to advance their technology 
(Chesbrough, 2003). Chesbrough’s (2003) central argument for why companies 
should use open innovation is that companies can not afford to rely entirely on their 
own exploration and exploitation in a world of widely distributed knowledge. By 
innovating with other partners, both risk and reward are shared, and this results in 
blurred boundaries between the company and its environment (Chesbrough, 2003). 
Business model innovation is also a new buzzword, made famous by Osterwalder 
and Pigneur (2010) and their business model canvas. A business model is a 
description of the value a company offers to its customers, presented in terms of the 
company architecture and its network of partners, that is used to create, market and 
deliver this value in order to generate profit (Osterwalder and Pigneur, 2010). 
Business model innovation entails reinventing a business itself, not only the product 
and service offerings. It results in a different type of company that competes on more 
than just the product or service that they offer, namely their profit formula, resources, 
processes and value network (Chesbrough, 2007). 
 
According to Tidd and Bessant (2011), innovation management can be understood 
by observing organizations that have survived for one or more centuries. Such 
companies have learned to manage the innovation process, by “doing better” and 
“doing differently” (Tidd and Bessant, 2011). A company must deploy knowledge 
resources to secure profits through the development of things already known, or 
exploitation as innovation researchers have coined this term (Tidd and Bessant, 
2011, p.257). A company must also facilitate radical product or process innovation by 
re-orienting the firm to adopt new attributes and knowledge outside of its domain, 
which is what innovation researchers call exploration (Tidd and Bessant, 2011, 
p.257).  
 
It is important to note that exploration and exploitation is not presented as a model 
for innovation management, they are only activities that if managed well can lead to 
innovation. In the next subchapter, we will describe the two concepts in greater 
detail, and give a practical example of both.  
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1.2.3 Exploration and exploitation 
The concept of exploration and exploitation was pushed into the spotlight with 
March’s famous and well-cited article “Exploration and exploitation in organizational 
learning” published in 1991. March (1991) provided a thorough definition of both 
exploration and exploitation, and since his definitions are widely accepted and cited 
today, we too chose to adhere to them as well.  
 
Exploration is the process of developing new products and services. The explorative 
activities concern developing new markets, and/or radically renewing products or 
services (March, 1991). Exploration requires new competencies and explorative 
activities are seldom profitable in the short run. Exploration includes search, 
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, and innovation 
(March, 1991). 
 
Exploitation is the act of using current knowledge to refine existing technology and 
processes. Exploitative companies pursue a strategy of effectiveness, and not 
flexibility, thus reducing waste and creating corporate systems that streamline 
processes (March, 1991, p.71). Exploitation includes such things as refinement, 
choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution (March, 
1991).  
 
An example of exploration is when Apple developed and released the first iPhone, a 
device that mixed elements of computers, music players, and cell phones into one 
unit with a revolutionary touch display. Developing the iPhone was certainly an 
expensive process, and Apple had no way of knowing what the impact would be. 
They simply wanted to make a new device that was completely different from 
anything the world had ever seen before. The iPhone was a roaring success, and it 
contributed to the rapid decline of the once dominating Nokia, who could not adapt to 
the changing market demand.   
 
The subsequent versions of the iPhone are examples of exploitation. When the first 
iPhone was a success, Apple knew there was a market, they knew who their 
customers were, and what they liked and disliked about the first model. Thus, making 
the next version of the iPhone was a less risky affair: they simply had to make it 
better than the first one. They still innovated in terms of features, reliability, design, 
and distribution, but did so along a defined path with many known variables. 
 
Just as any other company, Apple has to both explore and exploit to be able to 
survive in the long run. But combining exploration and exploitation in one company is 
easier said than done, because the two activities require contradictory company 
capabilities. Exploration requires excess resources, slack, and room for 
experimentation, whereas exploitation requires a streamlined company structure and 
efficiency. Some scholars see the two activities as mutually exclusive concepts, and 
the choice between them as a trade-off (March, 1991, Lewis, 2000).  
 
The majority of researchers within the field of innovation now agree that the activities 
of exploration and exploitation can be seen as a paradox, which means that it is 
theoretically impossible, but perhaps practically possible to be both explorative and 
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exploitative at the same time (Raisch et al., 2009). In innovation literature, balancing 
exploration and exploitation is described with the term ambidexterity, which in the 
literal sense means the ability to use both hands with equal dexterity. We will further 
explain the concept of ambidexterity in the next subchapter.  
1.2.4 Ambidexterity 
Ambidexterity is the organizational ability to balance both exploration and 
exploitation, and companies can be ambidextrous in different ways. The first studies 
on ambidexterity presented ambidexterity in terms of systems and structures, which 
is called an architectural approach to ambidexterity. An example of how architectural 
ambidexterity can be achieved is to have different departments within the 
organization that work with either exploration or exploitation (Tushman and O'Reilly, 
1996). Other scholars argued that the choice to be ambidextrous can be made at an 
individual level, and that organizations need to have the right context in order for the 
employees to balance exploration and exploitation themselves. This is called 
contextual ambidexterity, a term introduced by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004).  
 
Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) drew attention to the fact that previous scholars had 
focused on either architectural or contextual approaches, and claimed that a 
combination of both approaches is necessary for companies to be properly 
ambidextrous. Other scholars pointed to the fact that managers play an important 
role in ensuring the organization’s ambidexterity (Smith and Tushman, 2005).  
 
Ambidexterity, as a concept, was first introduced by Duncan (1976). Since then, it 
has been refined and extended, and become increasingly popular with innovation 
researchers. The number of studies in management journals that explicitly refer to 
organizational ambidexterity has grown exponentially since 1996. In 2004, less than 
10 studies mentioned this concept, and the number of studies grew to 80 in 2009 
(Raisch et al., 2009). When using the web search engine Google Scholar in May 
2013, we found almost 1800 publications containing the term “organizational 
ambidexterity”, and almost 1400 of them had been publicized after 2009. As 
ambidexterity is the theoretical focal point of our thesis, we will return to this topic in 
chapter 3 and describe it in greater detail.  
1.2.5 Summary of theoretical context 
We have provided a theoretical context to give the reader an understanding of which 
theoretical discipline our thesis belongs in. We place our work within the broad 
spectre of innovation research, where we aim to contribute to the field of innovation 
management. We will not participate in the discussion of how to manage innovation 
processes, but rather look at the activities conducted when innovating. We use 
March (1991) as a basis of discussion of exploration and exploitation, and continue 
to explore the ways in which a company can pursue both.  
 
We will at this point leave the theoretical discussions of innovation and innovation 
management. We included innovation management in the theoretical context 
because we felt that it was important to provide an overview of the organizational 
theory that serves as the basis for ambidexterity. In Part II of this thesis, we will pick 
up the trail of exploration, exploitation, and ambidexterity. In the following 
 8 
  
 
subchapter, we will describe the problem statement that we used to explore 
ambidexterity, both theoretically and in practice.  
1.3 Problem statement 
We set out to study how companies can be successful over long periods of time with 
a literature review in the fall of 2012 (Andersen et al., 2012). Our academic 
backgrounds are from Industrial Economics and Technology Management and 
Industrial Design, and in the last two years we have all studied at the NTNU School 
of Entrepreneurship. We had a notion from our academic backgrounds that 
innovation is a key ingredient for long-term success, and we wished to explore this 
theme further. Our starting-point was the classic article within innovation research: 
“Ambidextrous organizations: Managing evolutionary and revolutionary change” by 
Tushman and O'Reilly (1996), and from there we developed our understanding of 
ambidexterity in the context of innovation management.  
 
Our interest became centred on ambidexterity in the service sector, and our 
questions were many: How does innovation occur in service companies with no R&D 
department? How does exploitation manifests itself in service companies? Is the 
issue of exploration and exploitation even really a paradox? Is it the organizations or 
the individuals that are to be ambidextrous? 
 
Many of the articles we had read in our literature study were studies on large multi-
national companies, which made us curious about how the topic of ambidexterity 
manifested itself in a context that we could observe, more specifically a company 
located in Norway. We iterated several times to find a well defined research question, 
and used four criteria as guidelines in our discussions. The arguments for our choice 
of criteria are described more thoroughly in our methodology in chapter 4. We 
wanted to study a (1) Norwegian (2) service company, with a clear (3) innovative 
edge and (4) long-term economic success. While trying to find a research question, 
we also worked at finding an interesting company that could serve as a unit of 
analysis in our case study. The choice of both our case company and our research 
question coincided, and our question ended up being:  
 
How does Making Waves balance exploration and exploitation? 
 
As the keen reader may have noticed, the word “service sector” is not included in our 
research question. We omitting the word “service sector” because the insights we 
gained from our study are based on empirical data from only one case company. We 
wished to be clear about the fact that the answers to our research question would be 
specific for Making Waves. Also, we decided to frame our case company in terms of 
which value configuration it had, instead of in the term service company, because the 
service sector turned out to be an imprecise definition. The choice was made after 
we had reviewed the literature and started on our analysis, and our arguments for 
doing so will be described in the following subchapter.  
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1.4 From the service sector to the value shop 
In this subchapter, we will describe our focus on the service sector in our literature 
review, and clarify what we mean by the term service company. Then we will explain 
why we chose to frame our case company in terms of its value configuration, and 
give a short overview of the concept of value configurations. Finally, we will describe 
the value shop configuration more closely. 
1.4.1 The service sector 
When reviewing the literature concerning organizational ambidexterity, we became 
especially interested in how ambidexterity manifests itself in the service sector. Many 
of the articles we read were based on production-oriented companies (Jasmand et 
al., 2012, Marabelli et al., 2012), and we wondered if the theories were transferable 
to service companies. 
 
Another reason for our interest was the fact that more companies are adopting a 
service-oriented business model, where services contribute heavily to corporate 
profit, revenue and customer satisfaction (Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003). Companies 
are reassessing their business models because of stagnating markets, growing 
commoditization and increasingly demanding customer needs (Neu and Brown, 
2008, Matthyssens and Vandenbempt, 2008). The act of moving from a product-
oriented to a service-oriented business model is known in the literature as 
servitization (Vandermerwe and Rada, 1989, Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003). We also 
find the service sector interesting because in Norway, as in many other western 
countries, the service sector employs around 75 per cent of the workforce 
(Kristiansen et al., 2009). 
 
The term service sector is used in everyday language without a clear and commonly 
understood definition. Many see the service sector as made up of all companies that 
are not in the agriculture or manufacturing industry. The classification system NACE, 
used in the European Union, provides a somewhat more specific definition. 
According to NACE, the terms "service industries", "service sectors" or simply 
"services" are generally used to refer to economic activities such as hotels, 
restaurants, transport, storage, communication, financial intermediation, real estate, 
renting and business activities (Pires et al., 2008). The English Office for National 
Statistics defines the service sector as every business where the output includes all 
non-tangible and non-commodity goods (Butler, 1998). We consider the term tertiary 
sector to be synonymous to the service sector, as it is comprised of businesses that 
produce services instead of products. 
1.4.2 Narrowing the focus 
In the process of conducting our case study, we discovered a need to classify the 
type of company we were studying in more narrow terms than the service sector, 
because our results and contribution to the theory would be relevant to everything 
from hairdressers to research institutes if we used the service sector term. If we gain 
insight that allows us to build new theory, it is essential that this theory be tested with 
new case studies. The more narrowly we categorize our case company, the easier it 
will be to compare our results with other companies within the same category. By 
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using a more specific term, we would be able to conduct a more precise analysis, 
and be more specific of the transferability of our research.  
 
There are several ways to narrow down the definition of a case company. 
Companies can for instance be classified by their size, their knowledge intensity, and 
the way in which they create value for their customer. It is common to distinguish 
between small- to medium-sized firms (SMEs) and large firms, where the limit 
between the two, most often is drawn at 250 employees. Ambidexterity has been 
researched in companies of all sizes earlier, and the SME classification is by no 
means a subcategory of the service sector. Classifying our case company by its size 
will not help us in improving our understanding of ambidexterity. 
 
We could have placed our company in the knowledge intensive category, because 
knowledge intensive companies are heavily reliant on professional knowledge, and 
involve economic activities that are intended to result in the creation, accumulation or 
dissemination of knowledge (Miles, 1996). Knowledge intensive companies often 
comprise of legal services, engineering services, accounting and auditing services, 
and some medical services (Hipp, 1999). This classification does not describe the 
operations performed within the boundaries of the company, but rather the level of 
knowledge required. Since we are studying the operations performed in our case 
company, knowledge-intensity is not an adequate categorization. 
 
The term “value configuration” distinguishes between firms by how they create value 
for their customers (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998), which means that they focus on the 
operations performed within the company boundaries. Since we wished to contribute 
to the theory of how organizations achieve ambidexterity, this categorization fits well 
with the purpose of our thesis. In the next subchapter, we will explain value 
configurations, with an emphasis on the value shop configuration. 
1.4.3 Value configurations 
Companies can be structured in different ways based on the way they deliver value 
to their customers. Such structures are called value configurations, of which there 
are three types: Value chains, value shops, and value networks. 
 
The value chain was first described by Porter (1985), as a series of activities 
performed by a company to transform resources into products. According to Porter, 
structuring the company based on the activities in the value chain was necessary to 
be successful, and the value chain quickly became a popular tool for creating 
company strategies (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). The value chain describes the 
activities in production-oriented companies well, but does not fit well for many other 
types of organizations. Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) recognized this problem and 
created the value network and the value shop configuration. 
 
A value network is a single company that is configured to mediate interactions and 
exchanges across a network of customers (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). The value 
network can be direct, as in a telephone service, or indirect, as in retail banking 
where borrowers and lenders are linked together through a common pool of funds. In 
both cases, the customers constitute a network. The value shop configuration is a 
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model for how companies mobilize resources and activities to solve problems for 
customers, to create value. In the next subchapter, we will describe the value shop in 
detail, because this is the model we consider our case company to most closely 
resemble. The reason we think so will be explained briefly in the subsequent 
subchapter, and more thoroughly in subchapter 7.2.  
1.4.4 The value shop 
Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) explain that value shops plan activities and apply 
resources in a fashion that is dimensioned to the needs of their customer’s problem. 
Good examples of the value shop model include consultancy companies within 
healthcare, law, architecture, IT and construction (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). 
Employees in such companies are often organized in business units based on a field 
of speciality, but work in project-based groups. This means that their immediate 
manager is most likely a project manager, as opposed to a line manager, which 
employees in value chain companies usually report to. Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) 
outlined five main primary activities of a value shop: 
 
Problem finding and acquisition - Recording, reviewing, and formulating the 
problem to be solved and choosing the overall approach to solving the problem. 
Problem solving - Generating and evaluating alternative solutions. 
Choice - Choosing among alternative problem solutions. 
Execution - Communicating, organizing, and implementing the chosen solution. 
Control and evaluation - Measuring and evaluating to what extent implementation 
has solved the initial problem statement. 
 
Execution is a very obvious step when solving a customer problem, because it is a 
prerequisite of any project. If one does not intend to implement the chosen solution 
there is no point in starting a project at all. Execution could perhaps have been 
grouped together with choice, rather than having its own place in the value shop 
diagram, but has been given its own place by Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998). Figure 
1.1 explains the relationship between the different steps in the value shop process. 
Infrastructure, human resource management, technology development and 
procurement are considered to be business support activities, and are the same for 
all three types of value configurations.  
 
Figure 1.1 Value shop configuration. 
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The value shop sells solutions to their customer’s problems to solve problems, which 
means that they sell a non-tangible good. Since the definition of a service company 
is every business where the output includes all non-tangible and non-commodity 
goods, a value shop is a sub category in the service sector category. Stabell and 
Fjeldstad (1998) claim that value shops rely on technology to solve a customer 
problem, and that the different steps in the value shop process can vary according to 
the requirements of the problem at hand. There is an emphasis on intensive use of 
technology in value shops that is not a part of the general service company definition. 
 
Now that we have described the value shop configuration, we will explain why we 
consider our case company, Making Waves, to have this configuration. We will also 
explain why we believe that our case company can be considered ambidextrous. 
1.5 Making Waves  
As described in the previous subchapter, we decided to narrow the focus in our 
thesis down from the broad term service sector to a value shop configuration. The 
insight from our analysis is based on a single case, and our findings could be more 
relevant by choosing a narrower category.  
 
Our case company is a consultancy company called Making Waves that sells digital 
services to a wide spectre of customers. They are technology intensive, and they put 
together different multidisciplinary project teams depending on the type of problem 
that needs to be solved. The characteristics of our case company are very similar to 
those used to describe a value shop configuration; therefore we consider our case 
company to be a value shop. A more in-depth analysis of Making Waves as a 
company with a value shop configuration will be presented in subchapter 7.2.  
 
Since we are researching how companies achieve ambidexterity, a premise for our 
case study is that our case company is ambidextrous. We consider Making Waves to 
be an ambidextrous company based on the indicator of profitability over a substantial 
amount of time, more specifically since 2001. In this thesis, we define profitability as 
the condition of yielding a financial profit or gain. As explained more thoroughly 
subchapter 3.2.2, there seems to be a consensus among innovation researchers that 
ambidexterity is required for long-term survival, and our interpretation of long-term 
survival is that a company is profitable. Making Waves has existed for 12 years with 
the same owners in a market where similar companies have come and gone at a 
high speed. We therefore believe that Making Waves can be described as an 
ambidextrous organization. If they were not, we would discover it quickly when 
analysing them according to ambidexterity criteria presented in chapter 3. Making 
Waves will be described more in detail in chapter 5 and in subchapter 7.2. 
1.6 Purpose of thesis 
Historically, ambidexterity has never been as important as it is today, due to the rapid 
technological shifts and increasingly complex organizations (Tushman and O'Reilly, 
1996). Theoretically, scholars are far from an agreement on how organizations 
should achieve the goal of ambidexterity. As Gupta et al. (2006, p.697) explain: 
“although a near consensus exists on the need for balance, there is considerably 
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less clarity on how this balance can be achieved”. Companies in the western world 
are moving from product-oriented business models to service-oriented business 
models, changing the ground rules of innovation in the process. This creates an 
interesting context for our research, and by narrowing down our scope from the 
service sector to a company with a value shop configuration, we can be more 
specific about the relevance of our findings. 
 
The purpose of our thesis has not been to directly criticize the theories of 
ambidexterity, or to create a complete framework for how companies can achieve 
this state. Our goals have been to explore how ambidexterity manifests itself in a 
Norwegian value shop configured company, and understand more about how our 
unit of analysis deals with the paradox of exploration and exploitation. Our aim is to 
contribute empirically, practically and theoretically to the field of innovation 
management, and we will briefly explain how we intend to proceed. 
 
We consider the practical implications of our research to be insights that our case 
company can use. Since our research is limited to one company, we cannot venture 
to say that our work will result in practical tips that all value shop organizations can 
make use of. But since our thesis is case specific, and has an extensive amount of 
empirical data, it may help the employees in our case company understand 
themselves better. 
 
When it comes to theoretical implications, we wish to contribute to new theory by 
linking the theory on ambidexterity from our literature study, with our empirical 
findings. In doing so, we will look for both alignments and misalignments between 
theory and empirical data that may implicate new theory. We hope to contribute to a 
discussion of the current theory by strengthening existing theory in the areas that we 
deem important, and by creating new propositions that can help fill in theoretical 
gaps. 
 
We also produced a substantial amount of empirical data, as we interviewed, 
transcribed and analysed 18 employees within our case company, and ended up with 
over 300 pages of written material. This data will hopefully expand the empirical 
database, and can be used for further research on ambidexterity.  
 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to give other researchers and stakeholders a 
better understanding of innovation within the service sector, by applying 
organizational ambidexterity as the explanatory model. Now that we have explained 
how we hope to bring value to the field of innovation management, we will continue 
with a description of our thesis structure and an illustration that will help describe how 
we combined theory and empirical data in our discussion.  
1.7 Thesis structure 
The thesis is divided into in four main parts: I) introduction, II) theory, III) 
methodology and empirical data, and IV) discussion and conclusions. Part I, and the 
corresponding chapter 1, present an introduction to give the reader an understanding 
of the historical and theoretical context of our thesis. We present the research 
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question in the same chapter, as well as a description of our case company. 
 
Part II is split into two chapters and presents an overview and discussion of the 
theory. Chapter 2 describes exploration and exploitation, and we discuss how the 
need for both creates a paradox that can be solved with ambidexterity. In chapter 3 
we present theory on ambidexterity, internal, and external approaches, as well as a 
framework with four main internal approaches to achieve ambidexterity. Each 
approach to ambidexterity is presented with a metaphor from a construction process: 
bricks, mortar, the combination of both and a builder. These metaphors are used to 
illustrate that the approaches need to be used in combination to build ambidexterity, 
which is illustrated as a house of bricks and mortar. Figure 1.2 depicts the four 
approaches, along with an illustration of the metaphor we have linked them to. These 
four approaches will be essential to our discussion in Part 4.  
 
 
Figure 1.2 Representation of approaches to ambidexterity. 
In addition to four approaches to ambidexterity, we identify interesting propositions 
that will be used to shed light on our research question. These propositions are 
illustrated as grey circles, as shown in Figure 1.3, and they will be used to explore 
our research question in part 4.  
 
Figure 1.3 Our propositions. 
Part III is divided in three chapters: 4 Methodology, 5 Case Company and 6 Empirical 
data. The methodology chapter describes how we used a method inspired by 
grounded theory to create three categories based on the empirical data from our 
interviews, which we relate to our propositions. Chapter 5 describes Making Waves 
in form of their history, business system, offices and growth. Chapter 6 presents a 
summary of our interviews based on quotes. The three empirical categories are 
presented in Figure 1.4 as rectangular boxes. These will be used to structure the 
discussion of our theoretical approaches in part IV.  
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Figure 1.4 Categories from empirical data. 
Part IV is divided into three chapters: 7 Discussion 8 Summary of propositions and 9 
Conclusion. In chapter 7, we discuss our four propositions from the theory in relation 
to our three categories from the empirical data. We discuss our findings by linking 
our empirical data against the theory. We merge our four theoretical approaches with 
our three empirical categories, and place the propositions in the matrix based on 
what subjects they cover. The theoretical approaches are illustrated as vertical 
columns, the empirical categories as horizontal columns and the propositions as grey 
circles or ellipses. Figure 1.5 shows how the theoretical and empirical categories 
were merged to create a matrix in which our propositions could be inserted, and how 
the combination of categories and propositions constituted our framework for 
discussion.  
 
In chapter 8, we summarize our discussion from chapter 7 under separate 
subchapters for each proposition, and explain the implications of our results. In 
chapter 9, we try to answer the research question based on the discussion of our 
propositions. We also suggest topics for further research, and present our case 
company with advice based on our insights from the discussion.  
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Figure 1.5 The framework for our discussion. 
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Part II 
Theory  
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2 Exploration and exploitation 
In this chapter, we will revisit the concepts of exploration and exploitation, which 
were introduced in chapter 1. We will examine both concepts separately and how 
they are related to each other. Then we will describe how pursuing both exploration 
and exploitation in the same organization creates a paradox, and how this paradox 
can be solved by the concept of ambidexterity, which we will discuss further in 
chapter 3. 
 
March (1991) started the debate on exploration and exploitation, and provided widely 
accepted definitions that we chose to use in this thesis. Exploration is the process of 
developing new products and services. It requires new competencies and is seldom 
profitable in a short time perspective (March, 1991). Exploitation is the act of using 
current knowledge to refine existing technology and processes, and companies that 
are explorative pursue a strategy of effectiveness, thus creating corporate systems to 
streamline processes (March, 1991).  
2.1 Different views on exploration and exploitation 
March’s (1991) definition of exploration and exploitation is quite broad, which leaves 
room for different viewpoints of what the concepts of exploration and exploitation 
actually constitute. There have been two main views on the concepts within the field 
of organizational theory: one seeing exploration as learning and exploitation as using 
prior knowledge, and the other seeing them as two different types of innovation. 
Supporters of the first view see exploration as an activity that has to do with learning 
and innovation, and exploitation as an activity that is carried out with a goal of using 
prior knowledge rather than learning new things (Gupta et al., 2006). 
 
Supporters of the other view claim that both exploration and exploitation have to do 
with learning and innovation. Benner and Tushman (2003) state that exploitation 
involves improvement in existing technological components and competency, while 
exploration involves a change of technological course. According to Baum et al. 
(2000), exploration is a type of learning that requires planned experimentation and 
play, and exploitation is a type of learning that is achieved by refining, selecting and 
reusing existing routines. He and Wong (2004) define explorative innovation as 
activities aimed at entering new product-market domains, and exploitative innovation 
as activities with a goal to improve performance in existing domains. 
 
Of the two different views on exploration and exploitation, we choose to side with the 
view of exploration and exploitation as two types of learning and innovation. We 
interpret March’s (1991) definitions of exploration and exploitation to entail learning 
processes. We understand exploration to be about learning how to do something 
different, and exploitation about learning how to get better at what you already know 
how to do. In both cases the activities can lead to innovations, which according to 
Bessant et al. (2005) are new additions to products or services, or changes related to 
how a product/service is created and delivered.  
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We will present exploration and exploitation in separate subchapters, and describe 
the practices and results of both. 
2.2 Exploration 
Exploration is the process of developing new ideas, products and services. Being 
explorative enables firms to reach out to new markets, a process that requires new 
competencies (March, 1991). There is a consensus in literature that exploration is 
the activity best fit for searching for new knowledge (Gupta et al., 2006). This is 
because exploration is "rooted in variance increasing activities, learning by doing, 
and trial and error" (Smith and Tushman, 2005, p.522). An exploratory strategy 
emphasizes gaining new information about alternatives, requiring an investment to 
search among uncertain alternatives. Exploration includes search, variation, risk 
taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery and innovation, and is considered 
a contradiction to exploitation (March, 1991). 
 
Exploration is connected to experimentation, divergent thinking and increasing 
variance. It is also connected to radical innovations aimed at emerging markets 
(Smith and Tushman, 2005, Jansen, 2005). According to Jansen (2005, p.17) 
"exploration involves the search for new organizational routines and the discovery of 
new approaches to technologies, businesses, processes and products". From 
Jansen’s (2005) statement, one can interpret that exploration may lead to radical 
innovations, which have to do with “doing something different” (Tidd and Bessant, 
2011). If an organization has the goal of implementing exploration in their activities, 
the organizational structure should be unconstrained, according to (O'Reilly and 
Tushman, 2004). In addition to the right structure, it is our opinion that an 
organization must have slack to be able to be explorative. We will explain why in the 
following subchapter.  
2.2.1 Being explorative 
One way of achieving exploration is the concept of "slack" (Herold et al., 2006). 
Geiger and Makri (2006, p.97) define slack as "resources available to an organization 
that are in excess of the minimum necessary to produce a given level of 
organizational output". The main idea behind organizational slack is to make time 
available for the facilitation of the innovation processes. This can make the firm able 
to absorb failure, acquire innovations and explore ideas prior to actual need (Herold 
et al., 2006). It is important to note that the question of whether slack leads to 
innovation is not agreed on in the organizational literature (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). 
Supporters claim that it allows an organization to innovate by permitting employees 
to experiment with new strategies and projects (Nohria and Gulati, 1996, p.1245). 
Opponents of slack claim that it decreases incentives to innovate, and that it results 
in undisciplined investment in R&D activities that do not pay off (Jensen, 1986). 
 
Nohria and Gulati (1996) explored the question of whether slack contributes or 
inhibits innovation. In their study, they demonstrated an inverse U-shaped 
relationship between slack and innovation. They showed that too little slack and too 
much slack are both bad for innovation (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). On one hand, one 
can risk stopping a promising project because of fiscal discipline. On the other hand, 
one can pursue someone's folly pet project because it is difficult to justify termination 
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of the innovation process (Nohria and Gulati, 1996). From our theoretical perspective 
it seems likely that both sides are partially right, and therefore we agree with the 
findings of Nohria and Gulati (1996) that indicate a certain amount of slack is good 
for innovation. The U-shaped relationship is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Slack and innovation. 
 
Real-life examples of how slack has resulted in innovation are ample. Google’s 
success is partly based on their use of slack in their organization (Manyika, 2008). 
Google has a policy called "Innovation Time Off", where they allow employees to 
spend 20 % of their time on projects of their own choosing that are company related, 
and interest them personally. Gmail and Google News are among the products that 
have emerged because of "Innovation Time Off" (Bick and Mediratta, 2007). By the 
second half of 2005, half of Google's product launches stemmed from this policy 
(Miraclemart, 2009). According to O'Reilly and Tushman (2004), exploration calls for 
more visionary and involved managers, and it also requires an organization that is 
flexible and unconstrained.  
2.2.2 Results of exploration 
Exploration involves risk, both because of the fact that explorative activities may not 
pay off, and because of the nature of the explorative activity itself. Gupta et al. (2006) 
explain that the latter risk comes from the fact that exploration activities can be self-
reinforcing, and produce a "failure trap". A failure trap is a state where failed ideas 
and initiatives only lead to more exploration in companies that are searching for the 
next big thing (Gupta et al., 2006). According to March (1995, p.432) a “failure trap” 
is when an “organization fails, tries a new direction, fails again, tries still another 
direction and so on. The process leads to an endless cycle of failure and 
exploration.”   
 
The desired result of exploration and an appropriate amount of slack is an innovative 
company. Innovation can, according to Francis and Bessant (2005), manifest itself in 
four categories: product, process, positioning or paradigm innovation. It is possible 
for a company to move from its current position to one of the four different categories 
by either incremental or radical innovations, or innovations that are somewhere at a 
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continuum between the two. Incremental innovation can be characterized by doing 
what you do better, and radical innovations are characterized by doing something 
different (Tidd and Bessant, 2011). The core of exploration is doing something 
different. Therefore, the desired result of exploration is radical innovation that 
manifests itself through new or improved products, processes, market positions or 
paradigms, which will indirectly result in economic growth, if the company is able to 
capitalize on the innovation (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2004).  
 
We have now defined exploration, and explained which organizational structure and 
which methods a company can adopt to be explorative. We have commented on the 
discourse about whether slack is good or bad for innovation, and presented both the 
negative and positive results exploration can lead to. The concept of exploration will 
be further contextualized and discussed in subchapter 2.4, but we will first present 
the concept of exploitation.  
2.3 Exploitation 
In this subchapter, we will present the concept of exploitation in the same manner as 
we did with exploration, and we will also present the first of our propositions.  
 
Exploitation is the act of exploiting current knowledge to refine existing technology 
and processes. While pursuing exploitation, a company will focus on effectiveness, 
and not flexibility, thus reducing waste and creating corporate systems to streamline 
processes (March, 1991). Exploitation includes such things as refinement, choice, 
production, efficiency, selection, implementation and execution (March, 1991). March 
(1991, p.72) describes exploitation as a choice of investment, where one 
concentrates on finding the best alternative in a group of known alternatives, as 
opposed to searching for new information about unknown alternatives. 
 
Exploitation is closely linked to Porter’s (1985, pp.12-13) generic cost leadership 
strategy where he emphasizes that "A low-cost producer must find and exploit all 
sources of cost advantage." Companies that sell commodities or generics enjoy a 
more simple and stable environment (Daft, 1995), and have embraced this type of 
exploitative activity (Anderson et al., 2009).  
 
When implementing exploitative activities, a company focuses on utilizing and 
improving existing competencies, which results in incremental innovations (Jansen, 
2005, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). These competencies can comprise of both 
tacit and explicit knowledge (Nonaka, 1994) such as skills, processes, established 
designs and distribution channels (Jansen, 2005). Jansen (2005) describes a set of 
competencies that involves tacit or explicit knowledge, but does not clarify how these 
competencies can be combined for the sake of achieving ambidexterity. March 
(1991), O'Reilly and Tushman (2004), Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) all describe 
the refinement of existing knowledge as the path to exploitation, but do not explain 
which type of knowledge, or which combination they recommend.  
 
It seems natural that a formalized and explicit definition of a company’s operations is 
necessary to exploit one’s competitive advantages, because explicit knowledge can 
make it easier to spread and exploit knowledge, thereby increasing the efficiency in a 
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company. But we have not found a description of how to deliberately combine tacit 
and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation, especially not in the context of a value 
shop configuration. On that premise, we would like to introduce our first proposition:  
 
A value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to 
achieve exploitation. 
 
In our efforts to support this proposition, we will provide a in-depth description of how 
Making Waves not only achieves exploitation, but also how they balance exploration 
and exploitation, since knowledge and learning are inextricably linked to both 
concepts.  
 
O'Reilly and Tushman (2004) claim that in order to facilitate exploitation in an 
organization, the organizational structure must be formal and constrained. This 
makes sense, when one considers March’s (1991) focus on effectiveness and 
streamlined processes in his definition of exploitation. An exploitative method that 
can supplement an organization’s initiatives towards exploitation is the concept of 
lean, which we will present in the next subchapter.  
2.3.1 Being exploitative 
Lean is a well-known method companies use to increase their exploitative efforts 
(Chen and Taylor, 2009). The main focus of the lean method is to get rid of waste by 
eliminating every process, action and resource that does not add direct value to the 
product (Skorstad, 2002). To be able to identify waste, one has to identify what the 
end-customer values (Imai, 1986, Womack and Jones, 1996). The reason for 
focusing on the end customers’ perception of value is, according to Womack and 
Jones (1996, p.141), to avoid producing "the wrong product or service in a highly 
efficient way." Other methods that have evolved in the quest for high quality 
products, at relative low cost, at the time when needed, are just-in-time (JIT) and 
total quality management (TQM) (Chen and Taylor, 2009). JIT focuses on strictly 
producing on the basis of real, and not predicted, demand, and TQM concerns the 
continuous improvement of product or processes (Chen and Taylor, 2009). 
 
Lean originates from the automobile industry in Japan in the 1950s, and serves as 
part of the explanation for Japan’s growing share of the global car market from the 
fifties to the late eighties (Skorstad, 2002). While the US share of the automobile 
market shrunk from 50 % to 25 %, the Japanese share increased from 1,4 % to 
approximately 28 % (Skorstad, 2002). In order for an organization to implement 
exploitation, the organizational structure should be formal and mechanistic, and the 
management should lead with authority (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2004). 
2.3.2 Results of exploitation 
Exploitation is closely linked to what Tidd and Bessant (2011) call incremental 
innovation, which is an innovation type characterized by “doing what you do better”. It 
is expected that the result of exploitation is incremental innovations in form of 
improved or adjusted products, processes, market positions or paradigms, which 
again will result in a greater profit (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2004).  
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Exploitation has brought about substantial profits for many of the companies that 
employ it, at least in short term cycles (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996), but it involves a 
risk of creating a "success trap" (Gupta et al., 2006). A success trap is what happens 
when a company achieves early success based on effectiveness improvements, and 
in turn increases its emphasis on exploitation (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). In the 
long run, a company that only emphasizes on exploitation can develop a structural 
and cultural inertia that can prevent the company from reacting to technological shifts 
(Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). Another potential negative consequence of 
implementing lean is that creativity may unintentionally be crushed (Chen and Taylor, 
2009). Chen and Taylor (2009, p.826) remark: "This is especially true when the lean 
philosophy is applied to be the only way that organizations think and manage". 
 
In this subchapter, we have described exploitation, and the methods and structures 
that can be used to achieve it. We have also presented some of the positive and 
negative outcomes of exploitation. The next subchapter will describe how exploration 
and exploitation can co-exist in the same organization. But first, we will summarize 
our main points from both subchapter 2.2 and subchapter 2.3 by presenting Table 
2.1, where we juxtapose exploration and exploitation, according to the most central 
themes in our discussion: 
 
Table 2.1 Overview of key points related to exploration and exploitation. 
 Exploration Exploitation 
Structure Unconstrained Formal and constrained 
Method Slack Lean 
Possible positive 
outcome 
A radical innovation and 
subsequent economic growth 
Incremental innovation that result 
in lower cost and greater profit  
Possible negative 
consequences 
Failure trap Success trap 
 
2.4 The coexistence of exploration and exploitation 
As discussed in the two previous subchapters, both exploration and exploitation can 
lead to innovation, but it is disadvantageous for a company to only focus on one of 
the two activities. Organizations that are too focused on exploration end up with too 
many undeveloped new ideas, and lacking a distinctive competence (March, 1991), 
which is called the failure trap. On the other hand, organizations that solely engage in 
exploitation are likely to find themselves trapped in suboptimal stable equilibriums 
(March, 1991), called the success trap. It is therefore essential to achieve a proper 
balance between exploration and exploitation in all organizations (He and Wong, 
2004).  
 
Since both exploration and exploitation can have negative results if they are pursued 
to the extreme, scholars have grappled with the question of what the right amount of 
exploration and exploitation is. They have also discussed whether exploration and 
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exploitation can exist in the same organization, and there are two main views on this 
matter. The first view is that exploration and exploitation are mutually exclusive, and 
the choice between the two is considered a trade-off, and companies must choose to 
pursue either exploration or exploitation. The second viewpoint is that the existence 
of exploration and exploitation together creates a paradox, where they are seen as 
mutually exclusive entities that can exist simultaneously in the same organization.  
2.4.1 Exploration and exploitation as a trade-off or a paradox 
Exploration is captured by terms such as search, risk-taking, experimentation, and 
innovation; exploitation, on the other hand, is associated with refinement, efficiency, 
selection, and execution (March, 1991). March (1991) describes the relationship 
between the two processes as conflicting, to the point where it is almost impossible 
for both to exist in the same organization, because they have contradictory goals, 
require different organizational contexts, and compete for scarce resources. The 
relationship between the exploration and exploitation is a type of zero-sum game 
where both activities compete for managerial attention, scarce resources, and 
organizational routines; therefore, logic dictates that exploration and exploitation 
should be viewed as two ends of a continuum (March, 1991).  
 
Scholars have often presented strategy as a set of choices where the best choice is 
the one that leads to greatest economic surplus (Martin, 2007). A classic example is 
Porter’s (1985) generic strategy model, where he draws a clear distinction between 
cost and differentiation as two paths that lead to competitive advantage. Porter 
(1985) claims that a company must choose one or the other, which means that a 
company should either aim to be cost effective or pursue a differentiation strategy 
where they attempt to compete on other factors than price. This view is in 
accordance to March’s (1991) view on exploration and exploitation, as he sees the 
choice between cost and differentiation as a trade-off.  
 
However, scholars have increasingly recognized the importance of simultaneously 
balancing seemingly contradictory choices. They have begun to shift their focus from 
trade-off (either/or) to paradoxical (both/and) thinking, and increasingly view 
exploration and exploitation as a paradox (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, Earley and 
Gibson, 2002, Lewis, 2000). The leading consensus among scholars is that 
exploration and exploitation can be seen as orthogonal constructs that can coexist 
within organizations (Baum et al., 2000, Beckman et al., 2004). The emergence of 
this perspective is associated with the development of the concept ambidexterity 
(Nemanich and Vera, 2009), which we will explain in chapter 3. We will now present 
the paradoxical view, and how paradoxes can be solved in general. 
2.4.2 Paradoxes 
A paradox is the existence of two truths which separately appear logical, based on 
sound arguments, but that contradict each other. Paradoxes have a range of sub-
categories, where logical and rhetorical paradoxes are among the oldest and best 
known. An example is the logical paradox The Liar from 400 B.C., which states: "I 
always lie". The statement seems both true and false at the same time, and it has 
puzzled great philosophers such as Aristotle and Wittgenstein. It has provided a 
basis for thought exploration and theory development through history (Poole and van 
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de Ven, 1989). Poole and van de Ven (1989, p.564) state that "because theory 
building is a discursive enterprise, rhetorical strategies of handling paradoxes 
effectively are a central concern". This statement gives an argument for why the 
paradox of exploration and exploitation is interesting to study, given its status as an 
organizational paradox.  
 
Organizational paradoxes are increasingly popular as basis for new theory 
development (Lewis, 2000) because the theoretical discourses they form, present 
possibilities of a richer form of understanding, instead of assuming that every 
problem has an "either-or-solution" (Poole and van de Ven, 1989). Today's scholars 
see strategy as exploring opportunities provided by the tension and complexity of 
conflicting options (Poole and van de Ven, 1989, Martin, 2007). Paradoxes represent 
two sides of the same coin without any preferred end-point, as one gets with 
dilemmas or trade-offs (Lewis, 2000). 
2.4.3 The paradox of exploration and exploitation   
Lean manufacturing is an example of exploitation, as it  has to do with reducing cost 
by making processes within the company more efficient. When using lean 
manufacturing, everything that does not add value to the intended task, aptly named 
"waste", is removed (Imai, 1986). Exploration, on the other hand, requires "waste", or 
slack, in the form of extra time to work on things that do not necessarily lead to 
instant value, and spare resources to fuel creative processes and new thinking. 
 
Exploration and exploitation stand as two opposites that are well defined, well 
reasoned and well supported alternative explanations of mind-sets that lead to 
success (Poole and van de Ven, 1989). They are simultaneously true, because both 
mind-sets can lead to economic surplus, and are mutually exclusive since they 
require contradicting competencies (De Wit and Meyer, 2010). There seems to be no 
way to integrate both activities in an organization. This fact, along with the consensus 
in literature about the importance of balancing exploration and exploitation in 
organizations (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), creates a paradox. Improving on 
capabilities required for exploration reduces the capabilities required for exploitation, 
and vice versa. Therefore, if a company is to implement both exploration and 
exploitation, there will arise a problem of structuring and managing the company 
efficiently.  
2.4.4 Solving the paradox 
Poole and van de Ven (1989) did not only emphasize the importance of paradoxes in 
gaining a new and deeper understanding, but also presented a framework for how to 
handle them. The framework offers four methods for tackling a paradox: opposition, 
spatial separation, temporal separation and synthesis. Opposition is to acknowledge 
the paradox and appreciate its opposing aspects. In our case, opposition would be to 
acknowledge the tension created by exploration and exploitation. The second and 
third method involves some form of separation, either in time (temporal) or space 
(spatial). The last approach, synthesis, is defined as a new level of understanding 
that is achieved by joining together the contrasts of the paradox, not as a 
compromise, but as a coherent whole. See Table 2.2 for a compilation of the four 
methods.  
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Table 2.2 Synthesis of paradox, inspired by Poole and van de Ven (1989) 
Opposition Keep A and B separate and their contrasts appreciated. 
Spatial separation Situate A and B at two different levels or locations in the social world. 
Temporal 
separation 
Separate A and B temporally (in time) in the same location. 
Synthesis Find some new perspective which eliminates the opposition between 
A and B. 
 
The term ambidexterity, which is the focal point of our thesis, could be viewed as 
representation of a synthesis. Ambidexterity is defined as an organization’s ability to 
balance both exploration and exploitation (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008), which 
means that ambidexterity is the solution for the paradox of exploration and 
exploitation. Ambidexterity will be described in full in chapter 3. 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we have explained the concepts of exploration and exploitation. We 
have used March’s (1991) definition of the two concepts, and described the different 
views that exist in the literature. Exploration is the process of developing new ideas, 
services or products, and it can lead to radical innovations if the conditions are right. 
Exploitation can lead to incremental innovation, and it is the act of exploiting current 
knowledge to refine existing technology, products and processes. Our discussion of 
the concept of exploitation led to our first proposition: A value shop deliberately 
combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation. Exploration and 
exploitation require very different company configurations, and it therefore seems 
impossible that a company can do both. Yet, every company must do so in order to 
survive in the long run, which institutes a paradox.  
 
In the next chapter, we will discuss the concept of ambidexterity, which is a way to 
solve the paradox of exploration and exploitation. Ambidexterity is the central topic in 
our case study research, therefor it will also feature in our discussion in chapter 7. 
  
 27 
  
 
3 Ambidexterity 
In the previous chapter, we explained the concepts of exploration, exploitation, and 
how a company that is able to do both is exercising organizational ambidexterity. In 
this chapter, we will present a definition of ambidexterity and explain how 
ambidexterity can lead to success, and which approaches an organization can apply 
to achieve ambidexterity. We will identify interesting themes from the theory such as 
possible gaps, and possibilities of strengthening existing claims. When we identify 
such areas of interest, we will create related propositions that will be used to explore 
our research question.   
 
We will focus on internal approaches to ambidexterity, which are approaches that are 
used within the boundaries of the organization. We have divided the internal 
approaches into four subcategories, and we have created a metaphor that explains 
the connection between them. The metaphor is created to help the reader 
understand how the four approaches can be used together to achieve ambidexterity.  
3.1 Definitions 
Duncan (1976) was among the first to use the term ambidexterity, and he defined it 
as a company’s ability to deal with the tensions that arise from managing both 
exploratory and exploitative innovation in the same organization (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). Tushman and O'Reilly published the first comprehensive study on 
ambidexterity in 1996. According to the two authors, ambidextrous organizations are 
defined by their ability to implement both evolutionary and revolutionary change, or 
exploration and exploitation (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). 
  
According to Lubatkin et al. (2006), ambidextrous organizations are capable of 
simultaneous, yet contradictory, knowledge management processes, exploiting 
current competencies and exploring new domains with equal dexterity. Gupta et al. 
(2006) describes ambidextrous organizations as capable of managing both 
exploration and exploitation synchronously. A more recent definition of organizational 
ambidexterity is presented by Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008), who define it as an 
organization’s ability to be aligned and efficient in its management of today’s 
business demands while simultaneously being adaptive to changes in the 
environment. The consensus in the innovation research community is that one can 
define companies that pursue two types of disparate things simultaneously as 
ambidextrous organizations (Benner and Tushman, 2003, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004, Gupta et al., 2006, He and Wong, 2004). 
3.2 Ambidexterity and performance 
From when the concept of ambidexterity was introduced as a subject in 
organizational theory, it has been a common understanding that ambidexterity leads 
to long-term success in organizations (March, 1991, Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). In 
subchapter 3.2.1, we will describe the need for ambidexterity with a metaphor of 
evolution, and in subchapter 3.2.2, we will present the large-scale empirical studies 
that have strengthened March’s (1991) claims. Only recently have some scholars 
started to question if ambidexterity is always the answer, and we will present these 
questions in subchapter 3.2.2 along with our own thoughts on the matter.  
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3.2.1 The metaphor of evolution 
Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) use a metaphor of evolution when they describe why 
ambidexterity is a prerequisite for long-term survival. We feel that metaphor of 
evolution is very descriptive, and wish to present our version of as it can lead to 
better understanding.  
 
Companies can be compared to a specimans fighting for survival in an environment 
characterized by gradual and disruptive changes. In the same way as living 
organisms, organizations must also evolve and change as a result of changes in their 
environment. In evolutionary biology changes in the environment and the genetic 
variation in a species will result in natural selection. The best-fit specimen will survive, 
and the species as a whole will change in tune with their environment. An example of 
natural selection is the thirteen species of finches living on the Galapagos Islands, 
who all have developed different beaks according to their preferred diets. It is 
important to stress the fact that this is not because individual finches’ beaks gradually 
changed in their lifetime, but that the finches with specific beaks were better at 
exploiting their environment, and therefore had a larger chance of surviving and 
passing on their genes. 
  
There are, however, certain times when the rules of natural selection do not apply. 
When extreme events take place, like forest fires, earthquakes or meteor showers, 
the game changes. Let’s say there was a type of finch that had a beak that made 
them efficient at eating nuts from a particular thorny tree, and a forest fire kills off the 
thorny trees that the nut-eating finches were reliant on. This could result in a situation 
where the nut-eating capability does not give the finches an advantage, but instead 
the capability to find worms is the trait that will most likely lead to survival. If this was 
an actual event, and a particular finch species could not adapt to the sudden change, 
they would have become extinct. 
  
If one were to draw a parallel between organizational evolution and natural evolution, 
one can compare the gradual adaption of a species to its environment to 
organizations pursuing exploitation by constantly getting a bit better at what they 
already know how to do. Sudden changes can also occur in an organizational 
context, such as technological shifts, a financial crisis or a revolution. In these 
situations, the organizations that can adapt to the new situation the fastest and in the 
best manner have the best chances of surviving. And in order to be able to adapt fast, 
a company must pursue explorative activities.  
3.2.2 Theoretical discourse on the benefits of ambidexterity 
Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) stated that ambidexterity is a requirement for an 
organization that wishes to be successful over time. Several other scholars have 
since argued the connection between a company’s ambidexterity and its long-term 
success. They claim that companies that are aligned and efficient in their 
management of today’s business demands while simultaneously adapt to changes in 
the environment, will prosper in the long run (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, 
Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996).  
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Several scholars criticized March (1991) and Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) due to the 
fact that they had little empirical data to strengthen their theories on ambidexterity 
(Raisch et al., 2009). As a result, various large-scale empirical studies have been 
conducted, and they provide evidence of the positive correlation between 
ambidexterity and long-term survival. He and Wong (2004) conducted a survey of 
innovation behaviours and performance of product-oriented companies, and found 
support for the hypothesis “There is a positive interaction effect between explorative 
and exploitative innovation strategies on firm performance”. Gibson and Birkinshaw 
(2004) did a study at the business unit level by asking a large sample of individuals 
from 41 different companies to rate the business units they work in. They 
hypothesized that  “The higher the level of ambidexterity in a business unit, the 
higher the level of performance”, which they found support for. Lubatkin et al. (2006) 
focused their attention on small to medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and they use 
multi source survey data to find support for their hypothesis “The extent to which 
SMEs pursue an ambidextrous orientation is positively associated with their 
subsequent relative performance.” 
  
It is important to note that if a company does not wish to achieve long-term success, 
ambidexterity may not be essential. An example could be a company selling Justin 
Bieber t-shirts. Such a company grabs an opportunity to sell a wildly popular product 
without spending money on research and development (R&D). If they had spent 
resources on R&D this may have led to new products they could profit from once the 
teen idol loses his popularity. At some point down the road, they will not be able to 
sell more t-shirts and may have to shut down their business. But such a company 
may view the downside of not having a future revenue stream due to exploration to 
be balanced out by the opportunity to profit quickly from a product that will be in high 
demand for a short period of time.  
  
One should keep in mind that ambidextrous organizations can also be unsuccessful. 
Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) used the two large American companies IBM and 
Sears as an example to illustrate this point. In the 1990s, both organizations pursued 
exploration and exploitation simultaneously, but were facing serious losses in market 
shares and profits. Tushman and O'Reilly (1996) accredited this to the fact that both 
companies had cultures that were inward looking and resistant to change due to 
previous successes. The two authors summarized their article by stating the 
importance of organizational culture, linking it to short term success and long-term 
failure if not managed correctly. Other authors have questioned the predominant 
view that ambidexterity gives performance benefits. Lin et al. (2007, p.1645) sought 
to explore the theoretical boundaries of ambidexterity. They found support for their 
hypothesis that “an ambidextrous formation of alliances benefits large firms, and a 
focused formation of either exploratory or exploitative alliances benefits small firms”. 
Other findings also indicate that the ambidexterity approach may need to vary with 
different firm sizes and industry environments (Park et al., 2002, Van Looy et al., 
2005). 
  
The claim that small companies may not benefit from an ambidextrous approach is 
reasonable. The way we see it, some companies may not have the extra resources 
to allow slack and exploration in their organization, and must therefore only focus on 
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exploitation. Examples of such companies can be small start-ups with few people 
and limited funding. Our opinion is that such companies can still survive in the short-
term, but must eventually include exploration in their operations if they wish to be a 
long-term player in the market. By claiming this, we indirectly agree that not all 
companies are ambidextrous. A company might not be ambidextrous because they 
do not have the resources to focus on both exploration and exploitation, but this can 
also be because they can rely on external actors to supply either exploration or 
exploitation.  
 
Companies have the option of relying on external actors to perform exploration and 
exploitation activities for them, external actors being other companies in their 
organizational network (Gupta et al., 2006). A short discussion of the organizational 
network is required to understand this statement. Håkansson and Snehota (1989, 
p.187) claimed that  “No business is an island”, and by that they mean that an 
organization’s environment is constituted by a set of other active organizations, and 
that the result of interactions and exchanges between the different organizations 
creates relationships (Håkansson and Snehota, 1989). This means that some 
companies can achieve ambidexterity by specializing on either exploration or 
exploitation, and outsourcing the remaining activity to other companies in their 
network (Gupta et al., 2006).  
  
Although some companies may not wish to, or benefit from, being ambidextrous, the 
consensus in organizational literature points towards the fact that ambidexterity 
results in better performance in the long run. This consensus will be a basis for our 
discussion, and we will now proceed to an explanation of the strategy process and 
organizational roles. This will serve as a starting point for our explanation of how a 
company can achieve ambidexterity.  
3.3 Achieving ambidexterity  
The basis for achieving any organizational goal is to create a plan, or a strategy, that 
describes the steps that need to be taken in order to achieve the goal. This 
subchapter will describe the strategy process that serves as the basis for achieving 
any goal, be it ambidexterity or anything else. We will also describe the different roles 
within an organization, and elaborate on which roles are viewed as most responsible 
for achieving ambidexterity. Finally, we will discuss how ambidexterity can be 
achieved in a company with a value shop configuration.  
3.3.1 Ambidexterity as a result of a strategy process 
Organizational ambidexterity can be achieved by pure chance, or as the result of a 
devised strategy. According to Mintzberg and Waters (1985), strategies can be either 
deliberate or emergent. This means that if an organization has a clear goal of 
achieving ambidexterity, they must decide which type of strategy process they wish 
to use.  
 
Deliberate strategies often include an explicit and documented plan of action, and 
they provide a clear sense of direction, commitment to the course of action, optimal 
resource allocation and easy coordination of all strategic initiatives into a coherent 
pattern (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
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An emergent strategy, on the other hand, comes into existence along the way. 
Strategies will emerge from exploring and learning and thus the strategy will be 
shaped in an iterative process of thinking and doing (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
An emergent strategy allows an organization to make use of opportunities as they 
emerge, and to learn by experimenting, running pilot projects and trial runs. An 
emergent strategy provides managers with open minds, and avoids a situation where 
the organization is locked in a pre-set course of action (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
Figure 3.1 shows the process of creating strategies. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Strategy formation (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). 
At first glance, one can be tempted to draw parallels between deliberate and 
emergent strategy formation and exploration and exploitation. One can compare 
exploration to the emergent strategy formation, due to the focus on experimentation 
and opportunism. Exploitation can be compared to deliberate strategizing, since this 
type of strategy formation is focused around optimization and direction. But from our 
understanding, both exploration and exploitation have to do with learning and 
innovation, albeit at different dimensions. This may mean that both activities can 
more easily be accomplished in an organization that strategizes emergently. 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) explained that deliberate and emergent strategies 
created a tension, and that no strategy was purely deliberate or emergent, but a mix 
of both.  
 
Now that we have explained how ambidexterity can arise from a deliberate or 
emergent strategy process, we will discuss which roles in the organization that are 
responsible for carrying through the strategies to achieve ambidexterity.  
3.3.2 The roles responsible for ambidexterity 
According to the pioneers within the field of ambidexterity, Tushman and O'Reilly 
(1996), managers acts as architects of their organizations, and are responsible for 
designing their units in ways that best fit their strategic challenges. Recent papers 
have added that management at all levels has a responsibility for achieving 
ambidexterity (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009, Probst et al., 2011). 
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The classic view of a manager was described in the first half of the 20th century by 
Henry Fayol as a person that plans, organizes, commands, coordinates, and controls 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976). His view was later challenged by Henry Mintzberg, who 
portrayed managers in terms of a typology of roles instead, and concluded that the 
manager's job consisted of many brief and disjointed episodes with people inside and 
outside the organization (Mintzberg et al., 1976).  
 
Kotter (2001) provides a more recent definition of management. In his opinion, 
management has to do with coping with complexity, and good management brings 
order and consistency to key features, like quality and profitability of products. 
Managers tackle complexity by planning and budgeting, and they use organizing and 
staffing to reach their goals. Kotter (2001) makes a point of separating the concept of 
leadership from the concept of management, stating that leadership is about coping 
with change. In order to lead an organization through change a leader must set a 
direction by developing a vision and a strategy. A leader aligns people by 
communicating a vision to those who can understand the it, and commit to achieving 
the new strategies. A military analogy can be used to emphasize this point: During 
peace an army can survive with good management coupled with good leadership at 
the top. In war times however an army needs leadership at all levels (Kotter, 2001). 
For the sake of simplicity, in this thesis we will use the term manager for all levels of 
management independent of the types of tasks they do. 
 
Although the idea of ambidextrous organizations is far from novel, the concept of 
management in ambidextrous organizations has not been widely elaborated on 
(Rosing et al., 2011). In order to achieve ambidexterity, a manager must embrace the 
tensions between the old and the new and encourage a state of creative conflict 
(Tushman et al., 2011). Managers must balance current and new activities, combine 
short-term and long-term thinking and create engaging visions while at the same time 
staying focused on execution (Probst et al., 2011). 
  
Today’s scholars have built a consensus around that fact that managing the paradox 
between exploration and exploitation is a responsibility not only of top management 
but also across all organizational levels (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009, Probst et al., 
2011). According to Probst et al. (2011) an organization needs leaders that embrace 
ambidexterity and that have an ambidextrous mind-set. This applies to all leaders 
from top management, middle management and lower level management to 
managers of support functions such as human resource (HR) management, 
procurement management and infrastructure management. Figure 3.2 illustrates the 
view that Probst et al. (2011) presented on which roles are responsible for 
ambidexterity. 
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Figure 3.2 Ambidextrous leadership (Probst et al., 2011). 
In a paper concerning ambidextrous leadership, Probst et al. (2011) discussed the 
related challenges for all management levels involved in the process. The two 
authors claimed that top management were responsible for granting their 
subordinates enough autonomy to explore opportunities, while at the same time 
mobilizing resources to support new business activities (Probst et al., 2011). The 
responsibility of middle management is to lead new business activities by creating 
engaging visions, and staying focused on the execution at the same time (Probst et 
al., 2011). Line managers contribute with different complementary capabilities, such 
as task, expertise and social capabilities. They must embrace these differences and 
act together in order to achieve ambidexterity (Probst et al., 2011). HR managers 
help achieve ambidexterity by focusing on three people-related domains: hiring and 
selecting the right people, training and development of staff and performance 
appraisal and reward systems (Probst et al., 2011).  
 
Although the Probst et al. (2011) model for ambidextrous leadership seems logical, 
we believe that it is more fitting for a product-oriented company than a value shop. 
We have created our own model for ambidextrous leadership that we believe 
describes the roles responsible for ambidexterity in value shops better. The layers in 
our model consist of the CEO at the top, then top management, middle management 
and project management. 
 
We believe that the CEO is important in a value shop, due to the fact that the rest of 
the management structure is not as stable as it is in product-oriented companies. 
Employees are assigned to new project managers with every new project, which 
results in changing management structure based on the in and outflow of projects. 
The CEO may have a more important role as a symbolic leadership figure that unites 
the company when the rest of the management structure fluctuates. We have 
therefore placed the CEO at the top of our own ambidextrous leadership model. The 
next step of our ambidextrous leadership model is top management, because it 
seems logical this level of management must exist in any type of company, 
regardless of the value configuration. After top management comes middle 
management, also an expected layer of management in any organization of a certain 
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size. The middle management in value shops often manages a department with 
knowledge workers of the same background. Their responsibility is to act as resource 
managers, and make sure that their employees are sourced to different projects.  
 
Value shops often operate as consultancy companies, and try to keep costs down by 
having a small HR department, often consisting of only one person. Therefore we 
have removed the HR management layer from the model, and substituted it with 
project management instead. Value shops often have project-based groups 
consisting of multidisciplinary teams. Project managers in such groups are 
responsible for getting a project done on time, and are therefore responsible for 
balancing exploration and exploitation in each project. Our model for ambidexterity is 
illustrated as Figure 3.3 below.  
Figure 3.3 Ambidextrous leadership in value shop organizations.  
We have discussed the roles that are responsible for ambidexterity, and made our 
own model for ambidextrous leadership, inspired by Probst et al. (2011) model. In 
our opinion the CEO in a value shop is of great importance, and the project 
managers are responsible for balancing exploration and exploitation in specific 
projects. Although there is a consensus that all levels of management are 
responsible for achieving ambidexterity, there are few specific frameworks that 
describe how the responsibility is distributed among the different levels of 
management. This is an interesting question that will eventually lead out to a 
proposition in subchapter 3.5.4. Before we get to the specific approaches to 
ambidexterity we will continue this chapter with a discussion on how ambidexterity 
can be achieved in a value shop.  
3.3.3 Achieving ambidexterity in value shops 
In the previous subchapter we explained how we created our own model for 
ambidextrous leadership that depicted the different roles in a value shop organization. 
In this subchapter we will discuss how ambidexterity can be achieved in value shops, 
and if the paradox of exploration and exploitation is different in such companies 
compared to product oriented companies. We will discuss how ambidexterity may be 
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more difficult to understand in companies with a value shop configuration, and 
introduce a proposition related to the value shops relationship with its customers.  
 
Jasmand et al. (2012) emphasize that the concept of ambidexterity is not limited to 
certain companies, such as those product-oriented physical goods. They argue that 
ambidexterity can easily be used to describe the need for handling conflicting 
immediate and long time profit goals in any organization. The specific problems may 
be different in service companies as opposed to product-oriented companies, but the 
fundamental dilemma of balancing two contradictory goals the are same (Jasmand et 
al., 2012). Most authors that discuss ambidexterity in different types of organizations 
use the term service sector, but since we have focused on a subsection of the 
service sector, the value shop, we will use this term from now on. Ambidexterity in 
value shops might not be as easy to understand as in companies selling products 
that have been created in a value chain process, or product-oriented companies as 
we have decided to name this type of company. Product-oriented companies can 
easily separate the process of improving existing products and inventing completely 
new ones, value shop companies cannot.  
  
There is a clear separation between process innovation and product innovation in the 
literature on ambidexterity (Marabelli et al., 2012). Process innovation relates to 
production and delivery processes of a good or service, and is mostly an internal 
innovation. Product innovation is externally driven by customer demand and market 
needs (Marabelli et al., 2012). Just like product-oriented companies, value shops 
need to improve and reduce the cost of their services, or develop new services, to 
remain competitive. The biggest difference between exploration and exploitation in 
value shops and product-oriented companies is that separating process innovation 
and product innovation in the service sector considerably more difficult.  
 
A value shop’s products are the services they offer, which means that the product is 
often tightly linked to the process that consists of creating and delivering the service 
(Miles, 1996). An example can be when a consulting company creates a new 
strategy for a customer. The product is the new strategy, and the process is the 
creation of the new strategy. The production and delivery of the strategy is also a 
part of the product. This makes the difference between process innovation and 
product innovation in the service sector ambiguous (Miles, 1996). Thus, applying the 
theories developed for product-oriented companies to value shop organizations 
requires consideration as to whether separating process innovation and product 
innovation is necessary.  
  
Jasmand et al. (2012) do not argue for a need to separate process innovation and 
product innovation. They simply point out that value shops have two conflicting goals: 
(1) An inherent goal of selling as much as possible per sales staff, because a 
salesman spending less time per sale generates a larger revenue for the company. 
(2) A need to provide service to customers, both in the process of selling and support 
later on. Customer service is generally considered to increase customer satisfaction, 
and it increases the probability of repeat sales and sale of additional products or 
services, thus a way to get to goal (1) (Jasmand et al., 2012). 
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By pursuing goal (2), the company will have to spend resources on activities that 
may not pay off immediately, and thus conflict with goal (1), but may ultimately lead 
to increased sales. This is basically the paradox of ambidexterity, where the pursuit 
of either goal reduces the ability to reach the other, but both must be attained to 
reach the overall goal. One may argue that the principles of ambidexterity are not 
exactly the same for product-oriented companies and value shop companies, as one 
can study organizations at micro level and find many differences in for instance 
organizational structure and daily tasks. But such differences will surely be present 
between individual product-oriented companies as well. The main principles are the 
same for value shops as for other types of companies. The value shop organization 
described by Jasmand et al. (2012) has to balance short term and long-term profit 
goals to reach an overall goal of success, which is the same principle that applies to 
product-oriented organizations.  
 
The two conflicting goals that Jasmand et al. (2012) describe are related to a service 
organization's relationship with it’s customers. Marabelli et al. (2012) also draw 
attention to customer relationships when they state that product innovation is driven 
by customer demand. Miles (1996) claim that the difference between product and 
process innovation is ambiguous, which could mean that process innovation is also 
driven by customer demand. It seems as though value shops achieve explorative 
and exploitative innovation through the projects they get through their customers, 
because the customer projects directly affect what the value shop employees work 
with. Before we present a proposition that can help us understand more about value 
shops and their customers we will elaborate on this subject.  
 
If a customer has a project that involves a great deal of exploration for the value shop, 
it would only seem natural that the value shop, is explorative while working on the 
project. An example can be if a customer wants a special type of IT system that a 
value shop has not created before. If the value shop wins the tender and takes on 
the project, the people working on the project will be working with exploration. If a 
customer wants a standard IT system that a value shop has created before the 
project will involve more exploitative activities, because the value shop is essentially 
working with, and learning to do, what they already know how to do better. We find 
the possibility that value shops achieve ambidexterity through their customer 
relationships interesting, and we have created a proposition that can help us 
understand more about this. The proposition reads:  
 
Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with new and 
existing customers.  
 
We must emphasize on the point that we do not consider the customer relationship 
to be an external approach in achieving ambidexterity. We do not focus on how the 
value shop comes in contact with its customer, how they win tenders by competing in 
the market or how they achieve ambidexterity in collaboration with the external 
customers. Rather we focus on how value shops achieve ambidexterity through their 
customers, by looking at what happens when the tender is won and the project is 
internalized in the value shop. Since the relationship with the customer is built after 
the value shop has internalized the project we view the process as internal.  
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In this subchapter we have discussed the general strategy process as a basis for 
achieving ambidexterity, the roles we believe are responsible for making this happen, 
and how ambidexterity may play out in value shops. We have also presented a 
proposition that addresses how value shops can achieve ambidexterity through their 
customers. From this point we will continue to explain approaches a company can 
use to achieve ambidexterity, but from here the approaches will be presented in a 
more structured manner. We will start by explaining how we distinguish external and 
internal approaches, then present the external approaches briefly before we continue 
with an in-depth description of our focus area: the internal approaches.  
3.4 Structuring the approaches to ambidexterity 
In order to present the approaches to ambidexterity in a orderly fashion we have 
decided to categorize them in two main approaches, and then focus more specifically 
on the internal approaches. The reason we focus on internal approaches is because 
of our case study design, and the fact that our unit of analysis comprise of one 
company. Our design makes it difficult to analyse the external approaches, because 
that would require a larger scope and more resources.  
 
The two main categories we have created are called external and internal 
approaches. External approaches are achieved by activities performed outside of the 
organizational boundaries, and our definition of organizational boundaries will be 
presented further down in the text. We will continue with a short presentation of the 
external approaches before we introduce the internal approaches. The reason we 
present the external approaches first is because the internal approaches are more 
important to our thesis, and will be more thoroughly discussed.  
 
External approaches entail looking outward beyond the organizational boundary to 
achieve ambidexterity. Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) claimed that companies had a 
tendency to look inwards to find solutions to the challenges they encounter, by using 
the knowledge that already exists in the organization. They called for a new 
perspective that went beyond local search, and included the use of knowledge that 
could be found externally. They proposed a model that included both internal and 
external search approaches, and explained the difference between the two with the 
following model.  
 
 
Figure 3.4 Organizational boundary spanning (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). 
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In Figure 3.4, four types of innovation are generated by determining whether the 
technology used to innovate is external or internal to the company, and whether the 
technology is similar to what the company already uses or distant (Rosenkopf and 
Nerkar, 2001). Local innovation has to do with using technology that exists within the 
firm, and radical innovation builds upon technology that resides outside of the firm 
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 2001). Internal boundary-spanning innovation integrates 
technology from different domain, but within the same organization, such as from a 
different business unit. External boundary-spanning innovation integrates technology 
from its own technology domain, but from other organizations (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 
2001). Both radical and external-boundary spanning approaches involve innovating 
by going outside of the organizational boundaries. Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) 
have a techno-centric approach in their description of external and internal 
approaches, but we believe that this model can relate to innovation that is not 
technology related as well. We therefore choose to interpret the model in terms of 
innovation in general, and view local innovation as something that has to do with 
using knowledge or technology that the company already has. Radical innovation is 
seen as using knowledge or technology that resides outside of the organizational 
boundaries. Internal and external boundary spanning activities have to do with using 
knowledge or technology that is internal but from a different department, or external 
but similar to the department, respectively. We will focus on the innovation activities 
that are carried out internally, and to be clear about what “outside” of the organization 
means a discussion of organizational boundaries follows.  
 
Ambidexterity can be achieved outside of the organization’s boundaries by external 
approaches, or inside of the organization by internal approaches. Since the focus of 
our thesis is a single company, we will restrict ourselves to focus on what happens 
within the boundaries of the organization. Santos and Eisenhardt (2005) define the 
organizational boundary as a demarcation between the organization and its 
environment. An organization is according to the Oxford Dictionary “an organized 
group of people with a particular purpose, such as a business or government 
department” (Oxford Dictionary, 2013). Anyone who is not a member of the 
organization is therefore considered as a part of the organizations environment. But it 
can be difficult to draw a clear line, especially for companies that collaborate closely 
with actors in their network. Without going deeper into the discussion of what 
constitutes a organization, we will present a figure inspired by De Wit and Meyer 
(2010) to explain how we see the organization, and where we draw the line. We have 
made adjustments to De Wit and Meyers figure to make it representable for a 
organization with a value shop configuration. Figure 3.5 describes the different levels 
of organization where a strategy can be implemented. 
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Figure 3.5 The levels of strategy (inspired by De Wit and Meyer, 2010) 
We see ambidexterity as a result of a strategy process, and believe that a strategy 
can be created and implemented at different levels in an organization. For a value 
shop organization strategy can be implemented at the project group, business unit 
and company level. It can also be implemented at the network level. From our 
theoretical perspective a group of companies can have a strategy together, by 
forming an alliance, partnership and network. In order to restrict the scope of this 
thesis we will only focus on what we consider to be inside the company boundaries, 
which is the company, business unit and project group level. Network companies are 
a level over the organizational boundary, and considered to be external to the 
organization. Figure 3.6 show which areas we have chosen to focus on. 
 
Figure 3.6 Our focus. 
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External strategies for achieving ambidexterity have not received a lot of attention in 
the field of organizational ambidexterity, yet research on exploration emphasizes the 
importance of external acquisition of new knowledge (Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). 
Using external strategies for ambidexterity opens the possibility of having tasks that a 
company is unable to perform in-house performed by external actors. This type of 
approach involves ambidexterity at a network level, as the company appoints 
external actors explore or exploit for them, thus eluding having to deal with the 
paradox internally.  
 
We have decided to disregard external approaches in this case study because of our 
case study design. We use a single organization as our unit of analysis, and we must 
therefore exclude all other types of approaches others than those we can research 
within the organization and our time frame. We will present some external 
approaches in the following subchapter, but we will not go into great detail. Figure 
3.7 shows the boundary between external and internal approaches to ambidexterity. 
 
Figure 3.7 External and internal approaches. 
3.4.1 External approaches 
In this subchapter, we will describe three external approaches to ambidexterity: 
alliances, outsourcing, and mergers and acquisitions. We will describe the nature of 
each approach, and why they can be considered to be external.  
 
Alliances are the first external approach we will cover, as it has been shown that 
relationships between organizations can be seen as a type of exploration and 
exploitation process (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004). Any company can have a 
variety of alliances, and the alliances can be of both of explorative or exploitative 
nature (Gupta et al., 2006). Organizations can enter alliances to exploit 
complementary resources that their partners have, while at the same time promoting 
stability and reducing risk (Lin et al., 2007). Alliances can also be of use for exploring 
new markets and technologies, and adapting to paradigm shifts in the industry (Lin et 
al., 2007). In addition to this alliances can be used to obtain new knowledge (Grant 
and Baden-Fuller, 2004). It has been shown that strategic alliances (Lin et al., 2007) 
can facilitate both exploitative and explorative knowledge processes. Organizations 
enter an alliance to explore new opportunities or exploit existing opportunities, and 
several studies have shown evidence that there is a positive correlation between an 
organization's ability to be innovative and it’s alliances (Rothaermel and Deeds, 
2004).  
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Larger companies benefit from an ambidextrous formation of exploratory and 
exploitative alliances, whereas small firms benefit more from a focused formation of 
either exploratory or exploitative alliances (Lin et al., 2007). Also, a company that has 
an ambidextrous formation of exploratory and exploitative alliances will tend to 
exhibit better performance in an uncertain environment, and a firm with a focused 
approach will tend to have better performance in a stable environment (Lin et al., 
2007). 
 
Outsourcing is the second type of external approach to ambidexterity that we have 
found. An organization can externalize both exploration and exploitation by 
outsourcing activities (Baden-Fuller and Volberda, 1997), which means that 
organizations can be ambidextrous by outsourcing either explorative or exploitative 
processes to other companies. Outsourcing can be defined as “the significant 
contribution by external vendors in the physical and/or human resources associated 
with the entire or specific components of the IT infrastructure in the user organization” 
(Loh and Venkatraman, 1992, p.226), or alternatively as “the reliance on external 
sources for product-oriented components and other value-adding activities” (Lei and 
Hitt, 1995, p.836). 
 
Weigelt and Sarkar (2012) argue that problems related to exploitation benefit from 
being outsourced, because they are often divisible into separate sub-problems. 
Organizations can use outsourcing take advantage of the differences in production 
efficiencies of other organizations that are specialized and have economies of scale 
(Weigelt and Sarkar, 2012). The negative effects of outsourcing can be that 
companies can lose their core capabilities. This can happen if they outsource to 
many of their most business critical activities (Gilley and Rasheed, 2000). According 
to Weigelt and Sarkar (2012) problems related to exploration and adaptability get 
compromised if companies outsource, because a common organizational language 
is required to solve such problems. The more a company outsources, the more 
difficult it is to coordinate internal and external problem solving, and thus the 
company becomes less adaptable (Weigelt and Sarkar, 2012).  
 
Another external approach for achieving ambidexterity is to acquire or merge with 
other companies. According to Puranam and Srikanth (2007), an organization can 
renew their knowledge base through acquiring, or merging with, innovative firms. 
Mergers and acquisitions can lead to ambidexterity by reducing overall costs and can 
serve as a platform for economic growth and innovation (Nemanich and Vera, 2009). 
But since this approach involves internalizing external resources, it can also be 
viewed as an internal approach (Raisch et al., 2009). We choose to place mergers 
and acquisitions in the category of external approaches because it has to do with 
looking outside the organizations boundaries for knowledge. Yet, we acknowledge 
that the moment the external company is acquired and the integration process 
begins, or when the process of merging two companies start, these approaches can 
be viewed as internal. Now that we have provided a superficial explanation of the 
external approaches to ambidexterity, we will in the next subchapter go into a more 
detailed description of the internal approaches. We have also made a short summary 
of the external approaches in Figure 3.8. 
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Figure 3.8: External approaches to ambidexterity 
3.4.2 Internal approaches 
In the previous subchapter, we described external approaches to ambidexterity, and 
explained why we will not focus on these approaches in our thesis. This subchapter 
provides an overview of the internal approaches, and they will be elaborated on in 
subchapter 3.5. The internal approaches to ambidexterity are central to our thesis, 
and they will be used in our discussion in chapter 7.  
 
There is no consensus on how to structure the internal approaches to ambidexterity, 
so we have developed our own structure in this thesis. We have chosen to create 
four categories of internal approaches to ambidexterity; architectural approaches, 
contextual approaches, combinatorial approaches and management solutions.  
 
Our four categories are presented roughly in the same order that the themes they are 
related to have arisen in the organizational theory. Ambidexterity was first presented 
as a property that could be achieved by architectural approaches. Architectural 
approaches focus on the use of organizational structure to enable companies to reap 
the full benefits of both exploration and exploitation (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996, 
Gupta et al., 2006, Lee and Choi, 2010). A while later the concept of contextual 
approaches was presented, as a counterweight that could balance out the focus on 
architectural approaches. Contextual ambidexterity utilizes behavioural and social 
means to achieve the same effect (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, Lee and Choi, 
2010).  
 
Many scholars agree on the two main approaches to ambidexterity are architectural 
or contextual approaches (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, Jansen, 2005, 
Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). Other scholars pointed out that one should not see 
the two approaches as separate but strive to combine them, and presented 
approaches that were a combination of architectural and contextual, which are the 
basis for the combinatorial approaches. Management approaches, which is our last 
category, has since been given attention as an important factor to consider in the 
approach towards ambidexterity (Chang and Hughes, 2012). It is important to 
emphasize on the fact that the different categories do not have strict demarcations, 
and in some instances one approach can also fit into another category than the one it 
is placed in. The categorizations of the approaches serve more as a way to structure 
the literature on the topic, rather than a literal categorization of the approaches.  
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We have created metaphoric visualizations of our approaches to help the reader 
understand what we mean by our different categories. Ambidexterity is visualized as 
a house built of bricks and mortar. The four approaches are visualized in construction 
terms to emphasize how the approaches must be utilized to build the house of 
ambidexterity. We have illustrated architectural approaches as bricks, contextual 
approaches as a bucket of mortar, the combination of architectural and contextual 
approaches as a brick wall, and management approaches as a builder. In order to 
build a house one needs bricks and mortar. If we imagine architectural approaches to 
be the bricks, and contextual approaches to be the mortar we understand that the 
two approaches are the two elements we need to build the house. The two 
approaches must be used in combination for the house to be sturdy, and the 
combination of bricks (architectural approaches) and mortar (contextual approaches) 
is an approach in itself. But who will be responsible for combining the bricks and 
mortar to build the house? This is where the builder comes into action. The builder 
(management approaches) combines (combinatorial approaches) the bricks 
(architectural approaches) and mortar (contextual approaches) to build a house 
(ambidextrous organization). The illustrations and their relation to each other are 
presented in Figure 3.9:  
 
 
Figure 3.9 The four approaches to ambidexterity 
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In the following subchapter, we will examine the four internal approaches to 
ambidexterity in greater detail. These approaches serve as the main foundation for 
our analysis and discussion in chapters 7 and 8. 
3.5 The four internal approaches 
In subchapter 3.4, we described both external and internal approaches to 
ambidexterity, and argued for our focus on internal approaches. In this subchapter, 
we will examine the four internal approaches to ambidexterity, and present the rest of 
our propositions. All propositions will be repeated in subchapter 3.6, and will be used 
in the discussion in Part III. Figure 3.10 gives an overview of the four internal 
approaches to ambidexterity, and from here they will be presented in separate 
subchapters, together with a discussion of their indicators. 
 
Figure 3.10: Internal approaches to ambidexterity 
3.5.1 Architectural approaches 
Architectural approaches to ambidexterity imply dual structures within an 
organization that let employees focus on either exploration or exploitation. More 
specifically architectural ambidexterity is defined as the subdivision of tasks into 
distinct organizational units to develop an appropriate environment for ambidexterity 
(Raisch et al., 2009). This effectually assigns employees to work with either 
explorative or exploitative activities in permanent, separated groups, or at different 
times. Theories of architectural ambidexterity propose dual structures and strategies, 
differentiating efforts to focus on either exploratory or exploitative innovation (Gupta 
et al., 2006). Structural ambidexterity and differentiation are other terms used to 
describe the same concept as architectural ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004, Raisch et al., 2009, Simsek et al., 2009, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). We 
illustrate architectural approaches as a stack of bricks to emphasize on the fact that 
these approaches are centred on physical structures. 
 
One way of approaching architectural ambidexterity is by spatial separation 
(Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 
2009). Spatial separation is achieved by having separate business units that focus 
on either exploration or exploitation (Puranam et al., 2006). Tushman and O'Reilly 
(1996) described ambidextrous organizations as having established project teams 
that function as structurally independent units pursuing either exploration or 
exploitation. These units have their own processes, cultures, and structures, but are 
integrated into the existing management hierarchy. Units responsible for exploration 
are smaller, more decentralized and more flexible than the units responsible for 
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exploitation (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996, Benner and Tushman, 2003). Benner and 
Tushman (2003) explained that the ambidextrous organization designs are 
composed of highly differentiated but weakly integrated business-units. Spatial 
separation was one of the first examples of architectural approaches presented in the 
ambidexterity literature, the description clearly coincides with the understanding of a 
firm as a product-oriented company with a small R&D department and a larger 
production unit. A spatial architectural configuration helps organizations maintain 
both exploratory and exploitative competencies, which are necessary to handle the 
ever-changing market demands and business opportunities (Gilbert, 2005).  
 
Tushman et al. (2011) discussed the challenges of having separate innovation units 
beside regular business units, and the how to deal with the tensions that would arise 
between the demands of innovation units and regular business units. They stressed 
the importance of keeping these tensions at the management level. Two approaches 
for keeping the tensions between innovation- and business units at the management 
level are presented by Tushman et al. (2011) as the hub-and-spoke model and the 
ring-team model. The hub-and-spoke model involves that the heads of the business 
and innovation units only reporting to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and not to 
each other. The CEO manages each business unit separately, and each unit is very 
reliant on the CEO. The ring team model brings all business unit leaders together, 
and the decisions on resource allocation are made collectively. Tushman et al. 
(2011) also emphasize the importance of embracing inconsistency - by not 
measuring the business- and innovation units along the same metrics. Task 
partitioning is an architectural approach, which is very similar to spatial separation. 
Instead of splitting up business units dependent on the nature of their business 
operations, be it innovation or production, task partitioning has to do with individuals 
performing either explorative or exploitative operations within the same business unit 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Due to strong similarities we believe it can be viewed 
as spatial separation of individuals instead of separation of business units.  
 
Temporal separation, as task partitioning, allows for both exploration and exploitation 
to be pursued within the boundaries of the same business unit. But, contrary to task 
partitioning the individuals are allowed to perform both explorative and exploitative 
activities, but at different points in time (McDonough and Leifer, 1983, Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). A business unit can switch 
between exploratory and exploitative activities with different time intervals during the 
day, or switch between exploration and exploitation over a week or month. Gupta et 
al. (2006) also described a type of differentiation that is temporal rather than 
structural. They called it punctuated equilibrium, and explained that it entailed having 
companies cycle through periods of exploration and exploitation. They claimed this to 
be a radically different mechanism than ambidexterity, but because of the similarity to 
temporal separation we choose to categorize punctuated equilibrium as an 
architectural approach to ambidexterity. In our understanding the term Gupta et al. 
(2006) called punctual equilibrium is similar enough to what the other scholars 
(Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009) have described as 
temporal separation that we can use the term temporal separation to describe them 
both.   
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Another architectural approach used to achieve ambidexterity is formalization and 
interdepartmental connectedness; both ways of structuring an organization. 
Formalization is defined as the degree of which rules, procedures, job instructions 
and communications are formalized, written down or kept in records (Jansen et al., 
2006). This adjective describes to which extent a firm’s structure exhibits mechanistic 
properties. If an organization focuses heavily on standardized processes, routines 
and written rules, it is likely that efficiency and improvement are reinforced. An 
organization with a large degree of formalization will most likely focus on improving 
and refining existing activities. This is linked to exploitation (March, 1991) and 
therefore a high degree of formalization implies a pursuit of exploitative innovation 
(Chang and Hughes, 2012). Still, it is important to note that some companies can 
generate explorative innovations even though they have a high level of formalization. 
Jansen et al. (2006) conducted a study on large companies and found no evidence 
of a negative effect between formalization and explorative innovation. There is also 
support for the view that mechanistic structures can support the use of 
entrepreneurial capital (Kang and Snell, 2009). Still, informal mechanisms can inhibit 
organizations from making the most of their exploratory activities because their 
structural conditions do not effectively integrate innovations into the firms existing 
activities (Chang and Hughes, 2012).  
 
Interdepartmental connectedness has to do with connecting unrelated parts of the 
organization together through a structure that encourages informal communication 
and knowledge sharing (Chang and Hughes, 2012). This increases the opportunity 
for informal knowledge sharing by exposing individuals to small, unrelated pockets of 
knowledge from across the company (Atuahene-Gima, 2005, Jansen et al., 2006). 
Connectedness helps employees gain knowledge that betters their current 
understanding of technologies, products and processes, which in turn can lead to 
exploitative innovation (Jansen et al., 2006). Also, explorative innovation can be 
achieved by connectedness as a result of having individuals combine unrelated 
pieces of knowledge in ways that may encourage explorative learning (March, 1991). 
(Chang and Hughes, 2012) hypothesized that the more a structure is characterized 
by formalization and connectedness, the higher the appearance of ambidexterity. 
They tested their hypothesize, and found strong support for this statement.  
 
We have now explained that there are several architectural approaches that can be 
used to achieve ambidexterity. Three of the approaches are based on different ways 
of separating individuals or work modes. Spatial separation and task partitioning 
deals with individuals performing either explorative or exploitative tasks in different 
business units, or within in the same business unit, respectively. Temporal 
separation is concerned with separating the work modes of exploration and 
exploitation in time, rather than separating them between business units or people. In 
our opinion, these methods are clearly rooted in the paradigm of the product-oriented 
company, with a value chain configuration understanding of the business operations.  
 
Another set of indicators for architectural ambidexterity is the simultaneous presence 
of high degree of formalization and connectedness. These indicators are not 
concerned with the specifics in the organizational design. They do not involve a 
discussion of business units or work modes of individuals within these business units. 
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This makes formalization and connectedness more flexible indicators for discussing 
architectural ambidexterity, since they can be adapted to all types of different 
organizations. We think that connectedness is an important element of the 
architectural approach that is easy to forget when discussing the separation work 
modes. A higher degree of formalization can be viewed as a result of a more 
thoughtful business unit separation, but the informal connectedness within a 
company is vital in spreading new knowledge and fostering innovation. Even when 
choosing to separate the activities of exploration and exploitation, it seems 
necessary to reconnect the two to facilitate innovation.  
 
As we have discussed, the indicators of formalization and connectedness are more 
flexible concepts for discussing the architectural approaches. In our opinion, the two 
indicators offer a better explanation of architectural approaches, than other 
explanatory models presented. This leads us to believe that the two indicators will be 
useful in our discussion of the architectural approaches in the context of companies 
with a value shop configuration.  
 
Since architectural approaches often involve structure we thought it would be 
interesting to find out more about how a company handles ambidexterity it increases 
in size. It is a well-established truth in the organizational theory that an increased 
company size leads to an increase in structures and more hierarchy (Ouchi, 1979). A 
company growing from 10 to 1000 employees will obviously be in need of a more 
rigid structure in form of communication systems, working procedures and more 
specific roles for employees. This seems to coincide well with the architectural 
approaches to ambidexterity. But are growth and architectural approaches directly 
related? And if so, how do they correlate, and in which cases do they correlate? To 
investigate these questions we developed the following proposition:  
 
An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a more 
rigid structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural 
approaches.  
 
Now that we have a presented the architectural approaches, and which of them are 
the best fit to describe a value shop, and why we are interested in the connection 
between growth and architectural approaches, we will conclude this subchapter with 
a summary of the most relevant architectural approaches to ambidexterity. A 
summary of the most important approaches mentioned in this subchapter is 
presented in Figure 3.11. In the next subchapter, we will describe contextual 
approaches to ambidexterity. 
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Figure 3.11 Summary of architectural approaches to ambidexterity. 
3.5.2 Contextual approaches 
Raisch et al. (2009) define contextual approaches as the behavioural mechanisms 
that enable an organization to manage both exploratory and exploitative efforts within 
the same business unit. At the organizational level, contextual ambidexterity can be 
defined as the collective orientation of the employees towards the simultaneous 
pursuit of alignment and adaptability. Contextual ambidexterity calls for individual 
employees to use their own judgment as to how they should divide their time 
between explorative and exploitative activities (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). The 
term integration is used as a synonym for contextual approaches by several scholars 
(Raisch et al., 2009, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). We illustrate architectural 
approaches as a bucket of mortar to symbolize that these approaches are concerned 
with building an environment where ambidexterity can flourish.   
 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) presented the concept of contextual ambidexterity as 
a response to the heavy focus on structures and processes in achieving 
ambidexterity. The two authors suggested that contextual ambidexterity emerges 
when leaders in business units develop a supportive organizational context that 
helps employees make their own decisions when met with the strain between 
exploration and exploitation. For contextual approaches, the individual is to a larger 
degree responsible for the balance between exploration and exploitation. This is 
opposed to the architectural approaches, where the decision more often lies with the 
management, as they are the ones with the greatest influence over the structural 
design of the company.  
 
In order to achieve contextual ambidexterity one must have a clear idea of what the 
organizational context is. According to Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) organizational 
context is the systems, processes and beliefs that shape individual-level behaviours 
in an organization. This can be defined in terms of four behaviour-framing attributes: 
discipline, stretch, support and trust. These behaviour framing attributes are a result 
of conscious actions of the management in a company (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994). 
Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) did not argue that these four behaviour framing 
attributes would contribute to contextual ambidexterity, instead this research question 
was posed by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) ten years later. They hypothesized, and 
found support for, that a business unit has a higher level of ambidexterity the more it 
is characterized by an interaction of stretch, discipline, support and trust (Gibson and 
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Birkinshaw, 2004). These four contextual features will be discussed more in detail 
below.  
 
The attribute of discipline encourages employees to strive to meet the expectations 
that others have towards them due to their commitments, for example, when the 
hardworking employee tries to impress his supervisor. In order to establish discipline 
an organization must have clear standards of performance, a system of open and 
rapid feedback and consistency in the use of sanctions. The second behaviour 
framing attribute, stretch, encourages employees to set ambitious goals. To facilitate 
stretch, a company must develop a collective identity, create shared ambitions within 
the organization and make sure that employees attach a personal meaning to their 
work (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). If an employee has ambitious goals it is equally 
important that he or she is motivated enough to reach this goal. We believe that what 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) call personal meaning as a premise for stretch, can 
also be called motivation.  
 
The third feature of the contextual approach, support, induces employees to help 
each other. To make this happen an organization must have systems that facilitate 
knowledge sharing and equal access to resources. The aim is to provide an 
environment where there is freedom of initiative even for low levels of the 
organization, and where senior staff-members prioritize guidance of lower level 
employees (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). In our opinion, a high level of autonomy 
for all employees corresponds closely with establishment of support. The fourth 
attribute, trust, encourages employees to rely on each other. Fair decision processes, 
involvement in decisions that affect the organization and staffing the right people, are 
all actions that foster trust (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).  
 
Earley and Gibson (2002) argue that an organization needs to foster discipline and 
stretch so that individuals aspire to high goals, while at the same time creating a 
context of support and trust in order for this to happen in a cooperative environment. 
They also note that activities such as socialization and team-building practices foster 
shared values and aid coordination, helping actors think and act ambidextrously on a 
day-to-day basis. They predicted a relationship between organizational context and 
contextual ambidexterity, consisting of social context and performance management. 
They found support for this hypothesis, and the relationship they predicted is 
illustrated in Figure 3.12 below.  
 
Figure 3.12 Context and ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) claim their view of organizational context coincides 
with Ghoshal and Bartlett (1994) definition of the four behavioural attributes 
presented above. Exactly how the two views coincide is hard to decipher from their 
article. We believe that the attribute discipline can be connected to performance 
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management due to its focus on feedback and sanctions. We also think that the 
attributes trust, stretch and support can be linked to the social context. Based on our 
assumptions we have created Table 3.1 with an overview of how these subjects are 
related:  
 
Table 3.1 Paradox of personal drivers. 
Performance management Social context 
Discipline Stretch  
Support  
Trust  
 
Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) concluded their study by stating that they believed 
that the concept of contextual ambidexterity would become an important part of 
understanding how leaders should manage the tensions between exploration and 
exploitation. By doing so they effectually introduced a new domain of research within 
the field of ambidexterity, expanding from architectural approaches to the new topic 
of contextual approaches.  
 
Chang and Hughes (2012) looked into the two contextual conditions of performance 
management and social context when studying ambidexterity in small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). They hypothesized that the more a context is 
characterized by a supportive social context, and both goal and effort-based 
performance management, the higher the appearance of ambidexterity, but did not 
find support for this hypothesis through their study. Chang and Hughes’ (2012) own 
explanation is that the constrained access to resources in SMEs requires a tight 
focus on the organizational operations. Our interpretation is that the contextual 
elements of discipline, stretch, support and trust are more naturally present in SMEs 
because of their size. This means that management does not have to deliberately 
implement measures to create a supportive environment characterized by trust, 
stretch and discipline, as they obviously have to do in larger companies. An 
argument that strengthens our view is that Chang and Hughes (2012) based their 
quantitative study exclusively on self-reporting surveys from CEOs and Chief Product 
Design Managers, when trying to establish a relationship between contextual 
characteristics and ambidexterity. Although the respondents reported that there was 
no link between the two, the other employees in the organization may experience 
otherwise.  
 
Although Chang and Hughes (2012) couldn’t support their hypothesis of the 
relationship between ambidexterity and the contextual elements of social context and 
performance management, we are not ready to drop social context as an important 
indicator for contextual ambidexterity. Raisch et al. (2009) state that socialization and 
the under category of team building are important procedures that can assist people 
in thinking and acting ambidextrously. Socialization is the means by which cultural 
and social continuity are attained. Socialization is broadly defined as the process in 
which a person acquires the skills and social knowledge to assume an organizational 
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role. Methods that are used to socialize individuals into an organization involve 
training, education, cooperation and apprenticeships (Dubinsky et al., 1986). 
 
The concepts of socialization and support are directly linked to knowledge, as the 
prior has to do with acquiring new knowledge and the latter has to do with sharing 
knowledge through knowledge sharing systems. Systems can be formal such as 
training or knowledge management computer systems, and informal such as 
colleague networks where high levels of trust facilitate knowledge sharing. We 
wonder if it possible to attain the high level of trust needed to facilitate knowledge 
sharing, while implementing performance management systems. The reason we 
question this is because we believe that the implementation of performance 
management systems creates internal competition for praise and bonuses, which 
would counteract a trusting and supporting work environment. 
 
Value shops are often knowledge-intensive companies with a very autonomous work 
force, where the ability to acquire and effectively disseminate knowledge is a central 
competitive advantage. But how can a company encourage such behaviour through 
discipline and performance management? To examine these questions we present 
another proposition which links contextual approaches, the value shop configuration 
and the company resource of knowledge together. It reads as follows:  
 
Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge 
and acquire new knowledge.  
 
To be able to answer this question we combined the theoretical efforts of Ghoshal 
and Bartlett (1994), Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) and Chang and Hughes (2012) to 
summarize the contextual approach. We present the main points from Chang and 
Hughes (2012), performance management and social context, and on the basis of 
our previous discussion, placed the four behaviour attributes of discipline, stretch, 
support and trust in those two categories. We present this systemized summary in 
Figure 3.13. In the next subchapter, we will describe combinatorial approaches that 
integrate both architectural and contextual approaches.  
 
Figure 3.13 Summary of contextual approaches to ambidexterity. 
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3.5.3 Combinatorial approaches 
So far we have presented architectural and contextual approaches that companies 
can use to solve the paradox of ambidexterity. We will in this subchapter present the 
combinatorial approaches, which we as a brick wall, made up of bricks and mortar, to 
illustrate the fact that they combine architectural and contextual approaches. 
 
Architectural and contextual approaches have been prevalent in the organizational 
ambidexterity research for almost a decade, and according to Raisch et al. (2009) 
ambidexterity researchers have usually focused on either architectural or contextual 
approaches in their research. Several scholars have pointed out negative effects that 
a narrow focus on architectural or contextual approaches can result in (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004, Jansen et al., 2006, Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009).  
 
Critics of the architectural approach claim that the separation methods within this 
approach tend to lose the importance of connecting the explorative and exploitative 
activities and business units in their discussion of how to achieve ambidexterity 
(Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000, O’Reilly and Tushman, 2008). This means that 
structurally separating business units counteracts the goal of achieving an 
ambidextrous organization (Raisch et al., 2009). Critics of contextual approaches 
claim that the business context is constrained by the individuals in their efforts of 
performing exploratory and exploitative activities (March, 1991, Inkpen and Tsang, 
2005). Individuals use the same knowledge and experiences as a basis for carrying 
out both activities, which makes it difficult to explore fundamentally different 
knowledge bases (Raisch et al., 2009). 
  
Raisch et al. (2009) emphasize the necessity to combine both architectural and 
contextual approaches, but acknowledge its difficulties. This is because the 
combination of both approaches requires individuals to work in different thought 
worlds, which according to Inkpen and Tsang (2005) is beyond their cognitive limits. 
Also, when combining architectural and contextual approaches an organization runs 
the risk of destroying the pragmatic boundaries that protect exploratory activities from 
being influenced by mainstream activities in other business units (Carlile, 2004). 
Gupta et al. (2006) claim that it is important that organizations recognize exploration 
and exploitation as a paradox when combining architectural and contextual 
approaches. Although the combination of both architectural and contextual 
approaches can be seen as a paradox, they are complementary, not alternative 
mechanisms for ambidexterity (Raisch et al., 2009).  
 
We agree with Raisch et al. (2009) that the two approaches are not two sides to a 
paradox, but rather complementary, but as discussed in the last subchapter, the 
need to apply the different approaches might vary dependent on several factors. 
Whether it’s the size of the company, or the nature of how they provide value to their 
customer. The managerial challenge, which we will examine closer in the next 
subchapter, is to be able to understand the situation of the company, and strive for 
the right balance of exploration and exploitation. That balance is not directly 
correlated with the use of architectural and contextual approaches. Here we would 
also like to follow the argument of Raisch et al. (2009, p.687): “Because the need for 
exploitation and exploration can vary across initiatives as well as over time, 
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managing the differentiation-integration [architectural-contextual] tensions is likely to 
be an important dynamic capability for creating and sustaining organizational 
ambidexterity”. 
 
Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) answered the call from Raisch et al. (2009) on 
exploring the notion of architectural and contextual approaches not being alternatives, 
but complementary, and were one of the first scholars to present a model that 
combined architectural and contextual approaches. They noted that: “Whereas 
literature is replete with warnings about the difficulties of managing exploitation-
exploration tensions, related studies inhibit comprehensive understandings, 
presenting either architectural or contextual approaches and employing conceptual, 
anecdotal, or single-case studies” (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009, p.696). They 
sought to develop a more comprehensive model where the two approaches could be 
combined, and carried out an extensive comparative case study of five product 
development companies. As a result they summarized their finding with a 
presentation of architectural and contextual approaches that can be used in 
combination to foster ambidexterity. Contextual and architectural approaches were 
presented in the context of three underlying paradoxes of exploration and 
exploitation. These three nested paradoxes are strategic intent, customer orientation 
and personal drivers, and are shown in Figure 3.14.  
Figure 3.14 Combinatorial approaches. 
Strategic intent poses a paradox due to the need for companies to emphasize both 
profit and breakthroughs (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). To deal with the paradox 
of strategic intent Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) found that organizations cultivated 
a paradoxical vision in their employees while at the same time diversifying their 
project portfolio. In the five cases they investigated, this paradoxical vision typically 
manifested itself as the tension between commercial success and the employee’s 
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artistic expression. To cultivate this vision is a contextual approach because it 
involves using behavioural and social means to integrate exploration and exploitation. 
Diversifying the project portfolio is an architectural approach, because the company 
uses projects or contracts to enable a separate focuses on straightforward projects to 
pay the bills and on pioneering projects to build new capabilities (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009). 
 
The paradox of customer orientation comes into being when there is dissimilarity 
between what their customer wants to buy and what the organization that supplies a 
good or service want to create. When dealing with the paradox of customer 
orientation the architectural approach is to iterate between project constraints and 
freedom, and the contextual approach is to improvise purposefully (Andriopoulos and 
Lewis, 2009). When improvising purposefully project teams exploit existing routines 
while at the same time exploring within the project, which means that they 
intentionally decide on what to focus on as they go along (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 
2009).  
 
Personal drivers represents the tension between discipline and passion, both 
characteristics needed to successfully innovate (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). A 
employee can feel a strain between doing what they are passionate about and being 
disciplined enough to carry through projects that are not as fulfilling. The managerial 
challenge in tackling the paradox of personal drivers is to socialize practical artists, 
while at the same time temporally and structurally separate work modes 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). The socialization of practical artists has to do with 
nurturing paradoxical identities within people through hiring, educating and mentoring. 
The goal is to challenge knowledge workers’ creativity. To temporally and structurally 
separate work modes entails varying the nature of the work through different projects 
and project phases (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009).  
 
Our combinatorial approach is largely based on the article by Andriopoulos and 
Lewis (2009), due to the fact that the discussion of how to combine the architectural 
and contextual approaches is quite new, and not yet heavily discussed amongst 
innovation researchers. With this in mind, the article by Andriopoulos and Lewis 
(2009) is according to a search on Google scholar cited 219 times, and they are cited 
by well known scholars in the field of organizational ambidexterity, as Raisch et al. 
(2009), Tushman et al. (2010) and Smith and Lewis (2011). Viewed in conjunction 
with the actual content and quality of the work, we deem it safe to rely heavily on 
their article when establishing the combinatorial approach. 
 
The overarching paradox of exploration and exploitation may be perceived as quite 
abstract and difficult to handle in an everyday situation for practitioners, both for 
individuals as well as experienced managers. In our opinion dividing the overall 
paradox of exploration and exploitation in nested paradoxes is a logical way to 
describe how architectural and contextual approaches can be combined. The main 
paradox involves many independent elements, and when trying to tie them all 
together it is easy to get lost. Andriopoulos and Lewis’ (2009) nested paradoxes is a 
good way to discuss the elements separately, and in a more specific manner, and it 
also provides a comprehensible framework to tie together a understandable entity.  
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The dangers of splitting up the main paradox into smaller parts, is that it is easy to 
lose the overall understanding of exploration and exploitation. The list of nested 
paradoxes is in no way exhaustive, and the theory it is based on is a case study that 
is not quantitatively tested. So even though the study is very comprehensive and 
written by renowned researchers, it is only based on five product design companies. 
We will take these critical reminders into account when exploring the nested 
paradoxes further. We believe that it is necessary to strengthen the theory around 
combinatorial approaches, and we will therefore present two propositions that can 
help us explore this concept.  
 
We will not examine all of the three nested paradoxes, but focus especially on the 
paradox of personal drivers. In our opinion knowledge workers in all fields of 
specialty experience a strain between doing what they are passionate about, and 
being disciplined enough to perform the mundane tasks that come with most jobs. 
We would like to investigate the paradox of personal drivers further, in relation to 
central elements of the value shop configuration: company culture and knowledge 
management. When examining the relationship between the company culture and 
the paradox of personal drivers, we wish to reveal which elements of company 
culture that coincides with socializing practical artists and the separation of work 
modes. On these premises the first of the propositions related to the paradox of 
personal drivers reads as follows:   
 
To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements 
from the company culture.  
 
Obtaining, sharing and refining knowledge is important elements of knowledge 
management, whereas temporal separation of work modes allows employees to 
switch between tasks, and thereby learn new things and enhance existing knowledge. 
We wonder if the separation of work modes is enough to secure a high standard in 
knowledge intensive value shops, or of it needs to be combined with the contextual 
approach of socializing practical artists. This is the foundation for the nest 
proposition: 
 
To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements 
from knowledge management.  
 
To sum up the subchapter on combinatorial approaches we would like to remind the 
reader of the discussion about how organizations should not focus solely on 
architectural or contextual approaches. We agree with the scholars that critique the 
exclusive focus on architectural or contextual approaches, and we propose a 
category of combinatorial approaches based on the work of Andriopoulos and Lewis 
(2009). A way of explaining combinatorial approaches is by creating nested 
paradoxes, which splits the overall paradox into smaller, more understandable parts. 
We introduce two propositions in this subchapter that will be used to examine the 
relationship between company culture, knowledge management and the nested 
paradox of personal drivers. The solution to the three nested paradoxes presented 
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by Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) are gathered in Figure 3.15 below. In the next 
subchapter we will discuss management approaches. 
 
 
Figure 3.15 Summary of the combinatorial approaches. 
3.5.4 Management approaches  
The role of management in organizational ambidexterity has experienced increasing 
interest since the turn of the 21st century, as scholars have emphasized that the 
actions of top management can bring explorative and exploitative innovations to life 
(Chang and Hughes, 2012, Simsek et al., 2009, Mom et al., 2007, Lubatkin et al., 
2006). Both researchers working from a architectural and contextual standpoint 
recognize the indirect, yet pivotal role of senior management with regard to the 
organizations ability to achieve ambidexterity (Simsek et al., 2009). We choose to 
separate management from architectural, contextual and combinatorial approaches. 
This is because management approaches have more to do with the characteristics of 
leaders and how they manage, whereas the three others have more to do with they 
way an organization is designed.  
 
If we return to the metaphor of the house of bricks and mortar we can depict the 
manager as the person(s) that make use of both architectural and contextual 
approaches in combination to achieve ambidexterity. Essentially we are focusing on 
the leaders of the organizations and not the organizations themselves. We will be 
touching on factors such as the leaders characteristics, management styles and the 
division of management roles that in relation to achieving ambidextrous organizations. 
We illustrate managerial approaches as a builder, which symbolizes the person that 
is in charge of combining architectural and contextual approaches.  
 
Chang and Hughes (2012) examined risk-taking and adaptation in leaders. They 
hypothesized and found support for the fact that top managers with a high tolerance 
for risk and adaptability lead organizations with a higher degree of ambidexterity. 
Risk-taking has to do with the degree of risk a leader takes or tolerates. If top 
managers are tolerant towards risk and accept the cost of possible failures, their 
employees will most likely propose and introduce new product or services as a 
consequence of a changing environment (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990). This is because 
the way top management acts, and makes decisions, signals what type of behaviour 
is desired among their employees (Kohli and Jaworski, 1990). Top managers with 
high-risk tolerance, will most likely favour a higher return and, by that, more 
innovative opportunities (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).  
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It has been shown that managers with risk tolerance see risk differently than 
managers that are risk averse. This gives risk tolerant managers a better 
understanding of the opportunities in the market as it is changing (Janney and Dess, 
2006). The downside of risk tolerance is that leaders may have a hard time accepting 
that the high-risk projects that they have invested in will not succeed. This can result 
in bad decision making, for instance that the leader continues the project even 
though discontinuing it is obviously the right thing to do (Janney and Dess, 2006). A 
risk averse top manager on the other hand will most likely foster employees that 
focus on gradually improving existing products or services, instead of generating new 
solutions (He and Wong, 2004).  
 
Managers that take risk often favour more explorative projects with uncertain short-
term profitability, and risk-taking can have both positive and negative effects on a 
company’s ambidexterity. The issue of risk tolerant or risk adverse managers is yet 
another example of theory that is based mainly in the product-oriented or value chain 
paradigm. It is often related to market push mind-set of production companies, and 
not the market pull specifics of a value shop. Product-oriented companies with a 
market push mind-set usually forecast what their customers will need, and produce 
accordingly, whereas value shops are led by market pull, where the customer 
requests the product and the solution is based on this request.  
 
Naturally we would like to explore the risk tolerance of managers in companies with a 
value shop configuration in connection to ambidexterity and the paradox of 
exploration and exploitation. We suspect that they are risk averse due to the fact that 
when a explorative project fails, a value shop does not only lose the money invested 
in the project, but may also lose their reputation, customers, employees and 
therefore their main competitive advantage knowledge. The proposition we put 
forward to examine this subject, reads:  
 
When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on 
exploitation than exploration.  
 
Jaworski and Kohli (1993) write that adaptability depends on the knowledge of the 
firm’s markets, technologies, product-services and customers that managers and 
non-management employees possess. Being adaptable means being willing to 
change with a changing environment, and in the case of organizational theory is has 
to do with being adaptable to market changes. An adaptive leader will stress 
employees on the importance of adapting to market trends, being aware of 
competitors and the acting now to meet customers’ future needs. Morgan and 
Berthon (2008) questioned the relationship between market adaption and generative 
learning and found, in accordance to the concept of ambidexterity, that both 
contribute to exploitative and explorative innovation. But, they also prove a spill over 
effect where organizations that exhibit successively greater levels of market 
orientation corresponds with increase in levels of generative learning and vice versa 
(Morgan and Berthon (2008). 
 
Rosing et al. (2011) had a different viewpoint of ambidextrous leadership, and 
proposed that a leader needs two complementary sets of behaviours to achieve 
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ambidexterity, namely opening and closing behaviours. Also, ambidextrous leaders 
need to be able to switch between opening and closing behaviours in a flexible 
manner. This is because teams need to constantly switch back and forth between 
different activities in an innovation process (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). When 
switching between the two different behaviours a leader encourages employees to 
work with either explorative or exploitative tasks.  
 
 
Figure 3.16 Model for ambidextrous leadership (Rosing et al., 2011, p. 966). 
Examples of opening leadership behaviours are encouraging experimentation with 
different ideas, allowing errors, encourage error learning, allowing different ways of 
accomplishing tasks and motivating employees to take risk. Examples of closing 
leadership are establishing routines, sticking to plans, sanctioning errors, monitoring 
and controlling goal attainment, taking corrective action and controlling adherence to 
rules. It seems logical that opening and closing behaviours would be closely related 
to the manager’s personal characteristics, and his or her personal priorities. 
 
Since these characteristics influence the way she manages, a manager must be able 
to cultivate both exploration and exploitation in her efforts to achieve ambidexterity 
(Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996). These two activities are paradoxical and managing 
them requires behavioural complexity (Hooijberg, 1996). The concept of behavioural 
complexity is defined by Hooijberg (1996) as a repertoire of different behaviours, and 
the ability to alternate between these different behaviours according to the 
requirements of the situation. Emotional intelligence is also a characteristic that an 
ambidextrous leader should possess, so that she can understand the emotions of 
actors connected to the innovation process (Zhou and George, 2003). An 
ambidextrous leader should also be able to conduct integrative thinking (Martin, 
2007). Integrative thinking is described as being able to face the tension created by 
the opposing ideas of exploration and exploitation in a constructive manner (Martin, 
2007).  
 
In a company with a value shop configuration where the majority of work is 
conducted in temporary project teams, the CEO will probably surface as an important 
figure. Employees in value shops experience shifting management because they 
report to different project managers on every project, which makes the CEO one of 
the only constant leaders. We believe that when the project managers have less 
influence, because they constantly manage new people, the CEO’s way of leading 
the company becomes more important.  
 
This means that the CEO’s leadership style is important in relation to how the 
company achieves ambidexterity, and particularly in relation to the contextual 
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approaches. The CEO implements contextual approaches by standing out as a 
symbolic leader figure, and leading by example by setting ambitious goals, and 
communicating the vision. But he also has to follow up on his employees by creating 
an environment characterized by support and trust, to ensure that the employees 
keep working towards the achieving the vision. We have formulated a proposition 
that will allow us to explore this subject in our thesis. The proposition reads:  
 
The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches.  
 
We consider integrative thinking to be very closely connected to the temporal ability 
to switch between opening and closing behaviours, and we will therefore use 
temporal ability to switch between opening and closing behaviours as in indicator of 
integrative thinking. That means that we won’t mention integrative thinking explicitly 
when evaluating Making Waves in this thesis. Behavioural complexity and emotional 
intelligence are not aspects that we feel competent to evaluate, especially since we 
won’t be able to study the CEO for an extended period of time. We have therefore 
decided not to include them in our discussion in Part III.  
 
In this subchapter, we have described the management approaches to ambidexterity, 
and discussed the propositions we have crafted to find out more about management 
approaches in value shops. We have summarized the most important management 
approaches in Figure 3.17. In the next subchapter, we will review the propositions 
that we have created through our discussion of the theory, and systemize them for 
further use in our thesis.   
 
 
Figure 3.17 Summary of management approaches. 
3.6 The propositions 
In subchapter 3.5, we described the four different internal approaches to 
ambidexterity: architectural, contextual, combinatorial and managerial. In this 
subchapter, we will present a short recap of the propositions we described in 
chapters 2 and 3, and why we found them interesting.  
 
In subchapter 2.3, we learned that refining existing knowledge was a path to 
exploitation, and we questioned whether organizations focus on both tacit and 
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explicit knowledge, or only one of the two. The proposition we crafted to help us 
figure this out reads: A value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit 
knowledge to achieve exploitation. 
 
In subchapter 3.3.3, we found that ambidexterity in value shops is more difficult to 
understand than in production-oriented companies, because it is more difficult to 
separate product and process innovation. Since employees in a value shop mostly 
work on customer projects, it seems logical to believe that value shops achieve 
ambidexterity through exploration and exploitation in those projects. This means that 
they achieve ambidexterity through the customers, when internalizing and executing 
the necessary steps in a project. To learn more about how value shops achieve 
ambidexterity through customer projects, we created the proposition that reads as 
follows: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with new and 
existing customers.  
 
In subchapter 3.5.1, we found that architectural approaches emphasize structures to 
achieve ambidexterity, and therefore we expect there to be a correlation between 
growth in employees and an increase in the use of architectural structures. We 
therefore created the following proposition: An increased number of employees 
require a value shop to adopt a more rigid structure, which causes an increased 
emphasis on architectural approaches. 
 
In subchapter 3.5.1, we found that the contextual approaches of socialization and 
support are linked to knowledge, and since value shops are knowledge intensive, we 
wish to investigate how these types of organizations use contextual approaches to 
refine and acquire knowledge. The proposition we developed that would help us do 
so reads: Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge 
and acquire new knowledge. 
 
In subchapter 3.5.3, we made two propositions. The first one reads: To solve the 
paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from the company 
culture. The second one reads: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value 
shop must use elements from knowledge management. We created these 
propositions because we were curious to see if the nested paradox of personal 
drivers was transferable to other professionals than product designers. The nested 
paradox is linked to knowledge management because these concepts are relevant 
for the contextual approach of socialization, which constitutes one half of the 
combination of approaches.  
 
In subchapter 3.5.4, we created the following proposition: When selecting which 
projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on exploitation than exploration. The 
proposition was created to understand more about the risk-taking behaviour of 
managers in value shops. We learned that risk-taking managers often seek more 
explorative projects, and that this attitude may correlate positively with ambidexterity 
in an organization. But we suspect that managers in value shops are more risk 
averse due to the fact that failed exploration may lead to loss of a customers due to 
the extensive collaboration and big investment by the customer, and therefore we 
expect them to focus more on exploitation.  
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Managers that take risk often favour more explorative projects with uncertain short-
term profitability, and risk-taking can have both positive and negative effects on a 
companies ambidexterity. We are curious as to how managers tolerate risk in a 
consultancy based value shop, and wish to explore this further. We suspect that they 
are risk averse due to the fact that if a explorative project fails, a value shop does not 
only lose the money invested in the project, but may also lose their reputation and 
customers. The proposal we have created to find out more about this subject reads:  
 
In subchapter 3.5.4, we predicted that the CEO’s leadership style is important for 
how a company achieves ambidexterity, based on the theory from both subchapter 
3.5.4 and subchapter 3.3.2. Scholars agree that all levels of management are 
responsible for ambidexterity, but not much is written about how the responsibility is 
distributed between the different managerial roles. The proposition that will help us 
find out if the CEO in fact is as important as we think reads as follows: The CEO’s 
leadership style is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. 
 
Several of the propositions we have presented in this subchapter are related, and we 
will therefore group those particular propositions together. For the sake of structure in 
the thesis, we have numbered each proposition. The propositions will be brought up 
again in chapter 7.  
 
1a: A value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve 
exploitation. 
1b: Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge and 
acquire new knowledge. 
2: An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a more rigid 
structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural approaches. 
3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with new and 
existing customers. 
3b: When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on 
exploitation than exploration. 
4: The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. 
5a: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
company culture. 
5b: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
knowledge management. 
3.7 Summary 
We have explained that ambidexterity is the act of balancing exploration and 
exploitation, despite the fact that they require different company configurations and 
appear mutually exclusive. By being ambidextrous, companies increase their 
chances of long-term survival, as they are able to make more money on existing 
revenue streams, while being able to develop completely new and potentially 
groundbreaking products that may create future revenue streams. The overall 
responsibility of ambidexterity lies with the manager of any organization, but scholars 
today argue that lower levels of management, and perhaps across all organizational 
levels have to adopt an ambidextrous mind-set if the company is to succeed. 
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The two main groups of approaches to ambidexterity are external and internal 
approaches. External approaches are approaches where companies obtain 
exploration or exploitation from outside of the company’s boundaries. Internal 
approaches are approaches where companies achieve exploration and exploitation 
within the boundaries. We have chosen to focus on internal approaches in this study. 
 
We have identified and described four main internal approaches that can lead to 
ambidexterity: Architectural, contextual, combinatorial and management approaches. 
These approaches will be used in the discussion in chapter 7. In the next chapter, we 
will describe our methods for writing this thesis and collecting the empirical data on 
Making Waves, which will be presented in chapters 5 and 6. 
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Part III 
Methodology and empirical data  
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4 Methodology 
In the previous chapter, we described the different approaches to ambidexterity, 
which we will use to discuss our propositions in chapter 8. In this chapter, we will 
present the methodology we have used when creating this thesis, and explain why 
we chose a qualitative research strategy, and a single case study research design. 
We will also explain what we have done to strengthen the quality of our research and 
examine key points of critique. The qualitative research strategy and its implications 
will be presented in the first subchapter.  
4.1 Qualitative research strategy 
A simple way to distinguish qualitative research from quantitative research is that 
quantitative research concerns itself with words rather than numbers. But Bryman 
and Burgess (1999) point out that explaining qualitative research in terms of what 
quantitative research is not, is not sufficient. To overcome this issue, Bryman (2008) 
presents three dimensions that help define the most important attributes of qualitative 
research. The first dimension is the role of theory in relation to research; the second 
and third dimensions are the ontological and epistemological orientations. We will 
now introduce the three dimensions and their relevance to our thesis. 
4.1.1 The role of theory in research 
The role of theory in research is either deductive or inductive. In deductive theory 
one deduces a hypothesis from theory and tests that theory with empirical findings. 
The theory and hypothesis guide the process of collecting data, for example in the 
design of an experiment (Rynes and Gephart Jr, 2004). The process is reversed 
when using inductive theory, and the outcome of the research is not validation or 
rejection of theory, but a development of new theory. Observations and data drive 
the theory development forward in these cases (Bowen, 2008). 
 
Our research has not been conducted with the goal of testing the validity of 
theoretical concepts, but rather to explore a case in the context of the theory, and 
from that try to develop new theory. We have tried to better align the current theory 
with what we have observed in real life, in other words, we seek to close the gaps 
between theory and reality. This results in an inductive relationship between theory 
and research (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
4.1.2 Ontology 
Ontology concerns the question of how to deal with social entities in research. The 
two main perspectives are called objectivism and constructionism. Objectivism sees 
organizations as objective entities that constrain and internalize people, and 
constructionism sees them as social entities constructed and influenced by people 
(Searle, 2006). 
 
Our case company Making Waves was founded about ten years ago, and most 
founders still work in the organization. Our study is not a discourse analysis of power 
and influence in Making Waves, and we have been pragmatic in our consideration of 
ontology. We think that the top management and founders of the company have had 
a bigger influence in building the company culture than the lower level staff. Although 
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the organization may be perceived as less impressionable to lower level staff, we did 
not get the impression that it constrains them. We therefore consider ourselves to 
have a constructionist perspective.  
4.1.3 Epistemology 
Epistemology is the discussion of knowledge, its justification, limits and structure 
(Cook and Brown, 1999). It is a philosophical discussion about what true knowledge 
is, and how it should be obtained. In the social research setting, epistemology refers 
to a debate on whether the methods of natural sciences are applicable, or not. 
Researchers of the positivist tradition believe so; researchers of the interpretivist 
tradition do not. Interpretivists seek to understand human behaviour, rather than to 
seek explanations for it. They emphasize that social actions must be meaningful to 
social actors, and therefore they need to be interpreted from the social actors’ point 
of view (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The interpretivist perspective coincides 
well with our ambition to understand how the members of our case company view 
themselves in relation to the paradox of exploration and exploitation.  
4.1.4 Summary of qualitative research strategy 
We have introduced some of the main points distinguishing quantitative and 
qualitative research, and how they relate our thesis. We have chosen a qualitative 
research strategy because we have a desire to understand the theoretical concept of 
ambidexterity through the eyes of our informants, and to build new theory from this 
data. This implies an inductive relation between theory and research, with a 
constructionist and interpretivist perspective. 
 
Table 4.1 Quantitative and qualitative strategies Bryman (2008) 
 Quantitative Qualitative 
The role of theory in relation to 
research 
Deductive; testing of theory Inductive; generation of theory 
Ontology Objectivism Constructionism 
Epistemology Natural science model, in 
particular positivism 
Interpretivism   
 
A research strategy is a broad orientation and not a detailed plan for executing a 
research project. We have therefore developed a research design where the single 
case study design is our choice of method. We will elaborate on the justification and 
implications of this choice in the next subchapter. 
4.2 Research design 
The research design is a framework for the collection and analysis of data, where the 
specific design relates to the criteria for evaluating the research (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007). According to Bryman (2008, p.30) “It is, therefore, a framework for 
the generation of evidence that is suited both to a certain set of criteria and to the 
research question”.  
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The case study design is one of many options in research design, so we will present 
three reasons why we found it suitable for our research. A case study is preferred 
when you have a “how”-question, when you have little or no control of behavioural 
events, and when the research focuses on contemporary events (Yin, 2009). Our 
research question is “How does Making Waves balance exploration and exploitation”, 
and we could not, nor wished not, to control behavioural events. Making Waves is an 
existing company, making the event contemporary. 
 
We wanted to achieve an in-depth understanding of one organization through our 
research, and we wanted to explore how this organization operates within the 
theoretical context of ambidexterity. Both guidelines pointed us in the direction of a 
case study. The unique strength of the case study is that it can deal with a wide 
range of data sources to secure a broad and deep understanding of a unit of 
analysis, which is why we chose this design (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Yin 
(2009) described case study research as a linear, but iterative process. We present 
the steps we took in Table 4.2, but it is important to note that the process involved 
several jumps back and fourth between the different phases. Each step will be 
described more thoroughly in the next subchapters.  
 
Table 4.2 The steps taken in the research 
Case study phases Steps of qualitative research 
The Plan Research question 
Literature review 
The Design Revision of research question and propositions 
Choice of unit of analysis  
Preparation Selection of interview objects 
Creating an interview guide 
Data collection Interviews 
Observation 
Written material 
Analysis Analysis of empirical data 
Discussion of empirical data 
Linking theory with data 
Sharing the results Conclusions 
4.2.1 The Plan  
When planning our research, we identified a research question that would serve as a 
starting point, and conducted a literature review (Andersen et al., 2012) to gain a 
better understanding of the concepts our research question involved. It was in this 
phase that we decided to use the case study method.  
 
Research question 
The research question can be looked upon as the guiding star of one’s work as a 
researcher. It helps the researcher focus on the question at hand through the 
literature search, data collection, analysis and conclusion. You know where you’re 
headed, and it is easier to navigate through the your work as it proceeds. Without a 
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clear and specific question, it is easy to get lost when doing research (Rynes and 
Gephart Jr, 2004). 
 
We started out with an interest for innovation management, and a curiosity related to 
how some companies are both innovative and are increasingly profitable, which we 
have defined as experiencing an increasing financial profit. In our preliminary search 
for a topic within the field of innovation management, we discovered the topic of 
organizational ambidexterity. After reading up on the subject in the context of a 
preliminary study, we iterated several times until we decided on the research 
question: “How can service organizations balance innovation and effectiveness?” 
The question was created in parallel with the work in the preliminary study, and the 
preliminary study was conducted so that we could better understand the strengths 
and limitations of our research question. This preliminary study was conducted in the 
fall of 2012 in the form of a literature review (Andersen et al., 2012).  
 
Literature review  
We explored the concept of organizational ambidexterity theoretically in the literature 
review, and found an interesting research question while doing so. After reading 
many papers on ambidexterity in production-oriented companies, we became curious 
about how ambidexterity manifests itself in a service organization. The goal of the 
literature review was to increase our knowledge about the topic of ambidexterity, so 
that we could decide on a sound research question and design a good case study. 
We did not wish to create an exhaustive overview of existing theories on 
ambidexterity, but rather explore the literature to find interesting subjects. Starting at 
the broad term of innovation, we read about exploration and exploitation, and made 
decisions on which parts of this subject we wanted to focus on, and which parts we 
found less interesting. By choosing certain areas on which to focus, we coincidently 
rejected others. We whittled down our area of interest several times until we landed 
at the topic of achieving ambidexterity in service organizations.  
 
It was never our intention to conduct an encompassing literature review in the 
strictest sense. We did not uphold a rigorous regime of using strictly predefined 
search terms, or only referring to specific literary sources. We used the principles of 
snowballing, assessing relevance and open search in our information gathering 
(Webster and Watson, 2002). These principles are further explained in Table 4.3 
below. 
Table 4.3 The principles used in the literature study. 
Principle Description 
Snowball sampling Identify a set of leading scholars and their papers, and then 
identify additional relevant articles by examining the reference list. 
Assessing relevance Evaluate articles importance based on how many times it has 
been referenced in other articles, for instance by using Google 
Scholar. We also looked through previous curriculum to find 
names of scholars that were repeated often. 
Open search Involves searching for certain keywords in a search database that 
could help us find articles of relevance. Used when snowballing 
was not a sufficient technique for finding relevant material. 
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4.2.2 The Design 
The research question was developed through the literature review. The unit of 
analysis we wished to study was decided on in parallel with the review, and all of this 
influenced the new research question. We then developed a sample of subordinate 
propositions to help us better answer the main research question. 
 
Revision of research question and propositions 
After gaining more insight from the literature review, we decided to make some 
modifications to the research question. We decided that it would be appropriate to 
substitute the term “service sector” with the name of our case study company Making 
Waves, since we did not intend to describe the entire sector, just our single case. We 
also found out that the research question would be more precise if we substituted the 
terms innovation and effectiveness for exploration and exploitation. This led us to our 
revised research question: “How can Making Waves balance exploration and 
exploitation?” 
 
The research question is quite broad, so we used propositions to direct attention to 
certain parts we wanted to examine within the scope of our research question. 
According to Yin (2009), propositions can help researchers start moving in the right 
direction. We created a set of research propositions, and then revised them after our 
collection of empirical data, as part of our iterative process. The propositions were 
listed in subchapter 3.6, and are repeated here: 
 
1a: A value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve 
exploitation. 
1b: Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge and 
acquire new knowledge. 
2: An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a more rigid 
structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural approaches.  
3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with new and 
existing customers.  
3b: When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on 
exploitation than exploration. 
4: The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. 
5a: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
company culture. 
5b: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
knowledge management. 
 
The propositions are carefully developed to cover all the four main internal 
approaches towards organizational ambidexterity as presented in subchapter 3.5, 
which are architectural, contextual, combinatorial, and leadership approaches. They 
are also aligned with our empirical findings, which will be presented in chapter 6. All 
these elements are presented together in a comprehensible matrix in subchapter 
4.2.5 Analysis. While creating propositions and the new research question, we 
decided on our unit of analysis.  
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Choice of unit of analysis  
The unit of analysis is related to the research question because the choice of unit 
helps distinguish data about the subject of the case study (Yin, 2009). A lot of the 
theory we read about in our literature review was focused on large American or 
multinational companies, and these companies often showed evidence of a value 
chain configuration. We then decided upon four criteria for choosing our case 
company. We wanted to study a (1) Norwegian (2) service company, with a clear (3) 
innovative edge and (4) recurring economic success. We selected the first two 
criteria mainly because of the scope of the thesis, and because this was an area 
poorly covered in existing literature. We applied the two other criteria as guidelines to 
be able to find a case company that most likely would exhibit both explorative and 
exploitative activities and attitudes. In addition, the criterion on recurring economic 
success acted as a wide indicator on whether or not the case company could be 
defined as ambidextrous. 
 
We made a shortlist of a few candidates, with Making Waves at the top. We had met 
representatives from the company at a job-expo early in the fall of 2012, and found 
them very interesting. After some preliminary research, we contacted Making Waves 
in early November 2012, and they were immediately positive to the idea of having us 
write our masters thesis about them. The collaboration started with a short meeting 
on January 7th with the attendance of Kari Clifford, Helge L. Andersen and the 
director of Experience Design at Making Waves 
 
Considering the time and resource limit of a masters thesis, we chose to conduct a 
single-case study. Our rationale for choosing a single case is that our case company 
is a relevant example of a Norwegian value shop organization. We chose a holistic 
design for our case study, because we considered our analysis to be of Making 
Waves as a single unit, not several units within the company. A holistic design is 
advantageous when the relevant theory underlying the case study itself is of a 
holistic nature, or when no logical subunits can be identified (Yin, 2009). Theory 
about organizational ambidexterity is holistic in its nature, due to the fact that the 
balance of exploration and exploitation must be achieved at the organizational level. 
Although Making Waves has identifiable subunits in the form of business units and 
departments, our case study does not focus specifically on these, because almost all 
value-generating work is executed in multidisciplinary project teams with members 
from across the whole organizational structure. After agreeing to collaborate with 
Making Waves, and deciding on a case study design, we started the work of 
selecting informants.   
4.2.3 Preparation 
Case study research is one of the most difficult types of research to do, due to the 
absence of routine procedures. Careful planning of the research is therefore crucial 
(Merriam, 2002), and we did so by selecting informants and creating an interview 
guide. 
 
Selection of interview objects  
We asked Making Waves to send us their organizational chart, and we used this 
actively when choosing our first round of interview candidates. We tried to select a 
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variation of interview candidates, with different levels of management responsibility, 
ranging from the CEO to non-management employees. A list of the people we 
wanted to interview was sent Making Waves as well as a request for their 
suggestions on additional informants. When making our selection we decided to 
leave out employees from the Polish divisions, due to the fact that we wanted to 
focus on the Norwegian office, as this was our first criterion when choosing our unit 
of analysis. The focus of our thesis has been on the Norwegian office and Norwegian 
culture; also we did not have the resources to set up interviews with the Polish 
department. This will be elaborated on more in subchapter 4.5. In collaboration with 
Making Waves we ended up with 16 interview candidates in the first round of 
interviews, and we contacted the candidates ourselves after gaining permission to do 
so. We ended up scheduling and conducting 13 interviews between 11 and 18 
February 2013. 
 
After transcription and a preliminary analysis of our material, we decided to do a 
second round of interviews. During our first round of interviews, some employees 
were mentioned again and again, and we wanted to talk to them specifically. We also 
found that our sample was predominated by informants with design backgrounds. 
We increased our sample with employees from technology and strategy, without 
management responsibility. We also included the Minister of Culture, the director of 
sales and the manager from the human resources department. From March 18th to 
21st we interviewed another five people, and a complete overview of the informants. 
 
We believe that we have obtained a representative sample, due to the wide spread 
of responsibility and seniority, and by having both founder and non-founder 
candidates with or without ownership of the company. Although our sample includes 
more people from the Experience Design business unit than other units, we do not 
think that this weakens the representativeness of the sample, because the 
Experience Design unit is one of the larger units with the most departments. In order 
to gain a good understanding of the different roles that are critical in projects, we felt 
it was more important to speak with people from the different departments in 
Experience design, than to speak to more of the same type of employees from the 
other business units.  
 
We have created a graphical overview of the variation in our selection of informants 
(Figure 4.1). We have grouped the employees together by business unit 
responsibility or business unit belonging in the overview, whether or not they have a 
managerial position, with an exception for informants that hold a top management 
position. The informants with a top management position are not placed in the top 
management rectangle instead of in the business unit they belong to.  
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Table 4.4 Overview of the informants. 
 
 
# Title Business Unit Department 
Years 
in MW 
Years 
in 
merged 
comp. 
Tot
. 
Co-
Founde
r 
Stock-
holder 
Stock
 % 
1 Director Lifecycle Lifecycle 
Top 
management 3 4 7  X 0.1 
2 
Director 
People & 
Processes 
People & 
Processes 
Top 
management 12  12 X X 9.9 
3 Project manager 
People & 
Processes 
Project 
management 
 
1  1   0 
4 
Manager 
Project 
Managemen
t 
People & 
Processes 
Project 
management 12  12 X X 2.67 
5 
Senior 
Project 
Manager 
People & 
Processes 
Project 
management 8  8  X 0.1 
6 
Senior 
Designer / 
Front-end 
Experience 
Design 
Interaction 
Design 3 6 9   0 
7 CEO  
Administrati
on 
Top 
management 4  4 X X 8.6 
8 
Manager .N
ET 
 
Technology .NET 9 3 12 X  6.13 
9 
Manager 
Service 
Design 
Experience 
Design 
Service 
Design 1 5 6  X 0.72 
10 Interaction designer 1 
Experience 
Design 
Interaction 
Design 3  3   0 
11 Interaction designer 2 
Experience 
Design 
Interaction 
Design 3  3   0 
12 Manager PMO 
People & 
Processes Processes 7  7   0 
13 
Director 
Experience 
Design 
Experience 
Design 
Top 
management 3  3  X 0.76 
14 
Senior 
Strategy 
advisor 
Experience 
Design Strategy 3 5 8   0 
15 
Senior 
System 
developer 
 
Technology .NET 3  3   0 
16 Mister of Culture 
Experience 
Design 
Experience 
Design 12  12 X X 1.25 
17 
Director of 
Sales 
 
Sales Top management 12  12 X X 12.95 
18 
Human 
resource 
manager 
People & 
Processes People 3 1 4   0 
 72 
  
 
 
Figure 4.1 Visualization of selection of informants. 
Creating an interview guide 
To further prepare ourselves for the data collection, we created an interview guide. 
An interview guide is a brief list of memory prompts of areas to be covered (Bryman, 
2008). The interview guide was revised after the first round of interviews, as we 
discovered that some of our questions were unnecessary. We also decided to 
replace some of the questions we felt we couldn’t get more interesting data on with 
other questions. Both guides can be found in the appendix as Appendix 11.3 and 
Appendix 11.6.  
 
We tried to structure the interview around the approaches to ambidexterity that we 
have summarized in subchapter 3.7 in both interview guides. We also tried to include 
questions that were open and to some degree vague to counteract response bias in 
our answers, which is when the informants give the answer they believe the 
interviewer wants to hear. Asking open questions also give more leeway for the 
informants to include information that they think is important in their answers. An 
example of one of our questions is: “What is your interpretation of creative work?”  
 
We brought two recording devices to each interview, securing the permission of the 
informants to use the devices beforehand. We also gave a consent form with 
practical information about the interview to each informant (Appendix 11.1), and we 
explained the purpose of the interview. 
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4.2.4 Data collection  
When collecting case study one should, according to Yin (2009) use multiple sources 
of evidence, create a case study database, and maintain a chain of evidence. Using 
more than one source of data is called triangulation, and it results in more convincing 
discussions and conclusions (Stake, 1995). Our main source of empirical data is the 
interviews, but to get a richer and more in-depth understanding of the case company, 
we added observations and written material as secondary sources to nuance the 
picture. We have also tried our best to adhere to the two other principles for data 
collection presented by Yin (2009), by creating a case study database and by striving 
to maintain a chain of evidence through our work. Our case study database is 
comprised of a structured Dropbox folder, containing relevant theory articles and all 
the empirical data. We have used Google drive to systemize our analysis and write 
our thesis. The rest of this subchapter will concern itself with explaining how we 
collected our data.  
 
Interviews 
All interviews were carried out in the offices of Making Waves, either in small meeting 
rooms or in their cafeteria. The interviews were semi-structured and focused. Semi-
structured interviews refer to a context where an interviewer uses an interview guide, 
but can vary the sequence of questions and ask further questions (Bryman, 2008). A 
focused interview entails a person being interviewed for a short period of time, for 
instance an hour (Yin, 2009). We chose this interview form because we wanted to 
speak to several employees and therefore had to keep each interview short. We also 
wanted the freedom to follow up on answers we thought were interesting, even 
though the follow-up questions were not in our interview guide. All three researchers 
were not present at all interviews, so we let the absentee transcribe the respective 
interviews. To better the objectivity, we sought to alternate who took the role as lead 
interviewer, who transcribed the interview and who analysed the different interviews. 
Table 4.6 in subchapter 4.2.5 shows the distribution of the different tasks.  
 
Observation  
We decided to use direct observations as an additional data source to interviews. 
Direct observations are useful due to the fact that they provide researchers with 
realistic and contextual data (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).  
 
We observed three meetings when we conducted the last rounds of interviews. We 
sat quietly by the wall during the meetings, and noted things we thought were 
interesting. We obtained the data in form of written notes that were used in the 
discussion of our interviews, although we do not include them in this thesis.  
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Table 4.5 The observed meetings. 
Type of meeting Participants Duration Comment 
Portfolio and 
prioritizing meeting 
Top management 
and business unit 
managers 
01:30:00 
There was some 
traffic in and out of 
the meeting 
Employee meeting All employees 00:30:00 
The meeting was 
held during lunch 
Strategy group 
meeting 
The strategy 
department 
01:00:00 Not all members 
were present 
 
Other written material  
We were given access to several different documents that we used in our case 
study. These documents included: the organizational chart, the meeting schedule, 
the 2012 annual report, corporate checklists, and the employee contact lists. We also 
used publically available documents, such as the Making Waves website and other 
online data sources to increase our understanding of their business context. 
4.2.5 Analysis  
One of the challenges with qualitative research is that it generates a lot of data 
(Bryman, 2008). This was something that we could relate to, as the transcribed 
interviews alone added up to 318 pages of dense text. With few straightforward rules 
about how to carry out the analysis, these large bodies of unstructured text seemed 
at times insurmountable. We divided the process of reviewing the interviews into 
analysis, discussion and linking theory with data.  
 
Analysis of empirical data 
We chose to use a strategy for analysing data that is inspired by grounded theory 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The grounded theory strategy aims to generate theory 
out of empirical data by achieving a close fit between the two. The process involves 
theoretical sampling, coding and theoretical saturation (Charmaz, 2006).Theoretical 
sampling is the process of collecting data while at the same time coding and 
analysing the data to decide which data to find next. Coding has to do with breaking 
down the theory into component parts until the theory cannot be divided further. 
Saturation describes the point where no extra data can be found to illuminate a 
category, and no further concepts can be created by the method of coding (Charmaz, 
2006). 
 
The outcomes of grounded theory are categories created from concepts, hypothesis 
and theory. Categories are concepts that have been elaborated on until they are 
thought to represent a real world phenomenon, and hypothesis are initial hunches 
about relationships between concepts (Charmaz, 2006).Theory, in the context of 
grounded theory, is a set of well-developed categories that are related through 
statements to form a theoretical framework that explain a relevant phenomenon 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). We started out by transcribing the interviews, and we 
included just about all the words that were exchanged when we transcribed, as well 
as sounds. As mentioned earlier, all three of us tried to work on each interview. Table 
4.6 shows how we distributed the different tasks, as well as the length of each 
interview. The reasons for the varying length of the interviews are that some 
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informants had more to say on some questions than others,  and that some 
informants had more available time than others. This may result in a situation where 
some informants become more influential than others in the discussion of the data.   
 
Table 4.6 The interviews 
Interview  # Duration Interview 
lead 
Transcribed 
by 
Analysed 
by 
1 01:16:40 Tharald Tharald Helge 
2 48:50 Tharald Helge Kari 
3 51:09 Kari Kari Tharald 
4 01:03:57 Kari Kari Tharald 
5 55:02 Tharald Helge Kari 
6 01:22:51 Kari Tharald Helge 
7 01:11:11 Tharald Helge Kari 
8 59:17 Kari Kari Helge 
9 53:05 Tharald Kari Helge 
10 01:00:16 Helge Kari Tharald 
11 01:07:07 Helge Tharald Kari 
12 56:40 Helge Tharald Helge 
13 01:06:39 Kari Tharald Kari 
14 56:06 Kari Kari Tharald 
15 54:48 Tharald Helge Kari 
16 53:54 Helge Helge Helge 
17 01:18:04 Kari Tharald Tharald 
18 01:08:43 Tharald Helge Tharald 
 
After transcribing the interviews, we gathered all of the transcripts in one document, 
and decided to use open coding to find categories. Open coding consists of breaking 
down and categorizing data, which yields to concepts that will later be used to create 
new categories (Bryman, 2008). We read through each interview and created 
concepts such as “management”. Then we read through the interview again and 
divided the first concepts into sub-categories, such as “Human resource 
management”. We continued until we could no longer divide our concepts into 
smaller categories. After labeling the different concepts, we tried to group them into 
overarching categories. This process involved long discussions and more coding, 
and we found ourselves going back into the theory from our literature review as well. 
In the end, we managed to decide on three core categories we felt were relevant to 
 76 
  
 
our theory and represented real-world phenomena. These categories were: 1) 
Organizational culture, 2) Knowledge management and 3) Strategic orientation.  
 
After creating our main concepts, we sorted the relevant empirical data between 
them. We included empirical data in the form of our representation of the interviews, 
as well as quotes. We translated the quotes from Norwegian into English, since our 
thesis is written in English. Also we removed sounds such as “ehm” and “ehhhh”. We 
ended up with a document containing our three main concepts associated data, 
which in this thesis is called chapter 6 Empirical data The next step was to discuss 
the empirical data, and link our findings with theory.  
 
Discussion of empirical data 
After creating our core categories, we went through a long process of discussing 
what the data meant, how one could understand the propositions in light of the data, 
and how we could link our findings to other theories. We started out with several 
hypotheses about the relationships between the different concepts we had created, 
and we discussed these in relation to our research question and propositions. The 
process involved going back to subchapter 3.5 to look for examples of where our 
empirical data conflicted with what we expected from theory. We also reviewed our 
propositions, and found that some were no longer relevant due to the fact that we did 
not have empirical data to support or refute them. We iterated several times between 
the theory and the empirical data, and altered some of the propositions so that we 
could discuss them on the basis of both. After much iteration we came to a 
conclusion about how we would like to structure the discussion and link the theory up 
to the empirical data.  
 
Linking theory with empirical data  
We decided to discuss the data from our core categories in chapter 6 in relation to 
the four main approaches to ambidexterity from subchapter 3.5. We visualized this 
setup as a matrix, displaying our empirical categories vertically and the theoretical 
approaches horizontally. Our propositions involved at least one empirical category 
and one of the theoretical approaches, and visualized the relation as grey ellipses or 
circles between the areas they were related to. The result is shown as Figure 4.2.  
 
We then discussed each proposition in the light of the empirical data categories and 
the theoretical approaches. We tried to sum up each discussion with bullet points or 
tables when possible to make sure that we did not lose sight of our arguments when 
concluding.  
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Figure 4.2 Linking theory with empirical data. 
4.2.6 Conclusions 
In our discussion, we ended up supporting three, partly supporting four propositions, 
and not being able to support one proposition. We made new theories when 
possible, and suggested some practical implications for Making Waves.  
4.3 Quality Criteria 
All research involves the risk of making mistakes that will affect and skew the end 
outcome. This is especially true for qualitative research, such as case study research 
designs, due to the fact that the research design has few strict rules, takes long time 
and generates large amounts of data (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Flyvbjerg, 
2006) . 
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) describe trustworthiness and authenticity as criteria for 
assessing a qualitative study. Trustworthiness has four sub criteria: credibility, 
transferability, dependability and conformability. The criteria authenticity has the sub 
criteria: fairness, ontological, educative, catalytic and tactical authenticity. We have 
presented the criteria and sub criteria together with their definition and the measures 
we have taken to ensure quality of each criterion below. The two tables present an 
important overview of how we have ensured that the quality of our case study is 
consistent. 
 
The measures we took to ensure credibility, that leads to trustworthiness, were to 
make sure that our interviews were conducted and transcribed in an orderly manner, 
and that our informants were well aware of their rights to anonymity. To make our 
study more transferable, we made sure to select many different types of informants, 
and to help guarantee dependability we created a case study database and an 
interview guide. To ensure conformability, we crafted a consent form and were open 
about our personal goals for the study from the start.  
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Table 4.7 Quality criteria. 
Sub 
criterion 
Definition Measure taken to ensure quality 
Credibility Whether the 
researchers 
observations match 
with the theoretical 
ideas they develop 
When transcribing we included all the words and 
sounds to make sure we didn’t disregard anything in 
our analysis.   
Empirical data was sent back to the informants for 
review, to make sure that we agreed on what had been 
said.  
Use of multiple data sources (interview, observation, 
written material). 
Including a lot of empirical data in the form of quotes.  
Using tape recorders to ensure that no data was lost.  
Iterating on research questions and propositions 
throughout the process. 
Transfer-
ability 
The degree in which 
findings can be 
generalized across 
social settings 
Since we had a single-case we could not replicate 
process to ensure transferability. Instead we used a 
substantial amount of data to link to our empirical 
findings.  
Having a fairly large and varied selection of informants.  
Depend-
ability 
The degree in which 
the study can be 
replicated 
Creating a case study database with all interviews and 
other relevant material. 
Using an interview guide and sticking to the themes 
during interviews. 
Having an overview of the project in the form of our 
written thesis. 
Conform-
ability 
Ensuring that the 
researcher has acted 
in good faith 
Talking about what our personal goals were for the 
case study. 
Crafting a consent form together in the research group. 
 
 
Table 4.8 shows the measures we to ensure authenticity. Most notably, we made 
sure that the informants could review our empirical data before we submitted our 
thesis, and interviewed people from all levels of the organizational hierarchy. 
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Table 4.8 Quality criteria and the measures we have taken to ensure authenticity. 
Sub 
criterion 
Definition Measure taken to ensure quality 
Fairness Ensuring that the 
research represents 
the view of all 
informants 
Interviewing an array of employees, from the CEO to 
non-management positions.  
Ontological 
authenticity 
Ensuring that the 
research has helped 
informants understand 
their social 
environment 
The thesis will be sent to Making Waves when we are 
finished, and hopefully they learn something about the 
company while reading it.  
Also we have sent them the empirical data beforehand.  
Educative 
authenticity 
Whether the research 
helps informants 
understand the 
perspective of the 
others 
We are interviewing employees in all positions, and the 
thesis will be available to all participants in our case 
study. By that we hope that they can learn something 
about each other by reading their input in the empirical 
data.  
Catalytic 
authenticity 
Whether the research 
acts as an impetus for 
the informants to 
change their 
circumstances 
We hope that any information we have helped uncover 
will be significant enough to motivate the company to 
act on it.  
Tactical 
authenticity 
Whether the research 
empowers the 
informants to change 
their circumstances 
Our goal has been to create new theory rather than to 
present strategic advice. Still the practical implications 
that we uncovered in our conclusion will be shared in 
the thesis.  
 
4.4 Ethics and anonymity 
It is important to consider the ethical principles when doing research. Diener et al. 
(1978) present four main areas of ethics, which a researcher should be cautious of: 
1) Harm to participants, 2) Lack of informed consent, 3) Invasion of privacy and 4) 
Whether deception is involved. We will not elaborate on each principle, but discuss 
the measures we have taken to make sure that we are considering the ethical 
principles.   
 
Harm to participants can entail making the informants lose their self-esteem, become 
stressed or perform shameful acts (Bryman, 2008). We believe that our written 
accounts of the informants shed a positive light on them, and that there is no risk of 
offending any of them in our thesis. Our questions have largely been regarding their 
workplace and their jobs, which are not considered sensitive subjects. We presented 
the informant with an informant consent form before we interviewed them, and 
explained what our goal with the interview was. We explained who we are and the 
aim of our thesis. We also explained that we were going to use a tape recorder, but 
that the recording would not be made public, and that the informants would be 
anonymised, and that they would have the chance to examine the empirical data 
before publication. We also presented ourselves, and what our purpose was in each 
of the meetings we observed. We therefore do not consider lack of consent to be an 
issue in our research. We still acknowledge the fact that it is quite difficult to present 
 80 
  
 
participants with absolutely all the information they may need to make an informed 
decision. The fact that we did not wish to use the exact terms exploration and 
exploitation, to avoid response bias in the informant’s answers, may have contributed 
to that.  
 
The informants’ names are replaced with their business titles in the empirical data, 
but we admit that this does not provide complete anonymity for the informants that 
have unique roles or top management roles. Although we have not mentioned the 
CEO’s name, it would not be difficult for a person reading our thesis to figure out who 
the CEO of Making Waves is. We have also described his personality in greater 
detail than other informants, due to the fact that one of our propositions calls for this 
information. This puts us in a position where we may run the risk of invasion of 
privacy, which (Bryman, 2008) describes as upholding the privacy of the informants 
and keeping the information they share confidential. We sent our empirical data 
chapter back to all informants so that they could let us know if they felt that their 
privacy was invaded, and we have been very cautious with the written and audio 
material that we have gathered to ensure confidentiality.  
 
We are pretty certain that we have not broken the ethical principle of deception. 
Although we did not explain our thesis in the exact theoretical terms, we explained it 
well enough to give our informants a fair understanding of what we intended to do. It 
would not be nice, nor practical, to lie about the purpose, because it would directly 
counteract the goal of trying to understand how Making Waves balances exploration 
and exploitation. We would also like to add that none of us authors has been working 
for the case company before, or has signed any agreement on commencement of 
employment after finishing our master’s degree. Now that we have discussed the 
ethics of our thesis we will move on to the critique of methodology.  
4.5 Critique of methodology 
When creating a case study, there will always be a risk of inherit weaknesses in the 
design. The first step in counteracting weaknesses that might render the case study 
useless, is to be aware of which parts of the design can be criticized. This 
subchapter includes a summary our critique of our choices, and how they relate to 
the quality criteria and ethical principles that we have discussed in the previous 
subchapters. We have decided to present this information in a table format, where 
each table represents a phase of the case study as presented in Table 4.2 in 
subchapter 4.2. Each table describes the particular step of the phase, a critique of 
our choices in that step, the negative consequences of the choices and a comment 
on why we made the choices despite the critique. After each table we will summarize 
briefly, and the next subchapter will present an overall summary of our case study 
research design, as well as our own reflections.  
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Table 4.9 Criticism, consequences, and comments for the planning phase  
Steps Critique Consequences Comment 
Research 
question 
Unsettled research 
question before 
literature review.  
May make it difficult to 
navigate through the 
theory, and can also 
weaken dependability. 
The unsettled research 
question allowed us to iterate 
until we found something that 
we were interested in. 
Literature 
review 
No rigorous regime 
of using strictly 
predefined search 
terms, or only 
referring to specific 
literary sources. 
May weaken 
dependability. 
Our loose structure made us 
less constricted, and we were 
able to explore the theory 
more freely. 
 
As one can see in Table 4.9 from our critique of the planning phase, we did not have 
a clear research question, or a strict plan for how we wished to carry out our the 
literature review. This gave us the flexibility of finding an interesting research 
question and our own approach to theories along the way. We did not have much 
knowledge about the field of innovation management and ambidexterity beforehand, 
and we therefore felt that a flexible plan would help us zone in on the interesting 
research question while in the process of learning more about the field.  
 
Table 4.10 Criticism, consequences, and comments for the design phase  
Steps Critique Consequences Comment 
Revision of 
research 
question and 
propositions 
No clear defined 
propositions before 
the empirical data 
was collected. 
May make it difficult for 
others to follow our 
process, and weaken 
dependability. 
Allowed for an iterative 
process. 
Choice of 
unit of 
analysis  
We chose a 
company that has 
been successful and 
profitable for a long 
time.  
The fact that things are 
going well may 
influence our 
informants’ critical 
thinking, and therefore 
weaken catalytic 
authenticity. 
The success may be a result 
of a good balance of 
exploration and exploitation, 
which in fact is part of our aim 
to observe in our research. 
 
We did not have defined propositions before we created our case study in the design 
phase (Table 4.10). Not having propositions provided flexibility to find the 
propositions that best fit our research question through an iterative process.  
 
We chose a successful and growing company for our study, which may have resulted 
in skewed information, since employees in a successful company may be 
unreasonably appreciative of their company. Employees in a declining company 
might have better suited for identifying issues with their employer. Still, the success 
can be a result of ambidexterity, which is exactly the concept we have set out to 
study. 
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Table 4.11 Criticism, consequences, and comments for the preparation phase  
Steps Critique Consequences Comment 
Selection of 
interview 
objects. 
Possible over-
representation of 
informants from 
Experience Design, 
less from technology 
and marketing. 
May distort the focus 
and weaken fairness. 
Experience Design has a lot of 
different sub-units, so we did 
not interview lots of people 
with the same position. 
Did not include 
anyone from the 
Polish division in our 
selection. 
May weaken the 
fairness and the 
educative authenticity. 
We did not have the resources 
to do this. Also, we have been 
clear about focusing on the 
Norwegian culture.   
Creating an 
interview 
guide 
No clear case study 
protocol to 
accompany the 
interview guide. 
May weaken the 
dependability of our 
research. 
Is not as important for single-
case studies. 
We did not practice 
interviewing with our 
guide. 
Some of us might have 
asked questions that 
could be seen as an 
invasion of privacy. 
Tharald has journalism 
experience, so we let him 
interview first to learn from 
him.  
 
The most notable critique from the preparation phase (Table 4.11) was that we did 
not include any employees from the Polish division in our selection of interview 
objects. It is obvious that this can weaken our research, but we have several good 
reasons why we made this choice. First and foremost we were especially interested 
in the Norwegian context of ambidexterity, which is also why one of the criteria for 
our selection of unit of analysis was that the company were to be Norwegian. 
Secondly, we did not have the resources to fly to Poland, or to have the Polish 
employees come visit us in Norway. Thirdly, the language barrier could have 
lessened the quality of the interviews.  
 
As one can see from our critique of the data collection phase (Table 4.12), we 
planned our observation in terms of how we would collect the data or what we would 
use the data for. Although the observation helped us gain a more thorough 
understanding of Making Waves, we should have been more structured in our 
approach to make the most of the data. Despite not having decided upon how to use 
the written material we collected, we were able to obtain important information from 
them. 
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Table 4.12 Criticism, consequences, and comments for the data collection phase  
Steps Critique Consequences Comment 
Interviews Varying length of 
interviews. 
May result in some 
informants being more 
influential than others. 
Can be explained by different 
talking-speeds.  
Not all interviewees 
read the informant 
consent form. 
May result in lack of 
informed consent. 
We explained our purpose in 
addition to giving out the 
consent forms. 
Observation Extremely positive 
atmosphere in 
meetings, perhaps 
due to the good 
results the company 
are achieving. 
May influence our 
thinking, and result in a 
description of the 
company that weakens 
ontological authenticity. 
The atmosphere could very 
well also be a part of their 
culture.  
Few notes were 
taken and none were 
used in the chapter 
presenting empirical 
data. 
The small sample, and 
ad hoc notes did not 
contribute significantly in 
our analysis. We could 
have used our 
resources to conduct 
more interviews.  
Even though we didn’t use 
the data, the input helped us 
understand the company and 
the informants better.  
Written 
material 
No clear goal of how 
the written material 
would benefit our 
thesis. 
May result in a random 
selection of non-
standard documents, 
and therefore weaken 
dependability. 
We found several uses of the 
documents in retrospect.  
 
Table 4.13 Criticism, consequences, and comments for the analysis phase 
Steps Critique Consequences Comment 
Discussion of 
empirical 
data 
Translating 
interviews from 
Norwegian to 
English. 
May skew the meaning 
of the sentences and 
weaken credibility. 
Was necessary due to the 
thesis language. 
Removing sounds 
such as “ehm” and 
“ehhhh”, although 
these are included in 
the transcript. 
May remove context and 
weaken credibility. 
Most likely this action made 
the empirical data more 
readable. 
Linking 
theory with 
data 
Trying to fit empirical 
data into a 
theoretical 
framework.  
Our eagerness to find 
relations between the 
two can create a vague 
connection, and may 
weaken the credibility 
and ontological 
authenticity. 
We only make suggestions 
about new theory where we 
see that the theory and data 
converge or conflict on 
several points.  
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In the analysis phase (Table 4.13) we altered the data we had collected by 
translating the Norwegian interview to English, and by removing words such as 
“ehm” and “ehhh” to improve readability. This can weaken credibility by removing 
nuances in the language that may result in a different understanding of the text. This 
was a necessary measure, since we translated our material to English, and some 
phrases and expressions were not translatable. We did our best to be extremely 
careful when translating.   
 
Table 4.14 Evaluation of the phase of sharing the results. 
Step Critique Consequences Comments 
Conclusions Inexperienced 
researchers.  
May weaken all quality 
criteria of our research.  
We have received guidance 
from more experienced 
researcher.  
 
In the phase of sharing the results (Table 4.14), the central critique is our own 
inexperience as researchers. This critique relates to all other phases of the research 
design, and can weaken the quality of our final conclusions. We have educated 
ourselves by studying literature on research design to counteract this contingent 
weakness, and we have had frequent meetings with our supervisor. We will now 
proceed to an overall summary of and reflections on our methodology.   
4.6 Summary and reflections on methodology 
Although we have made several choices in our research that can be criticized, we 
have counteracted the most prominent weaknesses in our case study design. The 
fact that we did not have a clear research question, fixed propositions and strict plan 
in our literature guide allowed us to iterate as we moved through the theory, and end 
up with a well reasoned and current research question. Our choice of focusing on 
Norwegian business culture, and thereby the Norwegian office of our case company, 
justifies our choice of not interviewing Polish employees. The negative effects that 
can be caused by the unstructured approach to the observation should have been 
mitigated by the fact that we were very structured in our approach in the interviews. 
With 18 interviews conducted according to the guidelines in social research literature, 
we still have a sound foundation of empirical data, and the observations and written 
helps us to triangulate our data. Our inexperience as researchers can obviously 
affect the quality of our case study design, but we believe we have taken the 
appropriate measures to counteract those negative. This has resulted in a sound 
case study with well thought out ways of counteracting possible weaknesses in the 
design. Still, when reflecting on the process, we have realized that there are several 
things we could have done differently if we had more time. Two ways of improving 
and extending our case study would be to interview more people within the 
organization, and broaden the scope of our theoretical focus to include external 
approaches to ambidexterity as well. 
 
To extend this research, we would also recommend combining the four criteria we 
used to guide us in our choice of case company differently, the four criteria being: (1) 
Norwegian (2) service company, with a clear (3) innovative edge and (4) recurring 
economic success. One could, for instance, keep criteria 2), 3) and 4), but choose to 
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study a company in a different country than Norway. By doing so, one would be able 
to isolate ambidexterity in a company with a Norwegian business culture, by 
comparing it to other companies with different cultures. One could keep all criteria 
but 4) constant and choose to study an unsuccessful company instead of one that is 
successful. If other scholars were to contribute with more single case studies, it 
would be possible to create a basis for doing a cross case analysis. This is 
something that future students may consider as a possibility for their master theses. 
 
The fact that there were three of us has held both advantages and disadvantages. 
Each decision we made took longer, because we wanted the whole group to agree, 
and it is difficult to maintain a complete overview of the thesis at all times. The 
advantages of having three group members are the good discussions due to different 
perspectives and academic backgrounds from both industrial engineering and 
industrial design. Being three persons, we were also able to collect more empirical 
data than we would be able to on our own. We have definitely gained a great deal of 
respect for qualitative research, as we have gained a greater understanding of the 
complexity it entails. The next two chapters will present our selection of empirical 
data, starting out with a chapter with a description of our case company and 
continuing with a chapter with empirical data in the form of quotes.   
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5 Case Company 
In the previous chapter, we described the methods used to gather data for this thesis. 
In this chapter, we will present relevant data on Making Waves from written sources, 
observations, and a presentation held by their director of People and Processes. We 
will describe our perception of their offices and their company profile, together with a 
description of their business system, size, and turnover. The information in this 
chapter will serve as a supplement to the interview data presented in chapter 6, and 
we will use the information from both in our discussion in chapter 7.  
5.1 Overview and brief history  
Making Waves is a consultancy firm that develops, designs and operates digital 
services. The company has a total of 300 employees that are specialized within the 
fields of strategy, design, technology and communications (Hellem, 2013). Making 
Waves was established in 2001 by a group of people that believed there were 
opportunities in the combination of design, technology and the Internet (Hellem, 
2013). Making Waves was profitable from the year one, and have since then 
achieved a constant growth in annual sales. The company established a Polish 
division in 2004 and continued to strengthen their technical expertise by acquiring the 
IT-company Trimanet (Making Waves, 2013).  
 
Making Waves acquired the design-agency deVille in 2005. In 2008, the company 
had 130 employees and an increase in income despite the unstable economy 
(Making Waves, 2013). In 2010, Making Waves acquired the company Tarantell who 
bear a close resemblance to Making Waves. Their latest acquisition is the small 
company Zoot and was conducted in 2012. In this way they established their own 
business unit within the emerging market of service design. The current CEO made 
his entry in 2009 (Making Waves, 2013). Making Waves of 2013 aspires to be a 
creative and an innovative consultancy firm, creating user-oriented computer 
systems for other companies. Their goal is to run as many projects as possible in-
house, thus keeping employees involved with projects within Making Waves office 
spaces (Hellem, 2013). 
5.2 Offices 
This chapter is a summary of our observations of Making Waves that we made while 
spending time in their offices between interviews. We present this overview of the 
physical working space because it is relevant in our discussion in chapter 7. Making 
Waves has its office space in central Oslo, right next to Det Norske Teatret, which is 
the second largest theatre in Norway, and only a block away from the Norwegian 
parliament building. The offices used to be two separate buildings, where the 
newspaper Dagsavisen occupied one, and a small art gallery the other. The art 
gallery section is easily the most visible from the street, with its large windows 
displaying the interior of Making Waves’ cafeteria. The cafeteria itself strongly 
resembles a public café, with scattered tables and a barista working behind the 
coffee bar. The top management have put a lot of effort into making the cafeteria as 
welcoming and relaxing as possible, enabling it to be the main area for meeting 
colleagues and receiving visitors. Employees are served warm lunch, and tend to eat 
at the same time, filling up most of the seats. 
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The other part of the building houses workspaces and meeting rooms. It also houses 
the reception, which, as with the cafeteria, has been made to be as welcoming as 
possible. It has warm lighting, a coffee table with magazines, relaxing music and two 
receptionists. Most employees at Making Waves work in open landscapes, spread 
across three floors. People with different skills are partly mixed together in the open 
landscapes. But the main bulk of administration, management and project leaders 
are located on the first floor, whereas programmers and other technical personnel 
are on the second floor. Designers are located on the third floor. The ground floor 
houses no office spaces, only conference rooms, the reception and the cafeteria.  
 
There is not much elbowroom for people working in the open landscapes, and sound 
carries easily, requiring the employees to remain relatively quiet. Project rooms are 
available for groups working together, making their communication much less 
obtrusive for others. Also there are glassed conference rooms, which any employee 
can reserve both for internal meetings and meeting with customers and other 
external parties. These open, white-walled rooms seem designed to communicate 
Making Waves’ creative profile. They have slogans on the walls such as “”Design is 
not just what it looks like and feels like. Design is how it works”. Otherwise the office 
environment is sparsely decorated.  
5.3 Business system and organizational system 
A business system can be defined simply as “how a firm makes money”, or in a more 
formal manner as “the specific configuration of resources, value-adding activities and 
product/service offerings directed at creating value for customers” (De Wit and Meyer, 
2010). Making Waves’ business system is to provide their customers with tailored 
digital services such as mobile applications, e-commerce websites and intranet 
systems. They combine employees with different fields of specialty in multi-
disciplinary project teams, and pride themselves in having a user-centred approach 
in their development process.  
 
The organizational structure refers to the gathering of tasks and people into smaller 
groups, due to the fact that division of labour is necessary for an organization to 
function efficiently (De Wit and Meyer, 2010). A functional structure is based on 
different value-adding activities being carried out. Figure 5.1 shows Making Waves’ 
organizational chart, and short descriptions of the business can be found under the 
figure (Hellem, 2013). The five main business units within Making Waves are 
Experience Design, Technology, Project Management (PM), Marketing & 
Communication, and Lifecycle. Each of these business units contributes with a 
separate activity linked to the development of digital services. The Polish division 
deals almost exclusively with technological solutions. All units that have employees 
in Poland have a red dot in Figure 5.1. Although employees are placed in vertical 
business units, most work is project based, and therefore employees are organized 
in multidisciplinary teams that stretch horizontally over business units.  
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Figure 5.1 Making Waves' organizational chart. 
 
The experience design unit 
Experience design is the main design unit, with several sub units that deal with 
designing user-centric products. The sub unit Strategy is the consultancy part of 
Making Waves, with design-oriented employees guiding other companies. Service 
design is a brand new design unit that designs complete experiences for customers, 
both in terms of software, hardware and the user’s surroundings. Interaction design 
works with human-computer interaction. Graphic design is the act of making visual 
messages understandable for humans. Experience research collects user data for 
deciding how to create products. 
 
The Technology unit 
The technology unit is divided into sub units based on digital platforms and 
programming languages. Front-end & Mobile is a joint unit for two different 
disciplines: Front-end is the part of computer systems that users interact with, 
whereas Mobile is a collection of all mobile platforms, such as smart phones and 
tablets. .NET I and .NET II are two units responsible for developing in 
Microsoft’s .NET programming language, whereas Java/Open Source is responsible 
for developing in the Java programming language and dealing with Open Source 
products.  
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PM/PMO  
Project Management is the unit with project managers, who are run the various 
projects within Making Waves. PM stands for Project management, and PMO stands 
for Project management office, a newly created unit that is responsible for improving 
the projects’ transition from phase to phase, particularly from the sales to project start 
up phase.  
 
Marketing & Communication 
Content services either create text and other content for websites, or guide other 
companies on how to do it themselves. Digital marketing helps other companies 
market themselves in the digital domain. 
 
Lifecycle 
Lifecycle is the unit responsible for maintaining systems after they have been created 
through projects. Client Service Management is responsible for making systems run 
on newer clients. Application management is responsible for maintaining and 
develop existing systems further by adding minor features. 
5.4 Growth 
Making Waves has grown steadily since being founded in 2001, with the exception of 
2010-2012, where they acquired and then merged with Tarantell, making a large 
jump from 180 to 281 employees (Figure 5.2).  
 
Figure 5.2. The development of number of employees in Making Waves. 
Looking at company development from 2009 to 2012 (Hellem, 2013), we see that 
Making Waves lost money in 2010, which, according to management, was due to 
expenses when acquiring Tarantell. In their yearly report from 2012, the board of 
Making Waves expects a steady growth in the coming years, mostly from projects 
abroad, with the Norwegian market remaining stable (Hellem, 2013). 
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Figure 5.3 Making Waves' revenue and profit.  
5.5 Summary 
Making Waves is a consultancy company with a creative profile. They create 
computer systems, digital strategies, marketing campaigns, and content for their 
customers. The work is project based and performed in multidisciplinary teams. 
Making Waves is divided into several business units, and all the technology units 
have employees in Poland. Making Waves has grown considerably in size since 
2001, and had a turnover of 220 million kroner in 2012, with 281 employees. We 
have presented an overview of Making Waves based on written documents and our 
own observations. In the next chapter, we will present empirical data in the form of 
selected excerpts from the 18 interviews we held, which again will be used for 
discussing our propositions in chapter 7. 
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6 Empirical data 
In this chapter, we will state our most relevant empirical findings. Most of the 
collected material is in the form of interviews, and we will therefore present relevant 
quotes within our three main topics: Company culture, knowledge management, and 
strategic orientation. The topics of this subchapter are not meant to serve as strict 
classifications, but as a way of grouping together themes that are related to the 
research question. To increase the level of transparency we have included quite a lot 
of empirical data in this chapter. The data in this chapter is still just a small part of the 
transcribed interviews. Before presenting our empirical data, we will describe the 
three core empirical categories that emerged from our coding and analysis. 
 
Company culture 
Company culture is the first topic in the collection of empirical data. In an article from 
1990, Edgar H. Schein claimed that defining company culture was a difficult task, 
because the concept of organizations itself was ambiguous. He stated that it is 
enough for the purpose of company theory to specify that any definable group with a 
shared history has a culture. Therefore, if the organization as a whole has had 
shared experiences, there will also be an overall company culture (Schein, 1990).  
 
In this thesis, company culture includes the working language, values, visions, 
systems, beliefs, norms, symbols and habits of the entire organization. We see it as 
the collective behaviour of the employees, and how these behaviours are taught to 
new members of the organization.  
 
Knowledge management  
Knowledge management is the second topic in the collection of empirical data. It can 
be defined as something that involves blending a company’s internal and external 
information and turning it into actionable knowledge via a technology platform 
(Alvesson and Kärreman, 2001). Gupta et al. (2000) define knowledge management 
as “a process that deals with the development, storage, retrieval, and dissemination 
of information and expertise within an organization to support and improve its 
business performance”.   
 
There is no common definition of the subject, and although we agree with both 
Alvesson and Kärreman (2001) and (Gupta et al., 2000), we decided to refer to 
knowledge management in an even broader sense. The topic of knowledge 
management has to do with all aspects of how a company refines and transfers their 
current knowledge within the organization, and how the organization acquires new 
knowledge. This includes all practices and strategies that are used to create, 
distribute, share and represent both explicit and tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge 
can be articulated, written down, and stored, which means that it is easily 
transferable to other people. Tacit knowledge is based on experiences from activities, 
and cannot easily be described with words.  
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Strategic orientation 
Strategic orientation is the third empirical category and defined by Kumar et al. 
(2012, p.133) as “a pattern of responses that an organization makes to its operating 
environment in order to enhance performance and gain competitive advantage”. This 
category does not concern its self with Making Waves’ external relations, even 
though it may seem so. In this category we examine closer how they relate to the 
outside world, effects the their internal operations. How their project portfolio or 
strategic direction affects their everyday business. It does not examine how Making 
Waves achieves ambidexterity through their external relationships, but how these 
relationships affect their ability to internally achieve ambidexterity. 
6.1 Company culture 
In this subchapter, we will present the data that we collected on company culture, 
such as vision, mission statement, design thinking methodology and hierarchy. We 
will also present the establishment of the position of Minister of Culture and what this 
title means for Making Waves. We will describe what we found related to how the 
company includes new members into the organization, and the sharing-culture that 
several informants mention. Lastly, we will show how autonomy is an central part of 
managing Making Waves. 
6.1.1 Vision and mission statement 
Making Waves has a clearly articulated vision and mission. A vision is a long-term 
aim and a desirable future state, and a mission is a set of principles that forms a 
base of a company’s identity and guides is decision-making.  
 
Making Waves’ vision is: “A fantastic place to work”, and the mission is “Create 
delightful experiences”, and they were created in 2010 in the aftermath of what many 
of the informants referred to as an internal crisis that was solved by excellent 
leadership. The background for the story was that the top managements decided to 
create and implement a performance management system right after they merged 
with the design company Tarantell.  
 
They had spent probably a thousand working hours on finishing that system, 
but when they presented it on a kick-off, most of the employees felt it was like 
a surveillance system. “Now we’ll find out who knows what, so that we can 
keep the right people”. That was how many of the employees felt. The 
presentation lasted one hour, and I think that the guy who held the 
presentation felt really uncomfortable, that he felt like the big, bad wolf. And 
then management decided to just axe the whole project. 
Director,)Lifecycle!
 
Removing the performance management system made Making Waves return to their 
original values, which was that the founders wanted to make a company in which 
they would enjoy working. At that point, they created the vision and the mission. 
 
We have a vision of being a fantastic place to work, I think that characterizes 
the company. I think that the people that work here expect it to be that way. 
We presented the vision in 2010, and were met with smiles from some of our 
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employees. This was because we had tried to introduce a performance 
management system here shortly before.  
Director,)People)&)Processes!
 
The vision and the mission seem to be known by most members of the organization. 
 
The vision is “A great place to work”, and the mission, which I never seem to 
be able to separate from the vision. It’s something like: “Solutions that excite”. 
Project)manager!
 
In 2010 Making Waves had experienced growth due to the acquisition of Tarantell, 
and the management were keen on professionalizing the organization. The 
performance management tool was supposed to facilitate this process, but it was met 
with great internal resistance. Employees did not wish to evaluate their peers by 
grading them on different criteria and some felt “reduced to a number”. Although 
thousands of hours were spent on the system, the top management listened to their 
employees, and it was rejected.  
 
The new vision was created in parallel with a new strategy for how to manage 
Making Waves. The new strategy had its basis in self-determination theory and the 
goal was to encourage self-motivation, instead of using external motivators such as 
performance management.  
 
To have a vision that does not mention time or anything measurable is 
against the convention of what a vision is. The textbooks use John F. 
Kennedy’s “we will put a man on the moon and bring him back in this decade” 
as an example. Goal: To the moon and back alive. When: Within this decade. 
This was in ‘62, and it was unthinkable. They had just been able to fly 
airplanes. So it was visionary, no doubt about it. But we have decided that our 
vision isn’t measurable, it is noticeable.  
Director,)Sales!
 
Management has a conscious relationship to how employees should be motivated, 
and relies primarily on self-determination theory, which encompasses intrinsic 
motivators such as the feeling of achievement, the need to make one’s own choices 
and the feeling of belonging.  
 
Three factors must be in place in order for people to be motivated. The first 
has to do with autonomy. The second has to do with a need to succeed. And 
the last one has to do with building a company culture, feeling like you belong 
somewhere.  
Director,)People)&)Processes!
 
Making Waves mission is: “Creating delightful experiences.” According to the 
Director of sales: 
 
It is quite uncommon to have a vision and a mission that do not have 
measurable goals and that do not involve the customer.  
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Director,)Sales!
 
But since the incident with the performance management system, it seems that the 
top management has decided to prioritize their own employees first, both in action 
and with a clear vision and mission statement.  
 
We have a vision that doesn’t involve the customer at all: A fantastic place to 
work. And a mission statement that is “creating delightful experiences”. Not 
customer, but delightful experiences. And that may just as well be meeting a 
colleague, as it can be to make a web page that is delightful.  
Director,)Sales!
6.1.2 Design thinking  
Making Waves is permeated with the concept of design thinking, although it hasn’t 
always been this way. Tim Brown of IDEO defines design thinking as “a discipline 
that uses the designer’s sensibility and methods to match people’s needs with what 
is technologically feasible and what a viable business strategy can convert into 
customer value and market opportunity” (Brown, 2008, p. 2).  
 
Design thinking, innovation, is a relatively new approach in this company. You 
have probably heard about the incredible journey that this company has had. 
Since ten entrepreneurs started the company, there has been a development 
from technology and design-driven, to a more innovation and user-centred 
way of working.  
Manager,)Service)Design!
 
Making Waves uses this methodology in their projects, and often explains it with an 
illustration of three circles.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Design thinking, drawing made by informant. 
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Figure 6.2 The figure redrawn for easier reading. 
 
Have you heard about design thinking? Have you seen the drawing of the 
three circles of users, business and technology? And in the cross-section 
between the three is where innovation happens. In practice this means that 
we care a lot about having the right skilled professionals with us from the 
beginning of each project.  
Manager,).NET!
 
Design thinking often involves an iterative working process where ideas are tested 
out on potential users and then adjusted based on the feedback. This type of working 
process has many similarities to the agile software development process, which is 
based on iterative and incremental development. Agile working methods have 
become more common in Making Waves, replacing the old Waterfall method in 
which progress is seen as flowing steadily downwards through the phases of 
conception, initiation, analysis, design, construction, testing, production, and 
maintenance. 
 
We have gone from using the Waterfall method to becoming more and more 
agile. But how do you use Agile without having too many people involved, 
and too many stakeholders? There is also a budget that you must mind at all 
times. And the customers are extremely different from each other. 
Senior)System)Developer!
 
Agile also seems to be the preferred working method among the employees, 
although they may not always have the possibility of using this working method.  
 
How I wish I could work? I wish I could work more agile, but it has a lot to do 
with the contract, which means who pays for things and make the decisions. 
Interaction)Designer!
 
The reason that Agile methodology cannot be used in all projects is either that 
customers aren’t used to this way of thinking, or that they do projects for the public 
sector, where the waterfall methodology is specified in the tender. 
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The external conditions are not always in place in order for us to have an 
agile process. It doesn’t matter if we are agile if the customer isn’t. Everyone 
must participate, or else it’s impossible. We have learned to become 
pragmatic and practical.  
Manager,).NET!
 
The design thinking methodology has its roots in the creative field, and many of the 
informants see themselves as creative. This is true for people working positions that 
are not normally associated with creativity as well. A project manager quoted her 
department manager: 
 
Creativity is not a department. 
Project)Manager!
Some informants believed that all employees are equally creative, and some 
believed that the design departments are creative and the technology departments 
are not very creative. One manager was quite specific in who he believed were the 
most creative: 
 
I think the Strategy department is the most creative. It’s full of people who 
come up with good ideas. 
Director,)Sales!
6.1.3 Hierarchy 
The organizational hierarchy in Making Waves is rather flat, something that is 
underlined by the fact that the CEO sits in a shared office with three other employees. 
When asked to describe the company culture, both management and non-
management mentioned that Making Waves doesn’t have a strict hierarchy.  
 
Open, few competitive employees and a flat structure. Freedom to say what 
you mean. A culture open to change - listening and changing.  
Director,)Experience)Design!
 
All levels of management, including the CEO, eat lunch together in the cafeteria, and 
when asked if it was easy to talk to the CEO an informant replied:  
 
I talk to him almost every day, it is very easy. In practice we have a 
completely flat structure. I can sit and joke around, and it is not difficult to ask 
the top management how their weekend was. 
Project)Manager!
 
Making Waves used to have individual bonuses, but has gone to only giving 
collective bonuses. 
 
Bonus systems that are based on your profitability. We don’t believe in that. 
On the contrary, we believe that is very negative for the company culture. 
Once you have pecuniary incentive systems, people will automatically 
become more competitive. And we don’t want that. Last year, the individual 
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bonuses were removed from the sales department. And that was the last 
individual incentive system that we had in this company.  
Director,)Experience)design!
 
As mentioned by the Director for Experience Design, the sales staff was the last 
ones to change from individual to collective bonuses. The Director of sales was very 
sceptical to eliminating the individual bonus at first, but he was willing to try it.  
 
The Director of people and processes proposed that we remove the individual 
bonuses. He wanted us to have a collective bonus in the company, which is 
that 12 per cent of the profit we make is given back to the employees. And he 
wanted us to use this system for the sales department also. And I reluctantly 
agreed to try this for one year.  
Director,)Sales!
After a year had passed the director of Sales was convinced.  
 
I have monitored their performance this year, and I haven’t observed any less 
enthusiasm, less spirit, less writing of bids on a Sunday, none of that. So far it 
seems that The Director of people and processes was right. Individual 
bonuses only work the day they are appointed, after that they don’t motivate 
you anymore.  
Director,)Sales!
 
Making Waves uses its HR department to create and nurture a good organizational 
culture.  
 
There are four people in People and Processes in Making Waves. That is 
actually a pretty big group. There are many consultancy companies that only 
have one Human Resources person. That is because they are trying to keep 
the staff as slim as possible, which means less hours, right? 
Director,)Lifecycle!
 
The Director of People and Processes, is the head of the HR department, and one of 
Making Waves’ most ardent advocates of the self-determination theory that is used 
as a basis for their HR-strategies. According to one project manager, the work that 
the HR department does affects the way the organization works with innovation and 
creativity:  
 
One thing Making Waves does that I think is really good is that they have 
such a large focus on culture. Culture, and an unusual Human Resources 
policy. Unusual in the way that there are few other companies that have it, 
and others should have the same focus that our Human Resources 
department has. They define a lot of the fundamental practices on how we 
work with innovation and creativity. 
Project)Manager!
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6.1.4 The Minister of Culture 
The management of Making Waves has created a position called the Minister of 
Culture. The person that has this role was already a culture-bearer in the company 
long before she was given the title, but the title was given to her to formalize the job 
description. She now spends 50 per cent of her time as Minister of culture, and 50 
per cent as designer. 
 
It was established a couple of years ago, but she has always had that role. As 
a minister of Culture. There has never been any doubts about the fact that 
she has that role.  
Manager,)Project)Management!
 
The Minister of culture is among other things responsible for remembering people’s 
birthdays, buying champagne on the International Women’s Day, organizing parties, 
and generally contributing to making Making Waves live up to their vision as a great 
place to work. Her role also helps link the organization together. When asked about 
which people she works closely with, she replied:  
 
I run around and get feedback, and talk to people. When you have been 
around from the start you know more people. So I think I take up some space, 
and take action if I see something that needs to be done. But I work closely 
with the Marketing department, and partly with Sales as well, because we 
can’t have fun if we don’t also make money. The more money we make, the 
more fun we can create for our employees. There is a correlation there.  
Minister)of)Culture!
 
When asked if she sees herself as a person that builds bridges between people in 
the organization she agreed:  
 
You can probably see it that way. I’m kind of like that. Suddenly I’m just there, 
making things happen.  
Minister)of)Culture!
 
The title also serves as a symbol of the emphasis Making Waves puts on 
organizational culture.  
 
It has been a conscious choice to maintain the good culture in Making Waves. 
She always participates in all different kinds of event planning groups and 
stuff like that. We have systematized it by creating a formalized role for her. 
And we use it deliberately.  
Manager,).NET!
6.1.5 Socialization 
Making Waves has worked hard to maintain and strengthen the culture through 
socialization as the company has grown rapidly. Socialization is the means by which 
cultural and social continuity are attained. It has been important to assimilate 
acquired firms and integrate the Polish department into the company. Throughout the 
years, Making Waves has acquired several companies. Two examples are Tarantell 
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and Zoot, which were acquired in 2010 and 2012 respectively. A former employee 
from Tarantell claimed that they were well assimilated into Making Waves.  
 
...first I started in Tarantell, a company that was similar to Making Waves. 
Then Making Waves bought Tarantell. So I am a part of a group that comes 
from Tarantell. But we aren’t a sub-culture. We are pretty assimilated now.  
Senior)Designer,)previously)employed)in)Tarantell!
 
A former employee from Zoot was asked if he felt integrated into Making Waves and 
answered:  
 
Yes, I would say so. But it’s not the easiest thing in the world. You can’t just 
come, set up shop and get on with the job, absolutely not. Which brings us 
back to when we talked about culture. We have done it one way, now we are 
going to do everything differently.  
Manager,)Service)Design!
 
When it comes to integrating the Polish department of Making Waves, the 
importance of having a shared organizational culture, and the challenges that arise if 
this is not achieved, can be shed light on by this quote:  
 
I feel that Making Waves in Poland, or maybe Poland as a whole, has a 
different respect for authority than we do. The work life is quite strict, while we 
have a tradition of having a flat structure, where you can be informal and talk 
to people. When the instructions we give on design and ideas that are 
developed in Norway are supposed to be implemented in Poland, they have a 
tendency to not let us know if they think the instructions are bad. They are 
afraid of letting us know, and are afraid of asking. We weren’t aware of this 
until quite late.  
Senior)Designer!
 
Lately, Making Waves has become better at creating a shared culture between the 
offices in Oslo and Poland. This is achieved by among other things arranging 
exchanges between the two offices, having a Norwegian manager at the Polish 
department and allowing project teams to spend time with each other prior to a 
project.  
 
We are much better now at travelling back and forth to visit or work together. 
When we start on a new project, and there are people from Poland on the 
project group, we get together, either here in Norway or over there. The 
whole team gets to know each other better, and we work together in the first 
part of the project. After that, it becomes easier to work separately.  
Manager,).NET!
 
Team building is one of the methods Making Waves uses to socialize its employees. 
Management has recently established “friend groups” for the project managers, due 
to the fact that the project management group grew to more than 25 people. Such a 
large group makes it difficult for each member to get to know the whole group, and 
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the friend-groups are meant to help the group get to know each other as well as 
facilitating knowledge sharing.  
 
Because of the increase of people in our department, there have been talks 
of splitting it up into two. I don’t want that, so we established friend-groups, 
like they do in primary school.  
Manager,)Project)Management!
 
Also, Making Waves has several social events that the employees can attend if they 
wish. In addition to an annual Christmas and summer party, the employees can 
participate in different academically focused events. The company also hosts 
activities such as “Making Beer” and “Making Ski” where the focus is to bring people 
from different business units together.  
 
We go to a pub twice a month, and we have a summer party where you can 
bring your partner. We have academic evenings with different themes that 
you can attend, and cultural happenings. It is up to each individual to choose 
if he or she wishes to participate, but I think the events we have help bring 
people together.  
Minister)of)Culture!
 
Other ways that Making Waves bring their employees together is through an internal 
social media platform called Yammer. The platform is mainly used for work purposes, 
and the social aspect of it makes it easy for employees from different business units 
to talk to each other.  
 
We have a social platform called Yammer, you may know about it? We use it 
for spreading information about things that are going on, or ask questions 
like: “I have to do this and that, is there anyone that have worked with 
something similar that can give me some input?”. Messages like that.  
Manager,).NET!
6.1.6 A culture of sharing 
Making Waves has a focus on sharing knowledge between employees, business 
units and management. This can be challenging due to the fact that consultants 
within a business unit often work in separate projects, and not with each other.   
 
Most often, unfortunately, you work on your project, and only with that. I have 
been working on my current project for two years, and it becomes an own 
little world. And we have a challenge with sharing knowledge. We’re 
constantly working on it, but it’s hard.  
Senior)Project)Manager!
 
Another challenge linked to knowledge sharing arises from the fact that Making 
Waves has grown from 14 people to 270 people over a period of twelve years.  
 
Some of our project managers have little experience. So it is important that 
experiences from the rest of the organization are shared with them. So that 
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they don’t have to make the same mistakes that other people have been 
through. And that is a challenge, because when we were 20 people it was 
easier to spread the knowledge, as opposed to now when we’re 270. We 
used to hold a meeting once a week where any employee could present a 
case or experiences, and it was passed on to the whole company. You can’t 
do that now. You have to find other ways of doing it.  
Manager,)PMO!
 
Several of the informants mentioned called attention to the “sharing-culture” in 
Making Waves. 
 
I think the special culture, the sharing-culture, characterizes the environment 
at Making Waves. And there is a anticipation from the employees that the top 
management works towards creating a fantastic place to work. 
Director,)people)&)processes!
 
Part of our culture these years has been that people drop what they are doing 
and help out if they see that someone is struggling. That is a very positive 
thing. 
Director,)Lifecycle!
 
I think the most important thing is the sharing-culture. If someone has a 
problem, other people drop whatever they are working with and help their 
neighbour. I think that is probably one of the most positive things.  
Manager,)Project)Management!
 
I think that academic workers take pride in doing things themselves. But I 
don’t feel like they don’t want to share with others. On the contrary. People 
think it is cool to share, they want to share.  
Manager,).NET)!
 
One of the things I think is positive about Making Waves, is that people are 
very supportive. People back each other. Everybody is focused on each 
others positive qualities, and on helping each other as much as possible.  
Interaction)Designer)1!
 
6.1.7 Leadership style 
Through our interviews we spoke with different levels of management, from the CEO 
and members of top management to business unit, profession and project managers. 
A common theme that surfaced when we asked questions about how the managers 
wished to be led, and how they wish to lead others, was autonomy. Several 
informants appointed autonomy as the most important aspect of how they wanted to 
be led and how they wanted to lead others. This was evident in all levels of 
management. When answering a question about how he wished to lead others, the 
CEO shared:  
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Freedom to make your own choices. Some people expect more clear 
boundaries than others, but I think such boundaries conserve and restrict in 
most cases. So I would like us to keep that level of autonomy, as much as 
possible. My employees are so competent and my managers are so wise that 
they do not need the boundaries.  
CEO!
The CEO elaborated on how he manages, and that he might not give his employees 
as much freedom as they say: 
I see myself as a facilitator. I practice, or at least I’m trying to practice, a sort 
of serving leadership. But actually, it’s so far from my nature, that it feels like 
hogwash. I am a strong person with strong opinions, and I always express 
myself with strong terms. 
CEO!
Despite granting employees a large degree of autonomy, the CEO sometimes needs 
to give clear instructions on how he wants the company to be run. He elaborated, 
with a grin, on how he makes employees understand the need for being cost 
effective at times: 
I guess I do the normal stuff. I use many methods. Sometimes I cry, 
sometimes I yell loudly and tell people off. Other times, I treat people like 
kittens, being kind and sensitive, smile at them and pat them on their backs 
while saying that they have to perform better. 
CEO!
The CEO is not afraid to make drastic decisions about employees, such as when he 
discharged all the designers in Making Waves Poland after he decided that they only 
needed programmers there. 
I did that almost immediately [after becoming CEO], I spent about two weeks 
discharging them all. It sounds brutal, but it was necessary. We did it in a fair 
way. 
CEO!
The CEO explains how he would characterize himself as a leader of Making Waves: 
In reality, I’m afraid that I’m seen as a dominating and sometimes 
manipulating leader, unfortunately. Well, well. But my ideal of being a 
facilitator, which I strive towards, and which I try, and which fits my nature, 
because I’m a classical provider. I have a lot of femininity in me, and I think I 
have caring in me. So I’m genuinely interested in my co-workers and try to do 
everything to enable them to do their jobs. And I’m not talking about just my 
team of leaders or heads of departments in an extended leadership 
perspective, but every employee. And I try to create as flat a hierarchy as 
possible, and such a system makes it possible for me to talk to anyone in the 
company, and for anyone in the company to talk to me. So a serving 
leadership, involving leadership, and a significant degree of modern thinking 
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through contribution and listening to others, and then give a lot of freedom to 
the individuals. 
CEO!
 
When asked how he wanted to be led, an interaction designer emphasized that it 
was important that his manager was in control of the administrative aspects so that 
he could focus on his job. He also praised the autonomy he was given in the projects 
he has worked on.  
 
A person is autonomous to a very large degree, unless he asks his manager 
to get involved. You are seldom administered within the projects you work 
with, and you are responsible for your own delivery. I think that is a good 
thing. It creates a lot of responsibility and trust.  
Interaction)Designer)1!
 
Management does not only try to see what employees need and adapt to those 
needs, but also tries to educate employees on what is important to be happy in 
general: 
 
Every employee in Making Waves learns about the Maslow and his hierarchy 
of needs, and then we proceed to Herzberg. I think it’s only fair that they all 
know how important hygiene factors are, and how they relate to motivation. 
Manager,)HRD!
 
One manager explains that working directly with motivation is not too common in 
consultancy firms, or at least perceived by outsiders as a less prioritized field. But he 
believes that personal motivation is essential for doing a good job. When working on 
a project for a large Scandinavian hotel chain that became very complicated and 
exhaustive, he had to argue with the representatives from this customer that the 
project couldn’t continue like that. 
 
Some of our customers see consultants as machines. It’s unheard of that 
consultancy companies start talking about motivation and calling their 
resources humans and such. And that those humans can get tired and 
unmotivated. (...) So we told them [the customer] that if we were to succeed, 
our people have to be totally motivated, or we won’t be able to make an 
exciting system. And they understood that very quickly, they had just never 
heard consultants say that. 
Manager,)Experience)design!
6.2 Knowledge management 
In this subchapter, we will present data about how Making Waves shares and 
creates knowledge, and how the interplay between tacit and explicit knowledge 
works. We will present the ways in which Making Waves transfers knowledge 
through computer systems, people, projects and organizational structures, as well as 
different ways Making Waves acquires new knowledge.  
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6.2.1 Computer systems 
Making Waves utilizes several computer systems in their effort to contain and 
disseminate knowledge within the organization. Internally they use the team 
collaboration software Confluence, which they have integrated with the project 
management software Jira. The combination of the two programs facilitates both 
knowledge and project management.  
 
We have a wiki we use, called Confluence. (...) A challenge we face is that it 
feels very dead, although it is updated. It has become a filing system, which 
may not be the best format to disseminate learning and knowledge.  
Project)manager!
 
I use it [Confluence] to keep track of working hours on projects, and to keep 
an overview of the project portfolio. I use Confluence quite a lot - it's a good 
system for maintaining a dialogue with customers, collect and archive files, et 
cetera. I use it as a tool on a regular basis.  
Senior)strategy)developer!
 
Making Waves also has an intranet called The Wave and it has been developed in-
house. All the other systems are partly built into The Wave, meaning that they can 
see information from all those systems within The Wave. In addition to formalizing 
and storing knowledge, a part of knowledge management has to do with sharing 
knowledge. One way Making Waves tries to spread knowledge is through computer 
systems that make communication possible. They have implemented a 
communication system called Yammer, which is described as a social software for 
enterprises. In the words of the Director of Experience Design: “It is a kind of 
Facebook for companies.” This system opens up a digital space for informal 
communication with varying degree of work relevance. Not everyone uses it a lot, but 
none of our informants spoke negatively of it. Several informants also noted that 
using Yammer could be just as an efficient way of seeking knowledge as searching 
the wiki (Confluence). 
 
[Yammer] is a platform where you post funny stuff on Fridays and sometimes 
a little bit more serious things, like when you’ve found something interesting. 
And sometimes, looking there can be just as enlightening and take much less 
time than trying to read through some documentation that was put up in 
Confluence, which is a lot more like a heavy document management system.  
Senior)systems)developer))!
 
Efficient knowledge and communication systems are emphasized as a prerequisite 
for a well-managed knowledge organization by most of the informants. Still these 
systems are of low value if the human side to knowledge management is not treated 
with at least the same amount of attention. 
 
It depends a little bit on which phase you are in and how long you have been 
employed. It is obvious that all newcomers will benefit a lot from [Confluence]. 
Anyone who does something new once in awhile will benefit from it, because 
it's a place where you can find something by yourself, but most importantly 
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ask people. Because it’s mostly about human relations. But then the expert, 
the one who’s helping out, can point and say: ‘Then you click here and there 
you will find such and such method’. Contextual information between people 
is important.  
Director,)Experience)design!
6.2.2 Updating the computer systems 
Confluence includes complete overview of the methodologies that are used in 
Making Waves. The overview has been given the name The Wavemaker, and it 
contains a lot of information on how to execute projects. The management recently 
decided to update Wavemaker.  
 
Wavemaker is... All companies have a process or methodology, and it is 
important that you use the same words on phases and stages of the project, 
and the name of roles and all that. And that means that you can work more 
effectively on projects. So that's the main reason we have a methodology. 
The framework we had until,  let's say a year ago, it had evolved since 2001, 
somewhat haphazardly. Those who had a little extra energy worked on it. So 
in the end there was almost no one using anymore. Plus, there were some 
weaknesses with what we had. So then we decided to lift it over in 
Wavemaker 2.0, which is the new version of Wavemaker.  
Director,)Experience)design!
 
The decision to update Wavemaker was due to several reasons, one of them being 
company growth, and the challenges that have risen due to this.  
 
We are growing as an organization, we are approaching 300 employees. We 
grew quite fast in the last year. So most of what we had made before was 
made during the time we were around 100-150, now we are twice as many. 
And it requires new things that we haven’t needed in the past.  
Manager,).NET!
 
No-one has been given the overall responsibility for Wavemaker, which adds to the 
difficulty of keeping it updated.  
 
It is a big challenge, there has been no ownership of it [Wavemaker], so there 
have been several all-out efforts with updates, (...) we are now keen to 
establish a management organization. It does not necessarily mean that the 
internal project owner should manage the framework alone. It is important to 
have some professional groups who take care of their areas, such as 
technical infrastructure, design and so on, but there should be someone 
responsible for coherence and implementing lessons learned from projects 
into our methodology. Otherwise, these kinds of best practice collections or 
frameworks dies, because in our industry great things happen all the time. 
(...) There is a big difference from how we designed things three or four years 
ago, where there was only a PC monitor to relate to. So today I need some 
other tools and some other ways to handle my work challenges.  
Manager,)PMO!
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This renewed focus on formalizing one’s methods and work-culture is welcomed by 
most of the informants. During our observation of the strategy consultants’ weekly 
meeting, one of the staff members remarked, in conjunction with a discussion on the 
internal Wavemaker 2.0 project, that:  
 
We must use our own methods [design thinking] internally as well -  it’s 
extremely important.  
Senior)strategy)consultant!
 
Others had a different viewpoint as to what the update of the Wavemaker system 
means to Making Waves, claiming that the system provides more value for the 
customers than to Making Waves.  
 
These frameworks sometimes appear to be mostly window dressing, so that 
we can give the appearance of being a company that works systematically 
with the customer.  
Senior)systems)developer!
 
Table 6.1 An overview of computer systems mentioned by the informants. 
System Application 
The Wave An in-house developed intranet that sources information from other systems. 
Examples are financial information, project progress and HR information such as 
birthdays and visiting employees from the Krakow office. 
Confluence A enterprise knowledge management system which utilized the simplicity of a 
wiki. It is integrated with Jira, and is used as a team collaboration software. 
Jira A issue-tracking and project management software. Implemented by Making 
Waves in 2011 with the aim to replace several other systems and homemade 
excel spreadsheets. The system allows customers insight in project progression 
in real time. 
Yammer An enterprise social network service. Used as an informal knowledge sharing 
platform among employees.  
Wavemaker Wavemaker is Making Waves’ own methodology system that contains 
information of work processes and company specific terms in the form of text and 
illustrations. It is stored within the Confluence system. 
6.2.3 Knowledge sharing through people 
As explained in subchapter 6.1.6, the employees at Making Waves experience their 
work environment as friendly and helpful. But when helping other people solve their 
problems, time that could potentially have been used on their own projects is lost. 
Most employees are aware of the fact that Making Waves makes money by billing 
hours.  
 
There is a kind of balance between being able to ask someone for help and 
having respect for the fact that they must work on their own projects. f it were 
up to those who count your billable hours, we should all work with blinders. 
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But for us in communities, it's very important that we can utilize each others’ 
knowledge across projects. So it becomes a bit like "ok, if I help you out half 
an hour on your project, you help me half an hour on my project," it’s like if 
you scratch my back I scratch yours, right? But we have been very conscious 
that we want a culture where it is possible to stop for a moment and have a 
professional exchange of ideas and input with each other, without having to 
specifically return the favour. If not, there is no point of sitting together. There 
is something important about utilizing the specialist environment you are a 
part of.  
Senior)designer)/)frontHend)developer!
 
But some employees need to be reminded that they do not have an indefinite amount 
of time to make the perfect concept.  
 
Some are very practical, others would like to make the very best solutions for 
the customers from their academic perspective. They must often be reminded 
that we are working within certain time limits.  
Director,)People)and)Processes!
 
The project managers are responsible for making sure that other group members 
stay within the time limit for the project.  
 
Making Waves has a positive view on what they can achieve in projects. 
Project managers are the ones that have to be realistic about what we 
actually have time to carry though. Sometimes we are viewed as kind of 
negative, and as holding people back.   
Project)Manager!
 
 
This culture of sharing knowledge is not only confined to the different departments or 
disciplines, but extends all the way through the company. Employees seemed 
comfortable asking people they knew from different departments, and even the CEO, 
for help.  
 
I feel that in spite of that we obviously have gotten several new levels of 
management over the years, I can at least say for my part that I have no 
problem with asking the CEO, for help. You tend to use the ones you have 
worked with all along, the ones you know well, such as The Director of people 
and processes, or the head of the project management department, and so 
on.  
Manager,)PMO!
 
Another way Making Waves transfers knowledge is by nurturing the development of 
hybrid profiles. The philosophy is that knowledge flows better through their 
organization if employees have some degree of overlapping knowledge and skills. It 
is easier to staff projects if everyone has some knowledge about the other disciplines, 
which also results in project teams performing better.   
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It is about developing more people who can do both. Hybrids. (...) For when 
they operate like today, it is very much like "this is my domain, and that is 
your domain". And although we work on transferring competencies and 
knowledge sharing in meetings and project teams, something indefinable 
happens within the different departments. From the management point of 
view, we have higher profitability and create better solutions if we have more 
hybrid profiles. 
Director,)Experience)design!
 
The creation of internal groups within the organization can also make transferring of 
knowledge between people easier. As mentioned in subchapter 6.1.5, the manager 
of Project Management has created friend groups to relieve the biweekly department 
meeting of some functions. The department meeting is a two hour long meeting 
where issues and specific cases are discussed. A project manager comments: 
 
[The project management department] is very large and it becomes difficult to 
share with everyone. So these friend groups consist of five people where you 
arrange activities yourself. It might be breakfast in the cafeteria, lunch, a 
coffee at Kaffebrenneriet, a dinner at someone’s house. (...) The idea is to get 
to know one and another, to build trust between each other. So you know 
how to use each other, and so that we can talk about stuff. By the way, I just 
discovered this yesterday, it may seem like nothing, but I discovered how I 
could visualize that I had found an error in a web solution in a much more 
effective manner, how I could visualize it for the developers. Even though it’s 
a minor thing, it could be of value to the other project managers. But I would 
never raise my hand in a department meeting with 26 persons to share this 
bit of learning. So in that way the friend groups work well.  
Project)manager!
 
The previous quote exemplifies how Making Waves uses social relations to promote 
knowledge transfer between employees. This is further emphasized by how the 
Minister of Culture views the effects of her efforts in building company culture. Social 
initiatives and events are in her mind not only organized to establish a friendly work 
environment, but also used to foster knowledge sharing.  
 
Then you get to know people you might not have worked with before through 
social events. And then: "Oh, you are working on that project, I would like to 
hear a little more about that", or: "Oh, you are on that project, I worked with 
the type of project last year". It's easier to ask someone about anything after 
you have been acquainted. Because in our projects we put together different 
disciplines and different people, and in some settings you might have worked 
with the same team for three projects. And then you might not know whether 
there are others in Making Waves that could contribute, or possess helpful 
skills or knowledge. We have grown so big that everyone doesn’t know 
everyone anymore. But it is easier to approach someone with a work related 
question if you had a pint together last Friday, or met at lunch.  
Minister)of)culture!
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6.2.4 Knowledge sharing through projects 
In Making Waves a large majority of the value-generating work is conducted through 
projects. The projects vary both in size and length, and staff-members are 
exchanged between projects depending on the stage of the project and their own 
wishes and goals. Several managers claimed that Making Waves would save money 
if components created in one project were reused in other projects, but that doing so 
is difficult. In a project context, a component can be any part that constitutes a digital 
solution, such as a interface, a string of code or a colour scheme. One informant 
raised the issue of what will happen if Making Waves focuses too much on reusing 
existing components - that the company will not be able to create as many new 
components and solutions.  
 
I believe that if we are to be efficient in our deliveries, we must focus on the 
right things, and inventing the wheel over and over again is not the right thing. 
It does not provide value to the customer at all. On the other hand, we are 
dependent of professionals who have a desire to learn new things, to 
innovate. If they always just reuse what others have done, there will no 
innovation. So you need a good balance. We must think of the ability to be 
innovative, but also the ability to deliver effectively and provide value to the 
customer.  
Manager,).NET!
 
Another informant shares his thoughts on reusing components, and claims that it is 
the knowledge about how to create the components that is important: 
 
It is the knowledge of how to do things. That's what we reuse.  
Senior)systems)developer!
 
There is a substantial amount of knowledge transferred across the whole 
organization through the continuous flow of new projects. One project manager 
reflects on what she has learned in a project:  
 
We made an assessment and evaluation where we discovered how we could 
have saved a lot of time by using existing templates. Both me and other 
project participants learned something from this, and I'm sure we're going to 
take it with us to our coming projects. It is unlikely that all of us are going to 
work together again, but we can spread the experience this way.  
Project)manager!
 
The knowledge created in projects is often tacit, and the management team is eager 
to retain and make the most of it. The question is how tacit knowledge can be spread 
by other means than staffing employees with tacit knowledge to new projects. A 
manager comments:  
 
We are actually not good enough at re-allocating the experience gained in 
projects into the organization, so there are many who have to make the same 
mistakes and thereby learn from them. In a knowledge organization, we 
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should actually have better mechanisms for sharing the knowledge we 
acquire.  
Manager,)PMO!
 
The director of sales, who also is one of the founders of Making Waves, shared the 
frustration that the PMO manager expressed:  
 
So, just give me the name of someone who has done it [knowledge transfer 
from project to project] before. If you manage to figure it out - fantastic! Just 
think about how much stuff we do over again. It is completely crazy to think 
about how much work we do over again every day.  
Director,)sales!
 
Other informants had a different perspective. An interaction designer answered the 
question of whether Making Waves reuses knowledge in projects in this manner: 
 
We do that quite a lot of. At least that’s my impression. It’s maybe not copy-
paste...but it’s like that when solving...or, most of the projects participants 
have been on other projects. So then it’s like: ‘Yeah, that’s how we solved it 
for the Post and Telecommunications Authority’, or ‘this is how we solved it 
for the Mapping Authority, and then you find some sources of inspiration from 
those projects.  
Interaction)designer)2!
 
A manager claimed that in order for knowledge to be reused in projects, the people in 
the organization need to be sensible enough to ask others about their experiences.  
 
Yes, we do. If you are facing a problem, let's say an integration with a 
payment solution that is relevant to all e-commerce projects, it should be very 
obvious to check out who has done this before. And then look at the code to 
see how they have done it, and hear about experiences and so on. That we 
do, but we can get even better at it. For there isn’t really a system for such 
things, it depends on the individual being sensible enough to ask, to stretch 
out a hand.  
Manager,).NET!
!
6.2.5 Knowledge sharing through organizational structures 
One of the most recent structural changes that have been implemented in Making 
Waves, is the establishment of a Project Management Office (PMO). This is a small 
department of two people. It is placed together with the Project Management 
business unit, a unit that is headed by the director of HR, or People and Process as 
Making Waves calls it. The basis for the decision of the implementation of PMO is 
explained by the manager of the PMO department:  
 
[PMO] is supposed to be a support function for the project managers, and I’m 
defining myself to be a kind of facilitator, but also the manager that follows a 
set of requirements to help the process from Sales to completion of the 
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project, and through some sort of experience loop, to make projects flow in a 
better way.  
Manager,)PMO!
 
The thought is that investing a bit more time and effort early on in projects will help 
controlling the scope and possible risks of going over budget.  
 
I believe we could have saved time if we had spent a little more time on the 
handover from design to technical development. Implemented a really 
thorough discussion together of what should be developed and why (...).  
Interaction)designer)2!
 
Better communication and knowledge sharing between the project team and sales 
groups is another benefit that is mentioned:  
 
The other aspect of this is that we must try to convey the experiences we 
have in the projects back to the sales office, of course. In that way they can 
sell more correctly the next time they will be selling a similar project. But also 
how we can share experiences more sensibly within the organization. Now 
that we are starting to get quite large, there is a risk that important lessons 
are carried by project participants, but not spread to the rest of the 
organization. Then we make the same mistakes in new projects. So that is 
what we will focus on in the beginning, but we will also be improving the 
transition between sales and project start-up.  
Manager,)PMO!
 
Sharing knowledge can also be facilitated by making alterations to the way the 
company organizes its business units. This has been a recurrent discussion within 
the management team. 
 
We must always consider whether it makes sense to merger certain 
departments. Has it gotten so far that it makes sense to merger, for instance, 
front-end and graphics (...) or strategy and project management? A 
somewhat more exaggerated example is whether the strategy consultants are 
so involved in project management that they might as well have been part of 
a larger unit? 
CEO!
 
In contrast to most consultancy firms, Making Waves has a strong tradition of 
keeping consultants in-house instead of having them work at the customers offices. 
Some members of the project groups sit and work together, and others sit in the 
business unit they belong to. 
 
We try to sit together (...) at least us technologists. The others are a little 
more... such as designers and interaction designers... they like to have their 
own dens. So they are sort of up in the fourth floor, more like a tribe there. 
(...) while project managers tend to settle among us, but not always. So at 
least technologists tend to seek together when we work together.  
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Senior)systems)developer!
 
Some informants were concerned that having project members sit with their business 
units instead of with their project group may hamper knowledge sharing. Making 
Waves growth may result in business units becoming so large that they no longer 
communicate with each other. 
 
And there is a danger that there will be too many ‘knowledge-silos’, so that 
we become disciplines that stop talking to each other because we will grow to 
become too large and get divided.  
Interaction)designer)2!
 
This is a possible problem that is taken seriously by the management, and has been 
frequently discussed. 
  
We have discussed whether we should change from this discipline based 
organizational structure to a more market divisionalized structure many times. 
And every time, the discussion concludes with that if it works today, we earn 
money today and people are happy working with people from the same 
backgrounds. Why change a winning team?  
Director,)people)and)processes!
 
A way of ensuring that domain knowledge is spread across the organization, is by 
creating a managerial position that is responsible for making this happen. Just 
recently, several engagement directors have been hired in Making Waves, and the 
people that occupy these positions are responsible for different market segments. 
The CEO explains how the engagement model creates a new level of structure, and 
allows Making Waves to make the most out of possible synergies:  
 
So what we are doing right now is to extend, what shall I say, the project 
element to also account for market segments. So we are now introducing 
what we call an engagement model, where we define a market segment: 
public sector, banking-finance, it could be tourism or leisure, travel. It can be 
retail, and so on and so forth. (...) So we'll keep the verticals, we retain the 
business units as they are, at least for now, and we add this dimension to 
create more synergy. To build even more domain knowledge if you will, into a 
larger team then.  
CEO!
 
The engagement directors are responsible for creating synergies between 
employees working with projects within their particular segment. They are also 
responsible for the customers that the segment is made up of.  A senior strategy 
developer reflects on the new position:  
 
This issue is something I'm very interested in. I have been quite interested in 
this new role, the Experience Director role. I have helped in defining it for 
Making Waves. When growing to the size we are today, I've seen that one of 
the things that this kind of role should do is to find synergies across the whole 
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organization. I think we are doing far too little of this today, too little of: ‘this is 
very similar to a project we did three months ago. We can save the customer 
and ourselves a lot of time by retrieving the research and expertise from that 
previous project’. It may be an entirely different domain, not directly 
comparable, but the experience can still be transferred. This is because our 
projects are not so much about the domain and the business the customer 
operates in, and more about the time we are all in. The awareness of social 
media and how to engage users is quite similar, even if it is either the Health 
Directorate or Kiwi we are providing services for. There will always be some 
common denominators. So the answer is that we should do it, and we do 
practice it to a certain extent, but still too little.  
Senior)strategy)developer!
 
Several informants welcome the engagement model that makes market-specific 
knowledge more accessible. Still, informants stress that a structural change is not the 
entire solution, as human factors are also important.  
 
One thing is that we can have systems where you browse and search for 
things. But the main thing is that we obtain a human factor. Say this model 
with experience lead, people who know the projects well and who meets 
across departments. To break down silos and departments with someone 
who works well across the organization. 
Senior)strategy)developer!
6.2.6 Acquiring new knowledge 
Some approaches Making Waves use to acquire new knowledge are to allow 
employees to spend time developing their skills, integrate companies that they have 
bought with the existing organizational structure, and seek out projects that they 
don’t have experience with. It can be difficult to win a bid on a project if the company 
does not have references to similar projects. In order to win projects that Making 
Waves are inexperienced with, they sometimes pay for the project hours used to 
learn the new skill themselves.  
 
We have clients and projects where we effectively sponsor a part of the 
project. It can be a kind of e-commerce project where we need more 
references. Where we need to get more people up and running on certain 
technologies. So that is absolutely something we do, and sometimes we do a 
project just to prove that this is something we are capable of doing. But that is 
something that have to be rooted in the organization, that this specific project 
is an investment. That is something we do, and also we have a lot of newly 
hired employees which are staffed to projects but not payed for by customers. 
So it’s an investment to ensure that people are trained, and we use the 
projects as an arena for that.  
Manager,)Project)management!
 
A specific example is given by the Director of Experience Design. One of Making 
Waves’ core capabilities is knowledge of the Microsoft SharePoint platform, which 
they acquired through customer projects.  
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If there is a new technology we would like incorporate into our technology 
portfolio, we actively pursue such opportunities. We wanted to increase our 
SharePoint skills a while back, then we actively searched out SharePoint 
projects in the marketplace.  
Director,)Experience)design!
 
Even though Making Waves has many projects, employees that are not fully booked 
at all times. The company have an individual billing-percentage of between 70% and 
80%. This allows employees to use the downtime to refine existing knowledge and 
learn new things. Internal workshops can be used to refine existing knowledge and 
document it, so that it can be shared with other employees.  
 
We have had a period now where we have had more to do, some times there 
is less. Then one thinks of sales and marketing, but I also think of efficiency, 
to understand how we can work smarter. Think methodology, tools and 
process. We had a small one-day workshop about it. So we categorized 
everything we've done over a full service design process, and mapped all of 
the methods and tools that we had used. It's a job where, if you do not have 
so much else to do, you can go back to the things you've worked on earlier 
and pick out things like presentations, interview guides or a specific way to 
introduce a concept. You gather it and place it in a folder structure. So it 
becomes a tool for others to use, not just in our department, but we can share 
knowledge with the rest of the house. 
Manager,)Service)Design!
 
In Making Waves, new knowledge is acquired by having employees read books 
related to their field of specialty, attend conventions or participate in seminars. New 
employees are taught the ropes by being placed on projects as an extra resource 
without billing the customer. Also the company books speakers that hold lectures 
about different themes such as effective meeting methods or presentation techniques. 
Several informants mentioned that it is important to be in tune with the current trends 
within their knowledge field and to get certified in new technologies.  
 
In between projects we read to keep ourselves updated. About a half year 
ago I was part of a program where several of us were certified. In order to get 
certified we were sent on training courses. 
Senior)systems)developer!
 
When Making Waves acquired the service design company Zoot, Making Waves 
created a new business unit called Service Design, which was basically the old Zoot. 
The former boss became the head of the new unit, and two of the three employees in 
Zoot continued in the new business unit. When asked if he thought if Making Waves 
was able to renew itself he responded: 
 
I'm evidence of that. I’m right here. Making Waves has transformed from 
being technology-centric business, to start thinking about user-centred 
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processes and methods. Not everyone can transform like that. I think that 
says it all. 
Manager,)Service)Design!
6.3 Strategic orientation 
In this subchapter, we will present the empirical data within the category of strategic 
orientation. This relates to how they align their operations because of affects from 
their business environment, or how the arrange their operation to affect their 
environment. We will present the principle of customer selection by the criteria fun, 
fame, and fortune, how different staff members reacts to overselling, what kind of 
competitor focus they have, and which strategies they have for the future. 
6.3.1 Fun, fame, and fortune 
The top management in Making Waves have decided on three criteria for selecting 
which projects to pursue in the marketplace, called Fun, Fame, and Fortune. Fun is 
what personally motivates the people working on the project. Fame is how 
prestigious the project is, and how it strengthens the Making Waves brand. Fortune 
is how much Making Waves hopes to make from the project. Fun, Fame, and 
Fortune are not followed explicitly, but serve as guidelines. Some managers claim 
that they don’t use them very often: 
 
There are several criteria we use for evaluating our customers. Size is one. 
Fame factor, namely how visible this customer and the customer’s brand is, is 
another. We often talk of Fun, Fame, and Fortune. We don’t use them that 
often, but we sometimes use them as criteria. A typical fun project doesn’t 
have to be very profitable, but if it’s exciting for the people working on it, it can 
still be a very desirable project.  
Director,)Experience)design!
 
Other managers claim they do use Fun, Fame, and Fortune a lot: 
 
Fun, fame or fortune. All three should ideally be present. But we do some 
fame projects and some fun projects. We have, for instance, rebranded the 
theatre across the street. That’s fun and a little fame, but definitely not fortune. 
We do these things from time to time. But it has to be decided high up in the 
organization, because you often lose money on such projects. 
Director,)sales!
 
An example of a project that scored highly on the fun scale is the work Making 
Waves did for the fashion house Moods of Norway: 
 
A typical fun project doesn’t have to be very profitable. It’s sufficient if 
employees find working on the project extremely interesting. (...) We worked 
with Moods of Norway for a long time. We didn’t make any money on it, but 
we got some free garments and things like that. And people thought it was a 
fun project.  
Director,)Experience)design!
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Deciding what would be fun for the employees is based on that management know 
the employees well enough to know what they like. For example, management had 
no problem deciding that rebranding Det norske teatret would be, despite being a 
financial loss, fun to do for the employees: 
 
Well, we’ve got some experience after so many years. We knew that... the 
theatre was my responsibility.. that our designers would love rebranding one 
of Norway’s biggest theatres. There was no question about it.  
Director,)sales!
 
Despite losing money on the theatre rebranding, Making Waves negotiated a deal 
where they can use the theatre meeting rooms when they are not in use by the 
theatre, since Making Waves hasn’t got any large meeting rooms itself. Thus, they 
were able to get something back that would possibly cost a lot of money to rent 
elsewhere.  
 
Another example of the Fun, Fame, and Fortune idea is seen in the management’s 
plan to establish an office in New York. They were arguing where to place the first 
proper international office, and decided that New York was the most fun and fancy: 
 
I would like to tell you that establishing an office in New York was a rational 
choice, but it wasn’t. We simply have much stronger feelings for New York 
than Houston. And it’s easier to make employees go there. A lot of our people 
would probably like to spend half a year or a year in New York.  
Director,)people)&)processes!
 
The director’s view was supported by the CEO: 
 
We will be in London, we will be in New York. We’ll establish an office there, 
and it’s going to be a little happy-go-lucky. It’s one way to do it, and it might 
be the most risky way.  
CEO!
 
Making Waves sometimes does projects that are not fun, but strictly fortune: 
 
We’ve had at least one project, where we made an intranet for a ministry, and 
where another ministry later requested basically the same system. Then, and 
other times, we delivered the same intranet with a different skin, which can be 
quite profitable. But no-one is motivated by such a project. We choose to do it 
sometimes when we see low-hanging fruits, but we don’t really want to.  
Director,)Experience)design!
 
The Director of Sales answers the question of strictly fortune in this manner: 
 
It is not uninteresting. However, it should be a component of those [Fun and 
Fame], too. The easiest way to make money in the consulting world is to rent 
out consultants. And when you become so famous in the consulting world as 
we are, it is very easy. (...) Everyone needs consultants, designers, project 
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managers. So renting out single heads to customers is the easiest thing you 
can do. (...) We do whole projects, and that is much more risky, but much 
more fun. (...) Many of our competitors are much larger than us on renting out 
consultants, and do it very well. But it's a boring business. (...) Here at Making 
Waves almost everyone works in-house. There are a few out of 300 that work 
out with the customer, everyone else sits here. It attracts employees, and we 
want the best people, then we also get the best projects, we think. So it is 
best if there is a nice balance between the three elements [Fun, Fame, and 
Fortune]. A profitable project that is educational, which also is a bit funny. If 
there is a customer who is willing to invest a little bit in innovation and try new 
things, it's great fun. 
Director,)sales!
6.3.2 Customer selection 
Making Waves has gone from having to accept all customers to having an excess of 
customer requests and thus being able to select whom they want to work with. The 
criteria they use for selection are partly the somewhat intangible Fun, Fame, and 
Fortune (subchapter 6.3.1), and partly more measurable criteria. One criteria is the 
size of the company: 
 
We have a strategy regarding the size of the customers, and that the project 
we do shall be vital for the customers. The customer has to have a turnover 
of more than 250 million kroners.  
Director,)people)&)processes!
 
The Director of Sales elaborates on what “vital to the customer” means: 
 
How important is it for them to have a very good digital communication? If I 
think it’s not very important, that they’re just looking for a homepage. I try to 
get a sense of what kind of investment they’re willing to make. And if it isn’t 
big enough, we’ll decline. We have also decided that an interesting company 
should need consultancy services for about 3-5 million kroners per year. If 
they’re smaller than that, we’re quite lukewarm. 
Director,)sales!
 
In practice this preliminary sorting is based on quite rough standards. 
 
This means that when we get requests, I go straight to proff.no and check the 
size [of the company]. 
Director,)sales!
 
Another criteria is what kind of business they do: 
 
We have selected some areas that we want to work with, but we are not very 
strict. We just want to work within some familiar areas, because we’ve been 
successful there before. We’ve had many projects with travel companies, we 
have Choice Hotels, Visit Norway, and several others. We are also quite good 
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at doing projects within the public sector, and we’ve done a lot of intranets. 
It’s easier to sell our projects when we’ve got those references.  
Director,)people)&)processes)!
 
Even though they are not very strict they have a strategic orientation in choosing 
which projects to pursue. 
 
It’s essential that it is based on our strategy of what kind of company we want 
to be, and within the service areas we want to work with, and that the projects 
are buying across the different departments. We are most keen on projects 
where we can supply the entire range, where we take responsibility for an 
entire project, and preferably not only supply single heads. 
Director,)people)&)processes!
 
Still the line of customers wanting to work with Making waves is growing. 
 
We get a lot of inquiries, weekly we may receive 10-20-30 inquiries to 
respond to, and compete for. Many of those are new customers. We have 
gone from having quite a few customers. We have 200-300 active clients right 
now. 
Director,)people)&)processes!
 
The market Making Waves operates in can mainly be divided in two, the public or 
private sector, which has two separate modus operandi for acquiring customers. 
 
There are two varieties, one of which is public, then there is a defined 
process for it. Where it [the tender] is announced on Doffin, the governmental 
portal for tenders. Or it’s a private sector inquiry with its own processes. Then 
it goes into the sales department, which makes a perusal and brings it up on 
a prioritization meeting. After they have read more thoroughly they put it forth 
and have a recommendation if this is something we should take time to 
answer. Then it is made a decision in the sales meeting, yes or no. If there is 
doubt, the question should in theory be raised to a management meeting. If 
the [sales meeting] said yes and there is no doubt, then we allocates the 
resources, and ask department heads for resources to respond to the offer. 
Then it can be from a few hours to several hundred hours to answer such a 
request. We establish a deals team and there is a negotiation which is led by 
sales. If we win the contract, it goes to a ‘traffic meeting’, where the project 
eventually will be staffed. 
Director,)people)&)processes!
 
And sometimes, the reason for choosing a project is just that they know the people 
involved: 
 
We chose the project because the engagement director, who is responsible 
for the bank and finance sector, knew them beforehand. This happens quite a 
lot in business - it makes it easier to take advantage of the situation. 
Manager,)Service)design!
 119 
  
 
 
Working with customers that have purchased services from Making Waves before is 
often easier than working with new ones, because Making Waves often have to 
teach their customers how to work with them 
 
If we have immature customers, we have to teach them, which takes time. 
Therefore the first project with customers is often a waterfall project. And then, 
the second project might be more agile. Teaching them how we work is part 
of the projects we do. We have to talk to them, show them things as we 
progress. We need basic trust first. If we are working with a first-time 
customer, we can talk all day about how good we are, but they can’t know for 
sure. Unless they know previous customers of us. 
Manager,).NET!
 
The first project with a customer is almost always problematic. We always 
spend too many hours. It takes too long time to raise the ladder and initiate 
proper collaboration. But we have a 5-10 year perspective on customers. So 
we know that we have to accept some losses at first, and that we will make 
that money back during the following years, because we will have safer, 
better projects with them then. 
Director,)Sales!
 
Making Waves has just started hiring engagement directors, who will lead groups 
within Making Waves that will work with specific segments.  
 
It was going to be a trial, but now it’s an extended trial with three or four 
engagement directors. It provides us with the necessary experience to reduce 
the need of people having to ask people at Sales about, for instance, the 
public sector. They won’t have to ask, because they have been part of the 
process since the start, and are working close to others who are working on 
similar projects. And I think that’s a good thing. The basic idea is that we shall 
have some seniors that have a lot of knowledge about specific segments, 
more than we have at Sales. 
Director,)Sales!
6.3.3 Overselling 
Many of the informants noted that the sales department had a tendency to oversell 
projects to customers, thus raising expectations too high, and the project manager 
having to lower expectations when the project begins: 
 
I believe we sometimes have too big ambitions regarding sales. We pitch 
projects to them that their budgets don’t allow. 
Senior)project)manager!
 
The director of Experience design explained why the project with the Norwegian 
parliament (Stortinget) is way over budget:  
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There were several challenges with that project. One thing was that it had 
been won by offering a lot for a price that was too low, we didn’t control the 
expectations that were given to the customer after selling the system. We 
promised way too much. And we gave the project a too wide scope from the 
start, and haven’t been able to reduce it later on. Instead, we let the 
customers ambitions continued to grow, instead of being reduced to a level 
on which we can deliver.  
Director,)Experience)design!
 
An interaction designer recalled her experiences with the Norwegian parliament 
(Stortinget) project and why it went over budget: 
 
It was because the project was oversold, and we found out that the instant 
the team had been assembled. We evaluated the requirement specifications, 
and all the specialists on my team informed management that there were not 
enough resources for my task. So everybody knew about it from day one, and 
we informed the management. I don’t know if Sales know how much the 
project was oversold, I haven’t spoken to them about it. But I suspect it was a 
strategic choice, because we wanted a customer relationship to Stortinget, 
and we’re hoping to sell them more services in the future, thus eventually 
making our work profitable. And of course, it was a public tender, and that 
means there are many rules about which vendor to choose, and to get to do 
the project at all, we had to oversell. Perhaps someone from sales said that it 
would have been interesting to see how the other companies that made offers 
that were actually cheaper than our offer, had planned to deliver on the 
demands that Stortinget had.  
Interaction)designer)2!
 
The project managers feel that they have to provide realism in projects: 
 
Say that they make this system to save two million. Then they want to make a 
profit of it. And it’s important that we don’t take responsibility for that, saying 
that they will make that profit. Things like that are often mentioned in the 
contract, so when I work with customers, I make sure that they know that they 
are the ones responsible for claiming that profit. We shall not do that. So that 
separation is something we work quite a lot with, because the customers 
sometimes get the impression that we provide much more than we actually 
do. There are some customers that just lean back and wait for the project to 
be finished. But the job is theirs. 
Manager,)project)manager!
 
According to sales, overselling projects is a conscious strategy for getting a foot 
within new business areas and landing deals with customers. When confronted with 
the allegations of overselling the Director of Sales responded humorously: Of course, 
that’s what we do: Trust me, I’m in sales, before he elaborated: 
 
I get complaints from the project managers’ manager and the project 
managers all the time, and I try to explain to them why it has to be like this. 
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(...) When watching a movie trailer, do you really think it’s the most boring 
parts you are watching? Everything has to be sold. A theatre can have the 
best shows every night, but no-one will show up if they don’t know what’s 
happening. We have to be the poster for the show. And of course, the show 
itself has to be good, because if the performance is bad and the poster is 
good, we’ll fail to meet people’s expectations.  
Director,)sales!
 
It’s hard to tell if this is a conscious behaviour by the sales director, at least he 
describes himself as a very entrepreneurial  and informal person. 
 
I’m a very unbureaucratic. I'm an entrepreneurial guy, so I’m a representative 
of one extreme, non-formalism, but this is also why I resigned as chairman of 
the board here. I realized that we needed more formalism as we grew, but I 
think I can help balance it out, so that we don’t become silly formalistic. 
Director,)sales!
6.3.4 Competitor focus 
Several informants said that Making Waves does not really consider what its 
competitors are doing in choosing which strategies to follow. But some of them also 
said that they try to do the opposite of what competitors are doing, and much of 
management used the same phrase: “we go in the opposite direction.” 
 
Lately, we’ve been trying to avoid mistakes made by our competitors, and not 
much “me too”. It is very rare that we copy competitors, quite the contrary: 
We have mostly gone in the opposite direction.  
Senior)designer)/)frontHend)developer!
 
A manager explains how they relate to competitors: 
 
We haven’t paid much attention to our competitors. We believe in what we’re 
doing, but we want to make reality checks sometimes, of course. Just now, I 
think that many of our competitors are going in the same direction, saying the 
same things, and it’s differentiation that determines who will do best in the 
end. I believe that delivering products based on that is quite important.  
Director,)lifecycle!
 
A project manager responded to whether she pays attention to competitors: 
 
To some extent, because I’m heavily invested in my projects. I see what’s 
going on in media, and what I stumble upon, but I don’t actively seek such 
information. I rather find information about other things concerning my 
projects or things that are connected to project management in general. To 
keep myself up to date and challenged. 
Project)manager!
 
The CEO explained the overall company view of their competitors: 
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It is extremely, extremely rare that we have copied our competitors, rather 
quite the opposite. They have made some stupid choices. That doesn’t mean 
we don’t respect them - we admire a lot of our competitors. But we think it’s 
best to do things our own way, after understanding the mistakes that our 
competitors have done. We often go in the opposite direction.  
CEO!
6.3.5 Strategies for the future 
In 2012, Making Waves bought a small company named Zoot, which made service 
design solutions. Several informants mentioned that they believed service design 
would be an important field in future. 
 
I hope that the market will mature for service design in the future, because 
service design is a field where you consider the entire process, the entire 
situation for the company. What is the situation today? How is it REALLY to 
be a customer of ours? How is your outward appearance, how do customers 
perceive you through your communication channels? I think, after some time, 
that there will be an increasing interest in the market for really analysing what 
you are doing.  
Senior)designer)/)frontHend)developer!
 
The director of Lifecycle told is what his thoughts on Making Waves’ future is: 
 
We will be working with service design. It requires that you have the 
necessary systematic approach, and that you understand the customer’s 
solutions, and that you are able to combine the two things, meaning the 
analogue and the digital. And we will probably get a stronger position in the 
service design field.  
Director,)lifecycle!
 
Branching out this way into the market of service design can be viewed as a way to 
acquire new customers. But the Director of Sales does not agree. 
 
No, not really. We have been providing the same services all the time, but we 
have continually expanded our offers within digital communication. Our main 
product, to put it very simply, was originally design and development of web-
portals. That was what we started with. (...) But of course we are aware that 
service design is more than digital communications. The target groups are 
overlapping though. There are customers that have digital and physical 
meeting points with their customer again, and we can help to think holistically 
with them. (...) Having a digital starting point, is what we want to be known for. 
We do not start in the physical world and then see which digital services that 
can support it. 
Director,)sales!
 
Making Waves is in the middle of a very good growth period where all arrows points 
to the sky. This clearly affects the positive outlook several employees have for the 
future. 
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The customers are becoming more mature and realizing the importance of 
the digital channels. In particular within the publishing and media companies. 
I believe those channels probably will become more and more important. (...) 
We are in a fortunate situation that we can choose some of our customers. 
It's incredibly rewarding. One can choose customers who are mature and who 
are interested in going all out. This is the trend we have seen in the recent 
years, and we will certainly see more of it.  
Interaction)designer)1!
 
Both the vision and mission of Making Waves have, as explained before a particular 
story, and are not your stereotypical vision and mission statement. For instance they 
only implicitly mention their customer. So what kind of strategic choice have they 
done in positioning themselves in the market, especially for future growth?   
 
The bottom line here is our vision and mission, and then we have 
implemented a positioning strategy or positioning statement (...) Our strategy 
builds on these pillars, and the most important thing is our vision of a great 
place to work, the other important one relates to the mission: creating 
delightful experiences. They're both a bit soft, they are not about the 
percentage growth, or profitability at a certain level, or what revenues will be 
in five years. We are very people oriented and very committed to our 
customers, but we may have lost a beacon of light such as a market 
positioning statement. So we came up with a positioning statement which 
states that the demand for Making Waves and our services in creating great 
customer experiences will come from big international brands. (...) Perhaps 
utopian, but then it is no longer us who knocks on doors or respond to 
tenders. Then companies come to us because they know that Making Waves 
can solve such and such and such and such. Then we have a position in the 
market which makes us very attractive. 
CEO!
 
There is a clear consensus about this market positioning strategy within the company 
and the manager of the project management department puts it like this: 
 
This how I imagine that we develop. I'm very relaxed about if it happens 
abroad or here [in Norway]. 
Manager,)Project)management!
 
This notion of expanding abroad is supported by other managers. They state that 
they want to have more customers abroad, and that having strong international 
offices will contribute to that goal. 
 
I believe we will have more customers from other countries. But the trend that 
we see the beginning of today will become stronger in the future - I believe 
that we will have fewer customers with larger projects. Service design will 
also be more important, meaning that we’ll do more service design projects 
than today.  
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Director,)people)&)processes!
 
The CEO also agrees that in the strive to pursue the market positioning statement, 
more offices internationally is imperative.  
 
In order to achieve such a thing we must step out into the world, so in a way 
that is who we have rationalized it. And then we have analysed it from a 
tactical level. Analysed different approaches towards such a 
internationalization, and considered just moving to London or New York. (...) 
And then there is the most defensive strategy, which is about only identifying 
opportunities as single customer cases around the world, and then respond to 
them without a major commitment to establish ourselves in that market. Then 
it all becomes pretty random, and such activities we've got a lot of today 
already. We feel that it's too defensive, so we've landed on a mixed model of 
working those kinds of opportunities in parallel to enter an alliance with a 
couple of our technology providers, both Easy Publish and EpiServer, this to 
be able to work even more concrete, take customer cases and develop them 
on our own with these partners. (...) We made the most progress in 
cooperation with EpiServer for the U.S. market. That’s how we singled out 
New York as the most likely place to establish ourselves next time. Not 
because it is not a competitive market, it's a crazy competitive market, but it’s 
a large market. There are so many possibilities and EpiServer has done such 
a great job there, so we think it is suitable for us to piggyback on them. 
CEO!
 
The strategic choice to enter an alliance with their supplier is supported by the other 
members of the top-management group. 
 
We deliver solutions based on a content management system called 
EpiServer. EpiServer has established itself in the United States. We are the 
largest EpiServer-partner in the world, and have the highest number of 
certified employees in their technology, and they would very much like for us 
to establish a presence in the United States. They have recommended New 
York, as a place where there are no other partners. 
Director,)people)&)processes!
6.4 Overview and summary of empirical findings 
In this chapter, we have presented several statements by our informants and 
grouped them together in categories based on topic. These main topics are the three 
core empirical categories that emerged from our process of coding and analysis, 
which are company culture, knowledge management, and strategic orientation. We 
will discuss our findings as presented in this chapter in chapters 7 and 8, and refer 
back to the subchapters of this chapter. 
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Discussion and conclusions  
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7 Discussion 
In the previous chapter, we presented empirical data collected through interviews 
with employees in Making Waves. In this chapter, we will discuss the data in context 
of the four main internal approaches ambidexterity, presented in subchapter 3.6. We 
will continue to use the structure from chapter 6, by grouping the data in three central 
categories, which emerged through our analysis of the empirical data: (1) Company 
culture, (2) Knowledge management, and (3) Strategic orientation. Each main 
chapter is divided into four subchapters, based on the four main internal approaches 
to ambidexterity, which are: (1) Architectural approaches, (2) Contextual approaches, 
(3) Combinatorial approaches and (4) Management approaches. Before we head into 
the discussion, we will recap our propositions and confirm that Making Waves is in 
fact company with a value shop configuration. 
7.1 Recap of propositions 
Although our propositions will be repeated throughout the discussions in the 
subsequent subchapters, we will present a short recap of them here. Our 
propositions read as follows:  
 
1a: A value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve 
exploitation. 
1b: Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge and 
acquire new knowledge. 
2: An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a more rigid 
structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural approaches. 
3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with new and 
existing customers. 
3b: When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on 
exploitation than exploration. 
4: The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. 
5a: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
company culture. 
5b: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
knowledge management. 
 
We have created a framework for our discussion that illustrates how the propositions 
cover all of the core empirical categories, and all of the four main approaches to 
internal ambidexterity. The propositions in Figure 7.1 stretch over the categories they 
will be mentioned in, indicating what content will be discussed in each subchapter. 
For example, combinatorial approaches will be mentioned in subchapter 7.3.4 and 
7.4.4. 
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Figure 7.1 Framework for discussion. 
 
Proposition 2 spans over all three of the empirical categories, which causes the 
discussion of this proposition to be more fragmented than the others. This has 
resulted in some overlap between chapters 7.3.1, 7.4.1 and 7.5.1, since some of the 
indicators of architectural approaches are relevant for two or more chapters. Similarly, 
propositions 5a and 5b are closely connected, and they will be discussed with some 
overlap in two separate subchapters. 
 
In chapter 8, we will summarize the discussion of each proposition, evaluate them 
and discuss their implications. The discussion of the implications will form the basis 
of our conclusions and recommendations for further research presented in chapter 9. 
But, first we will discuss how we used our insights from the empirical data to confirm 
that Making Waves is a value shop. 
7.2 The value shop Making Waves 
As discussed in subchapter 1.4, we wanted to narrow down our scope from the 
generic term “service sector” to a classification we felt described our case company 
more accurately. We chose to use the model of value configurations, a model that is 
classified by how the firm creates value for its customer. In subchapter 1.4, we briefly 
introduced three different value configurations before we explained the model of the 
value shop more specifically. 
 
Several of our propositions rely on the definition of the value shop, and we would 
therefore like to argue that Making Waves is a value shop based on our empirical 
data. We will base this discussion on the properties of a value shop as explained in 
subchapter 1.4 (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998): 
 
● Problem finding and acquisition - Recording, reviewing, and formulating 
the problem to be solved and choosing the overall approach to solving the 
problem. 
● Problem solving - Generating and evaluating alternative solutions. 
● Choice - Choosing among alternative problem solutions. 
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● Execution - Communicating, organizing, and implementing the chosen 
solution. 
● Control and evaluation - Measuring and evaluating to what extent 
implementation has solved the initial problem statement. 
 
We will now explain how Making Waves has properties that make this organization a 
value shop, based on the empirical data we collected on the company.  
 
Problem finding and acquisition 
Making Waves do specific projects for customers, based on customer needs (chapter 
5). They have thorough discussions with customers before, and during, projects to 
figure out what the customer wants and decide what needs to be done (chapter 6). 
Thus, they work with problem finding and acquisition within the value shop 
framework.  
 
Problem solving and choice 
Considering that Making Waves has a running dialog with customers (chapter 6), and 
a broad technical expertise (chapter 5), their work process involves discussing many 
alternative solutions, both internally in project teams, and with customers. We have 
not immersed ourselves in details of their project execution method, but we know that 
they involve customers directly in projects (chapter 6). This means that Making 
Waves most likely generate and evaluate different solutions with their customers, 
and they use customer input to chose between the alternative solutions, meaning 
that they carry out problem solving and choice.  
 
Execution 
No project, or other processes for that matter, would ever be finished and delivered 
without the element of execution. It is a natural part of the value creation process, 
and since Making Waves’ business model is to deliver completed projects to their 
customers, they are able to execute.  
 
Control and evaluation 
To make sure that an organization is cost effective and actually solves the customer 
problem, it is important to continuously measure and evaluate projects. Having a 
running dialog with the customers is an effective way of knowing whether one is 
actually solving the right problem. Making Waves’ increasing profitability (chapter 5) 
indicates many satisfied customers, which means that the company is solving the 
right problems. Thus, Making Waves use control and evaluation within the value 
shop framework. 
 
As we can see, the operations in Making Waves coincides well with the different 
steps in the value shop configuration. In addition, Making Waves are described in 
chapter 5 as technology intensive. They establish different multidisciplinary project 
teams depending on the type of problem that needs to be solved, and rely on 
technology to solve problems for their customers. They also vary the different steps 
in the model according to the requirements of the problem at hand. On this basis, we 
can confirm that Making Waves has a value shop configuration, thus making our 
empirical findings valid as a basis to discuss our propositions.  
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The next subchapter will deal with the empirical core category of company culture, 
where we will discuss all the propositions that stretch over this category in our 
discussion framework. The two other empirical core categories will follow, and will be 
structured likewise. 
7.3 Company culture 
Company culture is one of the three core empirical categories that emerged from our 
analysis of the empirical data. In this subchapter, we will discuss the four approaches 
to internal ambidexterity in light of Making Waves’ company culture. We will discuss 
propositions 2, 4 and 5a, as highlighted in Figure 7.2. The propositions will be 
repeated in their respective sections, as presented in Figure 7.1.  
 
 
Figure 7.2 Company culture and propositions. 
7.3.1 Architectural approaches  
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 2: An increased number of employees 
requires a value shop to adopt a more rigid structure, which causes an increased 
emphasis on architectural approaches. 
 
As mentioned in chapter 5, Making Waves has increased the 
number of employees significantly since being founded in 2001, 
resulting in the creation of specific business units that work with 
specific tasks, the implementation of several new computer 
systems, and many other indicators that are commonly perceived 
to create organizational structure. Architectural approaches 
include, as described in subchapter 3.5.1, the concepts of 
systems, spatial separation, task partitioning, temporal separation, formalization and 
connectedness (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996, Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, 
Puranam et al., 2006, Jansen et al., 2006, Raisch et al., 2009, Andriopoulos and 
 130 
  
 
Lewis, 2009). These are all concepts that naturally involve some sort of increase in 
structure, and they imply increased discrete interaction between people and/or 
organizational units. They entail separating, formalizing or systemizing people, units, 
processes, or the connection between such entities or activities.  
 
The fact that architectural approaches imply more structure seems evident, but we 
want to consider the implication the other way around - that increased structure 
increases the need for architectural approaches. To do that, we need to prove that 
it’s likely that Making Waves has become more structured as a direct consequence 
of their growth, and that architectural approaches are a natural result of this. 
 
Proposition 2 is the only proposition that is covered by all three empirical categories, 
and will therefore be discussed in all three chapters. As explained earlier, the 
findings will be combined in subchapter 8.3 to give a comprehensive overview of 
proposition 2. When discussing the propositions, we will first present examples from 
our empirical data of the increased structure, and then examples of the increase of 
architectural approaches.  
 
More structure 
Making Waves went from being a small company with 14 employees where every 
employee by default had to fill several roles, and top managers had to work on all 
kinds of projects, to a company with almost 300 employees where employees usually 
have just one role, and managers only manage (subchapter 5.1). When Making 
Waves had 14 employees, they didn’t have a strict structure, and we believe there 
are several logical reasons for this, some of which are:  
 
● Multiple roles blurred the lines of management and the layers of hierarchy 
because people didn’t strictly report upwards in the organisation. Low-level 
employees had authority over managers in some projects. 
● No one considered formal systems and hierarchy necessary, because every 
manager knew what all the other employees were doing at all times. 
● No one really knew what formal systems Making Waves should have, since 
the company was young and trying to find its place. 
 
Now that Making Waves is about 20 times larger than when it was founded, 
management is actively trying to uphold the flat structure and lack of hierarchy 
(subchapter 6.1.3). It seems that the structure is no longer flat by default, although 
both managers and other employees want it to be. When Making Waves acquired 
Tarantell, and tried to implement a performance management system, it resulted in 
conflict, because employees perceived this as a way for management to survey and 
control. Employees resisted the new system, and the managers decided to reject the 
system (subchapter 6.1.1). Making Waves has aspired to keep the flat hierarchy 
since, but it seems very challenging to do so. The sheer number of employees 
makes it impossible for anyone to know what every employee does. The increased 
number of projects requires more administration and management, which decreases 
the potential for an individual to know where the company is going, and why. Without 
people on top coordinating the efforts of groups within the company, Making Waves 
would probably be diverging due to employees’ conflicting perceptions of the 
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direction the company is taking. Having a top layer of management controlling the 
direction of the company means both a more rigid structure and more hierarchy. 
 
The management in Making Waves has tried to keep the organization flat by having 
as few layers of management as possible. Yet, at present, they have a CEO who is 
in charge of five department heads, who again are in charge of 2-5 middle managers, 
who are in charge of a number of employees (Figure 5.1). This means that many 
employees have three layers of management above them.  
 
To counteract the potential negative effects from structure and hierarchy, Making 
Waves arrange many social events, such as skiing trips, beer making, having all 
employees eating together in the dining facilities, and many others. In addition, 
employees spend most of their time working on projects, where they answer to the 
project managers on a daily basis, more than to the middle managers, which might 
help to break up potential rigid structures. But Making Waves still has a formal 
hierarchy with the three layers of management that hold power over their 
subordinates, so they are not trying to avoid hierarchy, just the effects they consider 
undesirable. In effect, they consider more hierarchy a necessity as they have grown.  
 
More architectural approaches 
As Making Waves has grown, both in number of employees and levels of 
management, the company has adopted several architectural approaches. The six 
indicators of architectural approaches are, as described in subchapter 3.5.1, Spatial 
separation (Tushman and O'Reilly, 1996), task partitioning (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004), temporal separation (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009), formalization (Jansen et 
al., 2006), and connectedness (Jansen et al., 2006). As discussed in subchapter 
3.5.1, we group task partitioning together with spatial separation. As proposition 2 will 
be discussed within knowledge management and strategic orientation as well, we will 
elaborate on the architectural approaches which we believe are most connected to 
the company culture in this chapter, namely spatial separation, temporal separation, 
connectedness, and formalization. 
 
Spatial separation 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that spatial separation is the act of separating different 
business units on the basis of whether they shall do explorative and exploitative 
activities (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Making Waves have clearly defined 
departments (Figure 5.1) that are responsible for different kinds of work. One 
informant explained that the strategy department works very creatively and come up 
with new ideas (subchapter 6.3.1), which means that they are explorative. The 
lifecycle department is in charge of maintenance of the products that Making Waves 
sell, which means they can be seen as somewhat exploitative (subchapter 5.3). This 
is an indication of spatial separation. The main problem of applying spatial separation 
to Making Waves, is that employees work in multidisciplinary teams. Projects involve 
the combination of personnel from several departments, thus creating a strong 
horizontal linking between employees. This can imply that spatial separation is less 
important in value shops, and that spatial separation is not very relevant for our 
discussion.  
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Temporal separation 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that temporal separation allows both exploration and 
exploitation to be done in the same business unit, but at different times (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004, McDonough and Leifer, 1983). In Making Waves, employees go 
from open ideation phases to more closed and concluding phases during projects. As 
Making Waves has grown, we see no evidence of there being more temporal 
separation within projects, or in the rest of the company for that matter. Individuals 
might experience a stricter temporal separation since they no longer have multiple 
roles, but that is related to the category of formalization. Temporal separation is still 
an important architectural approach to ambidexterity in Making Waves.  
 
Connectedness 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that connectedness is the act of connecting unrelated parts 
of the organization together through a structure that encourages informal 
communication and knowledge sharing (Jansen et al., 2006). The managers we 
spoke to all talked about the importance of informal communication, and how it was 
possible for everyone to talk to anyone in their organization. Some likened informal 
communication to a lack of hierarchy, but we believe that these statements show a 
lack of understanding of hierarchy in the theoretical sense, which is that someone 
has power to make decisions and others do not (Ouchi, 1979). The informal 
communication in Making Waves is an example of connectedness, because 
information flows efficiently across departments and layers of management. Another 
example of connectedness is the social platform Yammer, described by one 
informant as a “Facebook for companies” (subchapter 6.2.1). Employees can use it 
both for sharing knowledge and socializing, and having such a system is an 
architectural way of creating company culture by facilitating informal communication.  
 
Formalization 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that formalizing is about formalizing rules, procedures, job 
instructions and communications, writing them down or keeping them in records 
(Mom et al., 2007). A very specific example of formalization is when management 
decided to formalize the position of Minister of Culture. The employee that bears the 
title used to hold that position informally, but as Making Waves grew, the need for 
someone to maintain the company culture increased. So management made sure 
that 50 per cent of her time was available for tasks related to company culture 
(subchapter 6.1.4). 
 
Findings related to proposition 2 
A few informants viewed the increase in organizational structures as negative and 
wanted to limit further growth, but they understood that the increase was necessary 
(subchapter 6.2.4). They were not directly criticizing new structures, or measures we 
consider as architectural approaches, but feared losing the characteristic Making 
Waves culture. Most of the employees were positive to the increase in structure and 
architectural approaches, as they deemed them necessary and useful. The wide 
acceptance of the need for structure and architectural approaches strongly supports 
proposition 2: An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a 
more rigid structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural 
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approaches. We have summarized examples of architectural approaches that relate 
to growth below: 
 
● Spatial separation - Some departments work with explorative tasks, and 
some with exploitative tasks. 
● Temporal separation - Employees on projects go from an open, explorative 
phase to a closed, exploitative phase, this has not changed with increased 
company size. 
● Connectedness - Much informal communication particularly facilitated by the 
creation of the Minister of Culture and the communication platform Yammer. 
● Formalization - Several roles and procedures have been formalized as 
Making Waves has grown, such as the role of Minister of Culture. 
 
7.3.2 Contextual approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 4: The CEO’s leadership style is 
crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. 
 
This proposition deals with how management approaches 
and the CEO’s leadership style affects contextual 
approaches to ambidexterity. The proposition is related to 
contextual and management approaches, and we will 
describe central contextual approaches first, so that we can 
discuss how and if they relate to the management 
approaches presented in subchapter 3.5.4. The discussion 
will be in context of the core empirical category of company culture. 
 
To determine the CEO’s influence on the contextual approaches to ambidexterity in 
Making Waves, we must first establish whether the company uses contextual 
approaches at all. The seven indicators of contextual approaches are, as described 
in subchapter 3.5.2: Stretch, discipline, support, trust, socialization, team building, 
and autonomy (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994, Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008, Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004). These indicators will be discussed in light of our empirical 
data that is related to company culture.  
 
Stretch 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that stretch encourages employees to set ambitious goals, 
and is attained by collective identity and personal meaning (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004). Making Waves has a few indicators of stretch, such as a collective bonus 
system (subchapter 6.1.3), that awards every employee in the company based on 
overall company performance. Making Waves have removed all individual bonuses, 
which strengthen the collective identity, as opposed to strengthening the individuals’ 
identity (subchapter 6.1.3). Stretch is closely linked to motivation, and managers and 
non-managers emphasize the systematic approach Making Waves has to motivation, 
mentioning their self-determination model as particularly important (subchapter 6.1.7).  
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Discipline 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that discipline encourages employees to strive to meet the 
expectations that others have of them due to their commitments. Discipline is 
attained by clear standards of performance, a system of open and rapid feedback, 
and consistency in the use of sanctions (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). The use of 
sanctions were mentioned in relation to time, and there had been incidents where 
project teams used more hours than planned on fixed price projects, and 
management stepped in to reassess the project and help the project teams get back 
on track (subchapter 6.2.4). Open and rapid feedback in Making Waves is to a large 
degree facilitated through the project management system Jira. This system allows 
every employee, and the customer, to observe the progress and performance of 
projects, and to receive and give feedback (subchapter 6.2.1).  
 
Support 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that support is about systems that facilitate knowledge 
sharing (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). This could be wikis or freedom of initiative 
for all levels, and senior employees that prioritize guidance. Support seems to be a 
fundamental principle in Making Waves, since they have several systems for 
knowledge sharing, that are often used (Table 6.1), and because employees are 
allowed to work according to their own best judgement (subchapter 6.1.7). Managers 
also try to help employees when asked to do so, instead of micro managing 
(subchapter 6.1.7). 
 
The words “support” and “help” were mentioned frequently during the interviews, and 
both management and employees characterize the working environment as 
supportive and helpful. The Norwegian way of saying that there is isn’t much 
aggressive competition by saying “no sharp elbows” also came up several times. We 
consider this to be an indicator of a supportive environment.  
   
Trust 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that trust encourages employees to rely on each other, and 
trust can be attained by fair decision processes, and staffing the right people (Gibson 
and Birkinshaw, 2004). Our informants did not specifically mention that they trust 
each other, or that trust is important. We think that trust is mostly spoken of when it is 
lacking, and we did not expect our informants to explicitly say that they trust each 
other. We believe that trust is an essential part of contextual collaborative 
environment, and that people only think about it when it is missing.  
 
Socialization 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that socialization creates a social context (Gibson and 
Birkinshaw, 2004). It is a process of inheriting and disseminating norms, customs 
and ideologies, providing an individual with the skills and habits necessary for 
participating within his or her own society (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). This 
means that Making Waves must not only have norms, customs, and ideology, they 
must be able to ensure that the employees internalize them. 
 
During the interviews, we discovered that Making Waves teach new employees the 
basic principles of Making Waves, including the vision and the mission (subchapter 
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6.1.7). They train new employees by having them observe projects so they can learn 
the ropes, and they send people to training courses when they are not busy with 
projects (subchapter 6.2.5). 
 
Norms can be a bit difficult to grasp, since they are not explicitly defined in an 
organization. But there seems to be a common understanding of some basic 
principles of conduct, such as not being loud in the open office landscapes. Another 
norm seems to be that employees have lunch at the same time. We have no 
indicators that the inheriting and disseminating of norms, customs or ideologies are 
lacking in Making Waves.  
 
Team building 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that team building is a type of socialization, and that it 
includes a range of activities that businesses use to improve team performance 
(Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). We learned from our interviews that Making Waves 
has several team building activities, such as Making Ski and Making Beer 
(subchapter 6.1.5), and friend groups (subchapter 6.1.5). All these activities are 
designed so that people will get to know each other and, in effect, create a social 
context.  
 
Autonomy 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that autonomy is the capacity of a rational individual to make 
informed and non-influenced decisions (Probst et al., 2011). Together with support, 
autonomy is something the informants talked about a lot. When asked how they 
wanted to be led, all informants responded that they wanted to have freedom, and 
that they wanted the manager to interfere only when they asked him to. The CEO 
said that he trusted his people to make all the right decisions, and that he did not 
have to exercise control in the daily running of the company. It became obvious that 
Making Waves has a high level of autonomy.  
Table 7.1 Contextual approaches and company culture. 
Performance management Social context 
Discipline 
● Open and rapid feedback. 
● Few signs of sanctions or discipline. 
Stretch  
● Collective bonus system. 
● Supporting teamwork. 
Support  
● Systems for knowledge sharing. 
● Employees using their best judgement. 
● Helpful managers. 
Trust  
● An apparent level of trust in the entire 
company. 
Autonomy 
● Employees given room to make their 
own decisions. 
Socialization and team building 
● Employees are taught Making Waves’ 
vision, mission and norms. 
● Many social activities after work. 
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Findings related to proposition 4 
We found several examples of contextual approaches to ambidexterity within the 
context of company culture in Making Waves, and we have listed them below in 
Table 7.1. Since proposition 4 spans over both contextual and management 
approaches, we will present our conclusion in subchapter 7.3.3, in addition to the 
proposition summary in subchapter 8.6. 
7.3.3 Management approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 4: The CEO’s leadership style is 
crucial for the effect of contextual approaches.  
 
As described in subchapter 3.5.4, managers that inhibit both 
the ability to adapt to market change and have a high 
tolerance for risk, lead organizations with a higher degree of 
ambidexterity (Chang and Hughes, 2012). The CEO of 
Making Waves is in direct contact with employees every day, 
and the employees report to different managers depending on 
the project they are working on. Due to his direct contact with the employees, we 
assume that he makes a particularly large impact on contextual approaches, which 
utilize many behavioural and social means. The CEO holds a lot of power over the 
company, and we assume that he therefore packs a lot of weight in discussions and 
other social interactions with employees.  
 
The CEO also has a high degree of impact on the organizational structure and 
architectural approaches, but those areas are dominated by formal rules and 
regulations, and are therefore not as influenced by the CEO’s personality.  
 
As described in subchapter 3.5.4, the five main management approaches to 
ambidexterity are risk taking (Chang and Hughes, 2012), adaptability (Jaworski and 
Kohli, 1993), opening behaviours (Rosing et al., 2011), closing behaviours (Rosing et 
al., 2011), and the temporal ability to switch between opening and closing behaviours 
(Rosing et al., 2011). We will explain how the CEO performs within each of those 
categories, and in the end of this subchapter, we will link them to the findings of the 
contextual indicators. 
 
Risk taking 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that risk taking has to do with the degree of risk a leader 
takes or tolerates (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). From what we learned in subchapters 
6.1.7 and 6.3.1, we interpret that the CEO is quite risk tolerant in his approach to 
both the daily management of Making Waves, and in laying the long-term strategies. 
For example, the reasoning behind establishing an office in New York is partly that a 
partner of Making Waves recommended it, but mostly because of the passion the 
CEO and the other managers have for New York. They clearly hope to transfer this 
passion to the rest of Making Waves, thus making the New York branch a success 
(subchapter 6.3.1). The strategy is not founded on analysis or calculations, but on 
what seems to be a gut feeling. We consider relying on the CEO’s gut feeling a risky 
strategy. 
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We consider high risk tolerance to be closely related to autonomy and trust in the 
contextual perspective of managing employees. Letting employees make their own 
decisions shows trust from the manager, and requires the manager to accept risk, 
especially when an employee does not have much experience. The safe way might 
be to micro-manage more, to ensure that employees do not make big mistakes, but 
this might also limit employees’ potential for creativity and finding their own solutions. 
Also, in the contextual ambidexterity perspective, trust is also about staffing the right 
people.  
 
One can therefore argue that granting the right people autonomy isn’t that risky, but 
rather quite safe. But deciding on which employees are to be defined as the right 
people. There is just no way to tell for sure when hiring, so granting employees 
autonomy therefore involves risk. We suspect that a risk-averse CEO might not be 
willing to grant employees the same level of autonomy as the CEO of Making Waves. 
This shows a clear connection of how the management approach of risk-taking 
affects the contextual approach of trust and autonomy, and that he or she would 
therefore not use as many contextual approaches to ambidexterity. 
 
Adaptability 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that being adaptable means being willing to change with a 
changing environment, and in the case of organizational theory it is has to do with 
being adaptable to market changes. An adaptive leader will stress to employees the 
importance of adapting to market trends, being aware of competitors and acting now 
to meet customer’s future needs (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993).  
 
The CEO has demonstrated ability and will to make changes in Making Waves. One 
definite example is when he fired all designers at the Polish offices (subchapter 
6.1.7), to turn it into a pure programming unit. He also spoke a lot about 
differentiating Making Waves from its competitors by being the best in the market, 
making customers prefer Making Waves to others (subchapter 6.2.5). To follow up 
such a statement, he has to pay close attention to what competitors do, and thereby 
have an overview of the market.  
 
The CEO does not, however, tell employees to adapt to market trends or be 
particularly aware of competitors. The director of the Lifecycle department even 
claims that they do not pay attention to competitors at all (subchapter 6.3.4). Making 
Waves seems to encourage employees to update their skills to meet future customer 
needs (subchapter 6.2.6), but we do not see any particular connection between that 
and the CEO’s focus. We believe that the process of updating skills is connected to 
formal processes within Making Waves. 
 
Opening behaviours 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that opening behaviours are behaviours that encourage 
exploration. Examples of opening leadership behaviours are encouraging 
experimentation with different ideas, allowing errors, encouraging error learning, 
allowing different ways of accomplishing tasks and motivating employees to take risk 
(Rosing et al., 2011). 
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Opening behaviours is basically about allowing employees to accept risk, as 
exploration yields potential long term profits, involving more risk than exploitation 
(Rosing et al., 2011). It is also closely related to autonomy, as employees are 
allowed to make mistakes themselves (subchapter 6.2.4). It is also related to a level 
of trust, but not necessarily trust in that employees will make the correct decisions, 
but rather that they will do their best. We have already argued that the CEO allows 
autonomy and accepts risk, so we consider him very capable of opening behaviours. 
 
Closing behaviours 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that closing behaviours are behaviours that encourage 
exploration. Examples of closing leadership are establishing routines, sticking to 
plans, sanctioning errors, monitoring and controlling goal attainment, taking 
corrective action and controlling adherence to rules (Rosing et al., 2011). 
 
Closing behaviours is basically about creating formal goals and implementing 
sanctions, and being a bit on the micro-managing. Despite being an advocate for 
opening behaviours, the CEO of Making Waves is also capable of giving clear 
instructions. He explained how he acted when he needed employees to perform 
better in subchapter 6.1.7: 
I use many methods. Sometimes I cry, sometimes I yell loudly and tell people 
off. Other times, I treat people like kittens, being kind and sensitive, smile at 
them and pat them on their backs while saying that they have to perform 
better. 
 
That answer emphasizes that the CEO uses his personality when enforcing rules and 
making employees understand the importance of his instructions. 
 
We believe that closing behaviours are strongly connected to “discipline”, but also to 
“stretch”. The discipline aspect of making employees strive to meet the expectations 
of others seems obvious, but also stretch, which is about employees setting 
ambitious goals for themselves, are probably affected by the CEO involving himself 
directly in affairs. We have already argued that discipline is not actively used in 
Making Waves, but if we had studied the Polish office closer, we might have had 
found more examples of discipline there. 
 
Temporal switching 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that temporal switching is switching between opening and 
closing behaviours to encourage employees to work with either explorative or 
exploitative tasks (Rosing et al., 2011). 
 
We have already established that the CEO is capable of both opening and closing 
behaviours. Since the two behaviours are opposites of each other, they cannot be 
displayed at the same, so the CEO has to be capable of temporal switching between 
them. He seemed a little unsure of his own ability to switch between the two 
behaviours, by mentioning that he wants to grant people the ability to make all kinds 
of decisions, but that he sees his own nature as controlling. He even fears that he is 
seen as a dominating and manipulating leader. However, none of the other 
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informants spoke of him in this way. They described him as someone you can talk to 
at all times, and who listens to what people say. It therefore seems that the CEO is 
capable of switching between opening and closing behaviours, despite his own 
doubts. 
 
Insights related to proposition 4 
It seems that the CEO of Making Waves is strongly involved in several of the 
contextual approaches, especially within stretch, support, trust, and autonomy, 
related to for proposition 4: The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of 
contextual approaches. We have summarized our findings in Table 7.2 below by 
combinatorial approaches and how the management approaches relate to them. We 
have also made a more general Figure 7.3 to show the relationship between the 
management approaches and the contextual approaches. 
 
Table 7.2 Management approaches affecting contextual approaches. 
Contextual approaches Management approaches 
• Stretch - Collective bonus system, 
supporting teamwork. 
• Support - Systems for knowledge 
sharing, employees using their best 
judgement, helpful managers. 
• Socialization - Employees are taught 
Making Waves’ vision, mission and 
norms. 
• Team building - Many social activities 
after work. 
• Autonomy - Employees given room to 
make their own decisions. 
• Trust - An apparent level of trust in the 
entire company.  
• Risk taking - CEO accepts risks and 
allows employees to make choices 
(Connected to Trust and Autonomy) 
• Adaptability - CEO and management 
change strategies based on market 
knowledge (Connected to Socialization). 
• Opening behaviour - CEO accepts that 
employees can make risky choices 
themselves (Connected to Trust and 
autonomy). 
• Closing behaviour - CEO is able to 
make tough decisions, such as 
restructuring Making Waves Poland 
(Connected to Discipline and Stretch). 
• Temporal switching - CEO is able to 
exhibit opening behaviours and closing 
behaviours when needed, being mostly 
open. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Management approaches and contextual approaches 
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7.3.4 Combinatorial approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 5a: To solve the paradox of personal 
drivers, the value shop must use elements from company culture.  
 
As described in subchapter 3.5.3, personal drivers represents a strain between 
discipline and passion, both characteristics needed to 
successfully innovate (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). The 
solution is socializing practical artists while at the same 
time temporally and structurally separating work modes 
(subchapter 3.5.3). We assumed socialization would be 
closely related to the company culture, due to the 
interpersonal nature of socialization. 
 
We suspected that using personal drivers would teach employees to be individually 
ambidextrous and able to understand the need to be responsible individuals that 
interact through norms, unwritten rules and high-level instructions, while at the same 
time being aware of the need of formal systems and specific tasks. The formal 
systems and tasks must be completed and reported, and this must be carried out in 
both explorative and exploitative phases. In short: When dealing with personal 
drivers, an organization must make employees adopt the essence of both 
architectural and contextual approaches to ambidexterity. 
 
In this subchapter (subchapter 7.2), we have already argued that Making Waves has 
adopted many contextual approaches to ambidexterity, while at the same time 
displaying signs of architectural approaches. If ambidexterity in Making Waves is 
efficient, they therefore must be able to combine the two approaches. It is not within 
the scope of this thesis to determine whether Making Waves is in fact ambidextrous, 
which could perhaps be proven by Making Waves surviving as a company 
indefinitely. We will just determine whether Making Waves use their strong company 
culture to solve the paradox of personal ambidexterity by combining architectural and 
contextual approaches to ambidexterity. 
 
Personal drivers in Making Waves 
Most employees in Making Waves work on projects, and all projects have a defined 
start and end, and go from an open, searching phase to a closed, finishing phase. 
This is a way of temporally structuring work modes, representing one half of the way 
to solve the paradox of personal drivers. We do not find that temporal structuring has 
any direct link to company culture, and we will discuss temporal and structural 
separation of work modes in subchapter 7.4.4. 
 
We explained in subchapter 3.5.3 that socialization of “practical artists” has to do with 
nurturing paradoxical identities within people through hiring, educating and mentoring 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). We will discuss education of employees in 
subchapter 7.4 in connection with proposition 5b, whereas we will deal with 
mentoring in this subchapter, which we consider to be the aspect of socializing 
practical artists that is closest related to company culture. 
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We find that mentoring is closely related to the way Making Waves practice 
autonomy and support within the field of contextual ambidexterity, as a mentor is 
someone who has a high level of knowledge within a field of work. A mentor can be 
asked questions, and give guidance, without managing the mentee. Having an open 
company culture with a flat structure like Making Waves probably makes it easier to 
use mentors. Several informants described that they receive help and guidance from 
co-workers and managers, and many of them seem to have one or two individuals 
they turn to if they have questions (subchapters 6.1.6 and 6.1.7). 
 
Findings related to proposition 5a 
It seems like Making Waves uses its company culture to teach employees to both 
use their own judgement on whether to be explorative or exploitative, and accept the 
need for more formal systems that provide direction. They also seem to have an 
informal, yet extensive, culture of mentoring, thus supporting proposition 5a. 
However, we do not find particularly strong connections between separating work 
modes and company culture. The best example we can find, is that they seem to 
clearly separate between time set aside for working, and time set aside for 
socializing and team building, which seems rooted in the company culture. 
 
Making Waves does not use only company culture as the means to socialize 
practical artists, as we will describe in subchapter 7.4.4 when discussing proposition 
5b. We have summarized our findings from this subchapter in Table 7.3 below, and 
will continue our discussion of practical artists in subchapter 7.4.4. 
 
Table 7.3 The paradox of personal drivers in Making Waves. 
Socializing practical artists Separating work modes 
Making Waves puts an emphasis on mentoring, 
where experienced employees help others. 
Projects have several phases, from explorative 
to exploitative. 
 
7.4 Knowledge management 
Knowledge management is the second of the three core empirical categories that 
emerged from our analysis of the interview data. In this subchapter, we will discuss 
all the four main approaches to internal ambidexterity in light of knowledge 
management in Making Waves. Proposition 1a, 1b, 2 and 5b will be described in the 
respective sections they cover, as presented in Figure 7.4. 
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Figure 7.4 Knowledge mangagement and the propositions. 
7.4.1 Architectural approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 1a: A value shop deliberately 
combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation, and proposition 2: 
An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a more rigid 
structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural approaches.  
 
We will first discuss proposition 1a, which will be mentioned 
in the three first subchapters of subchapter 7.4. We will 
therefore summarize the findings at the end of every 
subchapter that proposition 1a is handled in. We will 
present a complete overview of proposition 1a in 
subchapter 8.1.  
 
As described in subchapter 2.3, the act of exploitation helps an organization get 
better at what it already knows how to do (March, 1991). Exploitation has to do with 
refining the company’s existing competencies, and competencies can involve 
knowledge that is both explicit and tacit (Jansen, 2005). Making Waves is a 
consultancy company that creates digital services for a wide array of customers, and 
the employees are organized in multidisciplinary teams, working on projects. Making 
Waves’ competencies are therefore related to the knowledge about how to develop 
digital services in a team context, and within a set time-period. Most of Making 
Waves’ employees are highly trained and have several years of experience, which 
led us to assume that they possess a high degree of both explicit and tacit 
knowledge. Since Making Waves is a knowledge intensive company of a substantial 
size, we also think that one of the most important ways they can achieve exploitation 
is by efficiently sharing the accumulated knowledge that the employees possess 
across the organization. 
 
Tacit knowledge 
Tacit knowledge is not written down or formalized, but exists within employees. One 
way of spreading tacit knowledge is by having employees work next to each other, 
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because it is easier to acquire tacit knowledge by watching and learning than by 
simply being told what to do (Nonaka, 1994). As discussed by an informant in 
subchapter 6.2.5, the project members that work within the same field strive to sit 
close to each other while working on the same projects. The same informant 
explained that technologists that work on the same team sit together, but that the 
designers tend to sit with their business unit, even though they are not working on 
the same project. We think that this indicates that employees learn better by sitting 
with people working within the same field of knowledge. The reason that 
technologists sit together and the designers do not, is most likely that there are often 
several technologists on the same project, and seldom more than one or two 
designers. In subchapter 6.2.4 an interaction designer expressed her concern that 
having project members sit with their business units instead of the project group 
could hamper knowledge sharing. The Director of People and Processes explained 
that they had discussed changing the organizational structure from discipline-based 
to market-based, but that the current structure is working fine. Knowledge could flow 
more easily between interdisciplinary teams by changing to a market domain based 
structure, but the downside may be that it is harder for employees to gain new 
knowledge within their own field. They would lose opportunities to cross-pollinate 
information and ideas with people from their field of specialty. 
  
Two ways Making Waves has become more structured is through the establishment 
of a Project Management Office (PMO) and the creation of the new role of 
engagement directors. Both are examples of Making Waves using architectural 
approaches to ambidexterity. The manager of the PMO explains in subchapter 6.2.4 
that the goal of the PMO is to make projects flow better. In our opinion, there would 
not be a need for a PMO if the knowledge on how to make projects flow better was 
made explicit and easy to transfer. The experiences and tacit knowledge that the 
PMO contributes with are efficiently shared through the organizational structure. 
  
The new engagement director role that has been established in Making Waves, has 
been discussed and developed thoroughly, as described in subchapter 6.3.2. The 
engagement directors will be responsible for a market segment instead of a business 
unit, and his or her job will be, among other things, to spread domain knowledge 
throughout the organization. In subchapter 6.2.5, the CEO explained that the new 
position creates a new level of structure. We anticipate that the results of such a level 
of structure binds the organization together horizontally by markets as well as 
vertically by business units, and we have illustrated our assumption in Figure 7.5. 
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Figure 7.5 Structural implications the engagement directors will have.  
Explicit knowledge 
The computer systems that Making Waves use are good examples of an 
architectural approach for sharing knowledge, because all systems contain explicit 
knowledge stored digitally, in the form of information about customers, employees, 
methodologies, technical tool-kits, best practices and more. Table 6.1 in subchapter 
6.2.1 is a complete overview of all the computer systems. However, not all systems 
are useful all the time. A project manager described how the wiki Confluence feels 
“dead”, and more like a filing system than something that can be used to share 
knowledge (subchapter 6.2.1). A senior system developer explains that the 
“company Facebook” Yammer can be just as informative as some of the 
documentation that is shared in Confluence. In subchapter 6.2.1, informants told us 
of the fairly recent decision to upgrade The Wavemaker, which is an overview of all 
the methodologies used in Making Waves, as an effort to increase knowledge 
sharing.  
 
Findings related to proposition 1a 
We have found several examples of tacit knowledge being utilized through 
architectural approaches in Making Waves, thus supporting half of proposition 1a: A 
value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve 
exploitation. We have also found several examples of explicit knowledge being 
utilized through architectural approaches, thus supporting the other half of 
proposition 1a. A summary of these findings regarding proposition 1a, in the context 
of knowledge management, is presented in Table 7.4. A summary of proposition 1a 
including findings from all four approaches to ambidexterity will be presented in 
subchapter 8.1. 
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Table 7.4 Architectural approaches and knowledge. 
Architectural approaches 
Tacit Explicit 
Employees working together in projects or in 
their departments. 
Talks of reconfiguring the departments. 
Establishing a PM-Office. 
Establishing engagement director positions. 
Wiki (Confluence) 
Project management software (Jira) 
Yammer (social platform) 
The Wavemaker (methodology overview) 
 
 
We will now discuss proposition 2: An increased number of 
employees require a value shop to adopt a more rigid 
structure, which causes an increased emphasis on 
architectural approaches. Proposition 2 assumes that 
company growth intuitively leads to more company structure, 
and that architectural approaches to ambidexterity become 
more relevant with this increased structure. We will now discuss how proposition 2 
relates to the topic of knowledge management in Making Waves, but please 
remember that proposition 2 concerns itself with all three empirical categories, and 
will be summed up in subchapter 8.3. 
 
Knowledge management is the principle of refining, sharing and gaining knowledge 
(chapter 6). We found that knowledge exists tacitly in the employees of Making 
Waves, and explicitly in the form of written material that can be found in the 
company’s computer systems and other written material. As described in subchapter 
3.5.1, architectural approaches include creating a high degree of formalization and 
connectedness. This is being implemented having by procedures written down in 
records and a structure that encourages informal communication and knowledge 
sharing (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Making Waves’ emphasis on formalization 
and connectedness through the company’s computer systems is a strong example of 
architectural approaches related to knowledge management.  
 
Our informants explain the different computer systems they use in subchapter 6.2.1, 
and we’ll do a recap here: intranet (The Wave), knowledge management 
(Confluence), project management (Jira), company social network (Yammer) and 
methodology systems (Wavemaker). We find indications that there has been an 
increased emphasis on using them in subchapter 6.2.2. A manager explains that the 
company’s growth results in new requirements for Wavemaker, and the director for 
Experience designs explains that Wavemaker up until now has evolved rather 
haphazardly, but that they are now in the process of renewing it. The methodology 
system is used to share knowledge about project execution, and we believe that the 
rationale behind the upgrade is to facilitate connectedness in the organization. 
Wavemaker is also an example of formalization, as it is an overview of the different 
procedures written down and kept on record. We think the reason for doing so is that 
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the sharp increase in employees makes it more difficult to spread knowledge by 
holding meetings and informal talks by the coffee machine.  
 
The question of merging certain departments that was raised in subchapter 6.2.5 is, 
from our perspective, closely related to spatial separation, which is an architectural 
approach. The question has been raised due to the fact that Making Waves has 
become larger, and the management are worried that large business units will create 
so-called “knowledge-silos”, which will make it difficult to share knowledge 
throughout the company. The act of merging the front-end and graphical department, 
an example given by the CEO (subchapter 6.2.6), would result in a different 
organizational structure. Employees will still be working in a structurally separate 
environment, but there is no evidence that a restructuring will create more spatial 
separation. This means that we cannot use this example to support our proposition. 
But we feel that it is necessary to discuss whether spatial separation is a useful 
approach for Making Waves. Making Waves is a consultancy company, and the 
employees work in project teams. The structures of the different departments is a 
way of gathering knowledge workers within the same field of specialty, but no 
employees usually work and create value for their customer within the boundaries of 
their department. The value creation, in accordance with the value shop configuration 
takes place mainly in the temporary project teams. 
 
We showed that some employees work at their customers’ offices in subchapter 
6.2.5, some sit with the other people from their own business unit, and some sit with 
their project team. This means that even though the organizational chart in chapter 5 
depicts Making Waves as an organization with strictly separated business units, the 
majority of the employees actually work in interdisciplinary teams composed of 
several employees from across the various business units. We believe that spatial 
separation does not contribute to architectural ambidexterity in Making Waves. 
 
The PM-Office and the new role of engagement directors represent new layers in the 
matrix organization structure in Making Waves. We have described the changes 
these positions bring about in the beginning of this chapter, so we will not repeat 
them here. Instead, we will claim that introducing these new functions will create 
more connectedness, as they will connect unrelated parts of the organization closer 
together. The PMO will connect the sales department and project teams closer 
together, and the engagement directors will be responsible for linking together 
employees with different department affiliation working within the same market 
segment. 
 
Findings related proposition 2 
As explained previously, proposition 2 assumes that company growth intuitively leads 
to more company structure, and that architectural approaches to ambidexterity 
become more relevant with this increased structure. We have now discussed how 
proposition 2 relates to the topic of knowledge management in Making Waves, and 
or findings are summarized in the list below.  
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● Formalization and connectedness – Updating the methodology system. 
● Changing the organizational structure by merging departments (spatial 
separation, but not relevant to Making Waves). 
● Connectedness - Introducing new layers of management in the form of the 
PMO office and the engagement director position. 
 
7.4.2 Contextual approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss both proposition 1a: A value shop deliberately 
combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation, and proposition 
1b: Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge and 
acquire new knowledge. 
 
We will first discuss proposition 1a, and how 1a relates 
to the topic of knowledge management in Making 
Waves, by providing examples of how the company 
utilizes both tacit and explicit knowledge. We will first 
cover the hybrid profiles that the company wishes to 
focus on, and then explain how their systems, vision 
and sharing are related to knowledge.  
 
Successful hybrids  
A contextual approach for sharing tacit knowledge is the creation of hybrid profiles, 
meaning that employees have more than one field of expertise (subchapter 6.2.3). In 
subchapter 6.2.3, the hybrid profiles are described as valuable to projects because 
knowledge flows easier if project members have overlapping skills. A lot of the 
knowledge that hybrid profiles possess is tacit, and we think that is especially true 
about the knowledge they have about combining their two profiles. In subchapter 
6.2.6, we found that extra employees are added to projects as apprentices, at no 
extra cost for the customer. We consider the knowledge that is transferred from 
experienced employees to inexperienced employees tacit. If the knowledge were 
explicit, the management in Making Waves would simply ask the experienced 
employees to write what they know in a document, saving the cost of having a new 
employee on a project without billing the customer.  
 
Systems, visions and sharing 
We also found examples of explicit knowledge in that employees write down and 
archive their knowledge (subchapter 6.2.1) in computer systems. The creation of 
these systems is an architectural approach, but how employees use the systems is 
influenced by contextual approaches. We also found that tacit knowledge is 
transformed to explicit knowledge through sharing at internal seminars. Another 
example of explicit knowledge shared by contextual approaches is the vision and 
mission statement that most employees know by heart. From subchapter 6.1.1, we 
learn that the vision of a “fantastic place to work” is something that is well known to 
virtually everybody, and in our view ingrained in Making Waves’ culture. The same 
goes for the design thinking methodology, which is communicated through an explicit 
symbol of three intertwined circles as tacit knowledge. In subchapter 6.1.2, an 
informant drew the methodology framework on the wall, and two other informants 
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drew the figure when explaining their work processes, as well. Having these explicit 
and ingrained rules to live by is in our opinion a contextual approach to help 
employees work towards contextual ambidexterity. The culture for sharing and 
supporting, as explained in subchapter 7.3.2, is an important aspect both for the 
company culture and knowledge sharing. In subchapter 6.2.3, a senior designer 
explained how people often are willing to set aside what they are doing to help their 
co-workers. That principle of knowledge sharing is tacit, since they help their peers 
by working with them on their projects. 
 
Findings related to proposition 1a 
We find support for that Making Waves deliberately use contextual approaches to 
combine both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation, thus supporting 
proposition 1a. Our findings are summarized in Table 7.5 below. 
  
Table 7.5 Contextual approaches and knowledge. 
Contextual approaches 
Tacit Explicit 
● Sharing culture. 
● Hybrid profiles. 
● Apprenticing in projects. 
● Making tacit knowledge explicit through 
systems and seminars. 
● Vision, mission and design thinking. 
● Methodology explicitly memorized. 
 
 
We will now discuss Proposition 1b: Value shops must use 
contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge and 
acquire new knowledge. Subchapter 3.5.1 states that 
contextual approaches have to do with using behavioural 
and social means to lead the organization towards 
ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). In order to do 
so, an organization must create a business system of performance management, 
which deals with discipline and the right social context through an interaction of 
stretch, support and trust (Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1994), but we will also consider the 
element of socialization, as it is a fundamental principle in Making Waves, and an 
indicator of contextual approaches. We will discuss how these five indicators 
manifest themselves in Making Waves. 
 
Support 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that support is about systems that facilitate knowledge 
sharing, such as wikis, freedom of initiative for all levels, and senior employees that 
prioritize guidance (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). We think that refining existing 
knowledge in an organization can be done by making sure that information is shared 
efficiently between people working there. In subchapter 6.2.3, a senior designer 
explained that the employees are comfortable asking each other for help, and a 
manager explains that the culture of sharing can be found in all parts of the company. 
We believe that this indicates that the senior level of management prioritizes 
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guidance of others, which we explained in subchapter 3.5.2 is a way of creating 
support (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004), and an example of refining existing 
knowledge. 
 
Another way that Making Waves shares knowledge is through the development of 
hybrid profiles (subchapter 6.2.3). Our understanding of hybrid profiles is employees 
that are specialists within two or more fields, such as programming and interaction 
design. An informant explains that hybrid profiles leads to better solutions, which we 
believe is due to the fact that knowledge is shared more easily in both projects and in 
the organizations as a whole when a person has knowledge of more than one field of 
work. From what we understood, employees were free to decide if they wanted to 
develop skills within more than one fields of knowledge or not. We interpret this as a 
freedom of initiative, which we explained in subchapter 3.5.2 is a way to induce 
support (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004).  
 
Stretch 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that stretch encourages employees to set ambitious goals, 
and is attained by collective identity and personal meaning (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004). A contextual approach related to knowledge management in Making Waves is 
the creation of friend-groups. One can argue that this borders on architectural 
approaches, since it is a structuring of people. But since this structure does not have 
anything to do with the organizational structure, but is an informal gathering of friends, 
we interpret it as a contextual approach. The effects of the friend-groups are 
undeniably social and behavioural. A project manager that participates in such friend 
groups tells us that the arrangement builds trust and communication (subchapter 
6.2.3). We are convinced that these friend-groups result the group-members getting 
to know each other better, and by that establishing a collective identity. In subchapter 
7.3.2, we argued that the friend group idea is an indicator of team building, but the 
friend groups also serve also a way of creating stretch.  
 
Trust 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that trust is an attribute of context that encourages 
employees to rely on each other. Attained by fair decision processes, involvement in 
decisions and staffing the right people (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). It evident that 
the employees’ own wishes and goals are important to the managers and that 
employees are allowed to weigh in on the decisions about what projects they wish to 
work on (subchapter 6.2.4). This gives us the impression that they care about the 
employees, and by showing that they care they foster trust in the organization. 
Involvement in decisions and fair decision making are both ways of cultivating trust, 
as we explained in subchapter 3.5.2 (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). 
 
Socialization 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that socialization creates a social context. It is a process of 
inheriting and disseminating norms, customs and ideologies, providing an individual 
with the skills and habits necessary for participating within his or her own society 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). Employees in Making Waves are given time to 
develop their skills and learn new things (subchapter 6.2.6). Based on the interviews, 
it seems that employees can decide what they wish to learn, and can partly decide 
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themselves which seminars they wish to attend, or which books they want to read. 
The billing-percentage of 70-80 allows ample time for the employees to improve 
themselves. Another contextual approach that results in new knowledge, is bringing 
new people into the organization. This can be done by hiring new employees, or by 
acquiring or merging with other companies. The acquiring and merging approach is 
architectural in the way that it involves a re-structuring of Making Waves. But the 
social implication of this is new people with new knowledge being integrated into the 
company. It is our belief that by integrating new employees into Making Waves, the 
knowledge that these people possess will eventually be distributed within the 
organization when they interact with their co-workers. A manager explains in 
subchapter 6.2.6 that Making Waves has shown an ability to renew itself through the 
integration of the acquired service design company Zoot. From our perspective, a 
company is only successfully integrated through a socialization process. Since 
several of our informants that were previously a part of an acquired company 
expressed that they felt like a part of Making Waves, we believe that Making Waves 
has an efficient socialization process.  
 
Discipline 
Subchapter 3.5.2 states that discipline encourages employees to strive to meet the 
expectations that others have towards them due to their commitments. Discipline is 
attained by clear standards of performance, a system of open and rapid feedback 
and consistency in the use of sanctions (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). As explained 
in subchapter 7.3.2, we could not find any good examples of discipline being 
practiced in Making Waves in a cultural context, and we are not able to find 
examples in a knowledge-sharing context, either. Sanctions and formal commitments 
to others in Making Waves are not mentioned by any of the informants. 
 
Refining and acquiring knowledge 
Based on our discussion of stretch, support, trust, socialization, and discipline, we 
have found several methods of knowledge refinement and knowledge acquiring, 
which we have summarized in Table 7.6 below. 
 
Table 7.6 Contextual approaches and knowledge. 
Contextual approaches for refining 
existing knowledge 
 
Contextual approaches for acquiring new 
knowledge 
 
• Support – A culture of sharing, a 
result of senior employees that 
prioritize guidance. 
• Support - Development of hybrid 
profiles, which provides freedom of 
initiative. 
• Stretch - Friend-groups that create a 
collective identity.  
• Trust – Employees are involved in 
decisions.  
• Stretch - Employees have time to 
learn new things, which provide 
personal meaning. 
• Trust - Hiring the right people.  
• Socialization - Acquiring and 
integrating new companies. 
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Findings related to proposition 1b 
We have placed the different contextual approaches within the model under the 
category where they belong in order to compare our empirical data with our 
theoretical model (Table 7.7). It became evident that Making Waves does not use 
performance management as a contextual approach towards ambidexterity. In fact, 
we found specifically that the management of Making Waves decided to discontinue 
the policy of using performance management altogether, and they trashed the 
performance management system that they had spent thousands of hours making 
(subchapter 6.1.1). Thus, we cannot support proposition 1b. 
 
Table 7.7 Emphasis on social context, and not performance management. 
Performance management Social context 
Discipline 
 
Stretch  
● Employees have time to learn new 
things 
● Collective identity 
Support  
● Culture of sharing  
● Development of hybrid profiles  
Trust  
● Hiring new people  
● Employees motivation and wishes 
important  
Socialization and team building 
● Acquiring and integrating new firms 
 
7.4.3 Management approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 1a: A value shop deliberately 
combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation. 
 
As we explained in subchapter 3.5.4, management 
approaches have to do with the characteristics of the 
managers and how they do things, as opposed to what is 
done, which is more closely linked to architectural and 
contextual approaches (Rosing et al., 2011). Risk-taking, 
adaptability and opening and closing behaviours are 
indicators of management approaches, and we will evaluate empirical data related to 
these themes in the context of how Making Waves combines tacit and explicit 
knowledge in their organization. 
  
Risk taking 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that risk-taking managers may lead to a more ambidextrous 
organization (Chang and Hughes, 2012). We believe that the choices related to the 
update of the computer system Wavemaker, that are addressed in subchapter 6.2.2, 
provide us an example of the management displaying a risk-taking behaviour, 
because they have gotten mixed feedback on the system and its usefulness, and 
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they still decided to invest resources in updating it. Spending money on a system that 
may not generate returns is risky.  
 
Adaptability 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that being adaptable means being willing to change with a 
changing environment, and in the case of organizational theory, has to do with being 
adaptable to market changes. An adaptive leader will stress to employees the 
importance of adapting to market trends, being aware of competitors and the need of 
acting now to meet customer’s future needs (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993). The 
establishment of the new PM-Office and the engagement directors is in our opinion a 
display of adaptability, as Making Waves now is in a situation where they are large 
enough to focus on certain market segments. The CEO explains in subchapter 6.2.5 
that they have employed engagement directors to be responsible for the segments 
and the employees working in the particular segments. The desired result of this is to 
create synergies, and we believe that this will help Making Waves be better at 
serving the segments they have chosen to focus on. 
  
Opening and closing behaviours 
Subchapter 3.5.4 states that opening behaviours are behaviours that encourage 
exploration (Rosing et al., 2011). Examples of opening behaviours are encouraging 
experimentation with different ideas, allowing errors, and encouraging error learning, 
allowing different ways of accomplishing tasks and motivating employees to take risk. 
Closing behaviours are behaviours that encourage exploration. Examples of closing 
behaviours are establishing routines, sticking to plans, sanctioning errors, monitoring 
and controlling goal attainment, taking corrective action and controlling adherence to 
rules (Rosing et al., 2011). 
 
According to a director in subchapter 6.1.6, employees expect the management to 
create a good culture in Making Waves. Data from subchapter 6.2 leads us to believe 
that the management have been successful in doing so. The way we see it, the 
sharing-culture that is described in subchapter 6.2 is essential for knowledge sharing 
in Making Waves, and it seems that the employees feel comfortable asking others for 
help. Still, most employees seem aware of the fact that when they ask others for their 
time, billable hours are lost, as explained in subchapter 6.2.3. We think that the fact 
that the employees are aware of the trade-off between helping each other and the 
company’s profitability is a sign that the management team uses both opening and 
closing behaviours. Employees are encouraged to experiment, and they are allowed 
to make mistakes, which are both examples of opening behaviour. At the same time, 
a director acknowledges in subchapter 6.2.3 that employees sometimes need to be 
reminded that they are working within a time frame. This is an example of the 
management monitoring and taking corrective action, both examples of closing 
behaviours. 
 
Findings related to proposition 1a 
Overall, we find support of proposition 1a: A value shop deliberately combines both 
tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve exploitation within management approaches 
to ambidexterity. Our findings are summarized below: 
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● Risk taking – Updating and expanding Wavemaker. 
● Adaptability - Establishing new departments and positions. 
● Opening and closing behaviours - Creating a culture of sharing with 
employees that are aware of the trade off between taking time off to help 
others and working on their own projects. 
7.4.4 Combinatorial approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 5b: To solve the paradox of personal 
drivers, the value shop must use elements from knowledge management. 
 
We have already explained that Making Waves use 
both architectural, contextual, and management 
approaches to achieve exploitation, and we can 
therefore say that they use a combination of 
architectural and contextual approaches, which, as we 
explained in subchapter 3.5.3, contains various nested 
paradoxes of architectural and contextual approaches 
(Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). We choose not to 
elaborate further on proposition 1a in this subchapter, but instead discuss proposition 
5b.  
 
In order to be able innovate, a person must be passionate enough about his or her 
work to come up with new ideas of how something can be done better. At the same 
time, the person must be disciplined enough to follow through on the necessary 
steps that must be taken to bring the idea into life. Subchapter 3.5.3 describes the 
need for both passion and discipline as a paradox of personal drivers, nested under 
the overarching paradox of ambidexterity (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009).  
 
According to Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) there are architectural and contextual 
approaches that can be used to solve the paradox of personal drivers, and they must 
be used in combination. The architectural approach is to temporarily and structurally 
separate work modes. The contextual approach involves socializing “practical artists”. 
We interpret a practical artist as a person that is a highly skilled and creative, but that 
at the same time understands that a part of his or her job is to perform mundane 
tasks. Evidence that this may be relevant and necessary at Making Waves can be 
found in subchapter 6.2.3, where a member of top management acknowledges that 
employees sometimes need to be reminded that they have a schedule to uphold, and 
that they cannot spend endless hours perfecting their work. The empirical findings 
from subchapter 6.2 provide us with examples of Making Waves using both 
approaches.  
 
Social artists 
In subchapter 6.2.6, informants explained to us that they are allowed to spend a 
certain amount of their time learning new things by reading books, or by attending 
courses or seminars. Allowing employees to spend time on self-improvement is one 
way of socializing a “practical artist”, since the employee is allowed to delve into the 
field of knowledge that interests him or her most. Since Making Waves has a billing 
between 70 % and 80 % of the employees’ hours to projects, we find it pretty obvious 
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that the company values the desire their employees have to learn about things that 
interest them. Having said that, we also believe that employees can learn many new 
and exciting things through the projects that they work on. As described in the first 
paragraph of subchapter 6.2.4, managers consider each employee's personal wishes 
and goals. We believe that by giving the employees a say in the decision about 
which projects they are to be placed on, will result in them being more motivated for 
the job. Being able to influence what you will be working on lets you prioritize the 
projects that you think are the most exciting.  
 
Our empirical data provided us with many other examples of how the top 
management valued the employees’ opinions about not only projects, but also on 
internal strategies, such as if they should introduce a performance management 
system, or where they wanted to establish a new office. From the accumulated 
quotes in subchapter 6.2, we have gotten the impression that all employees in 
Making Waves see themselves as creative and innovative people. In subchapter 
6.2.4, a technology manager expresses his department’s need to innovate. 
 
The general impression we got from the interviews, the company’s website and 
Making Waves’ offices, was that Making Waves as a whole is a creative company. 
As one informant said, “Creativity is not a department” (subchapter 6.1.2). We think 
that the creative company profile may influence the way the employees see 
themselves. It is quite common to identify oneself with the place you work, just in the 
same way one would identify with the place a person lives, or where he has gone to 
college. Being able to identify with a creative company may influence employees to 
see themselves as practical artists.  
 
Work modes 
There are examples of both temporarily and structurally separating work modes in 
Making Waves. Still, there are a lot more examples of temporal than structural 
separation, and it seems that structurally separating work modes is not something 
that Making Waves strives to achieve. We are given the impression that since most 
work is performed in project groups with members from the different business units, 
there is little reason to separate work modes. A technologist explains that he prefers 
working with the other people in his group, because a project group functions much 
better if the members are not separated (subchapter 6.2.5). This principle is enforced 
when projects are carried through with employees from both the Polish and 
Norwegian offices, as they sit together in the first part of the project. 
 
In subchapter 6.2.3, we found that the project managers are the ones responsible for 
group members staying within their time limit in projects. This was repeated in 
several other interviews, and leads us to believe that project managers deal with the 
paradox of exploration and exploitation on a daily basis, and to a greater degree than 
most other employees, except perhaps other managers. Projects start out with a 
explorative phase, and after the concept has been chosen, the concept must be 
designed and built as efficiently as possible. In subchapter 2.2.1, we explained that 
the project manager must decide how much time should be spent on the different 
phases, and how much slack he or she should allow the group members, as slack is 
used to give room for the innovation process (Herold et al., 2006). We think that 
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slack in the context of a project usually takes the form of extra project hours that are 
used to generate new ideas for the customers. In the organizational context, slack 
can be the extra resources that are used for exploring a new market, or creating a 
better knowledge management system.  
 
The fact that more and more projects are carried through with an Agile methodology 
complicates the project-managers’ task of upholding the time budget in projects, as 
described in subchapter 6.1.2. We believe that as a project goes through more 
frequent iterations, the boundaries between explorative and exploitative become 
blurrier. In our view this makes the project managers task of temporarily separating 
work modes even more complex.  
 
Findings related to proposition 5b 
We found much support for proposition 5b: To solve the paradox of personal drivers, 
the value shop must use elements from knowledge management. We have 
summarized our findings in Table 7.8.  
 
Table 7.8 The paradox of personal drivers. 
Socializing practical artists Temporarily and structurally separating work 
modes 
● Time set aside for improving skills. 
● Invoicing per cent less than 80. 
● New employees intern on projects. 
● Allowing employees to influence 
decisions about their own workday, as 
well as the company in general. 
● Creative profile in MW leads to a feeling 
that “everyone is creative”.  
● Less structural than temporal 
separation. 
● Employees are divided into business 
units, but mostly work in project teams. 
● Project manager are in charge of 
temporally separating work modes.  
● Agile methodology complicates temporal 
separation. 
 
7.5 Strategic orientation 
Strategic orientation is the third of the three core empirical categories that emerged 
from our analysis of the interview data. In this subchapter, we will discuss all the 
main four approaches to internal ambidexterity in light of the strategic orientation of 
Making Waves. We will discuss proposition 2, 3a and 3b, as highlighted in Figure 7.6. 
The propositions will be discussed in the respective section they cover, as presented 
in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6 Strategic orientation and the propositions. 
7.5.1 Architectural approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 2: An increased number of employees 
requires a value shop to adopt a more rigid structure, which causes an increased 
emphasis on architectural approaches and proposition 3a: Value shops achieve 
ambidexterity through their relationships with new and existing customers. 
 
We will first discuss how proposition 2 relates to the topic 
of strategic orientation in Making Waves, but since 
proposition 2 concerns itself with all three empirical 
categories, it will be summed up in subchapter 8.3. As 
explained in subchapter 7.3.1, we intend to find out if 
company growth leads to more company structure, and if 
architectural approaches to ambidexterity become more 
relevant with increased structure. In this subchapter, we will discuss how proposition 
2 relates to the topic of strategic orientation in Making Waves. We expect that 
growing ambidextrous organizations have an increased emphasis on elements of the 
architectural approaches. 
 
Formalization 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that formalizing is about making rules, procedures, job 
instructions and communications formal by writing them down or keeping them in 
records (Mom et al., 2007, Duncan, 1976). When becoming a larger, more mature 
and more successful company with more customer requests, Making Waves have 
gone from accepting almost every customer inquiry within reason, to be able to 
choose projects more deliberately. Making Waves therefore choose customers that 
help promote the Making Waves brand, and they have adopted a more formalized 
strategic orientation, reflected in their positioning statement: having big international 
brands come knock on their door (subchapter 6.3.5). Evidence of formalization can 
be identified in statements made by both the Director of Sales and the Director of 
People and Processes, when they talk about choosing customers based on size and 
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the customers’ actual needs. They ask themselves if the customers are big enough, 
and explain that the customers must have over 250 MNOK in revenue to be 
interesting. They also evaluate if an extensive digital presence is important, if the 
customers have a long-term plan for their digital products. These two questions help 
the sales department and top management in Making Waves decide which 
customers they wish to have in their portfolio. 
 
Connectedness 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that connectedness is the act of connecting unrelated parts 
of the organization together through a structure that encourages informal 
communication and knowledge sharing (Jansen et al., 2006), and that 
connectedness must be combined with formalization (Chang and Hughes, 2012). 
Formalization regarding choice of customers could be just an effect of the growth the 
company has seen lately. To argue for the use of architectural approaches, we must 
therefore find examples of connectedness. The most evident example of 
connectedness is the implementation of engagement directors. When hired, they will 
work with tying together knowledge from different market domains across the whole 
organization (subchapter 6.2.5). This will result in a more effective exploitation of 
domain knowledge, and simultaneously help smaller groups of employees explore 
certain market domains more in-depth. This gives the impression that knowledge 
sharing will not be facilitated strictly through formal channels, but also by putting 
people in touch with each other, supporting the principles of connectedness. 
 
Spatial separation 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that spatial separation is the act of separating different 
business units on the basis of whether they do explorative and exploitative activities 
(Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008). Making Waves used to be a small company with 
employees that viewed themselves as a family, but this is difficult now that they are 
approaching 300 employees. Several of our informants point to international 
expansion as the solution for further growth, thus creating separate working spheres, 
instead of increasing the size of the Norwegian offices indefinitely (subchapter 6.3.5). 
 
One of Making Waves’ reasons for establishing an office in New York is to be able to 
create future value and profits by being present in several markets (subchapter 6.3.5). 
The creation of a new office is an architectural approach to ambidexterity and long-
term survival. The office is not yet established and there is no clear vision of its 
structure, but we would classify it as a spatial separation based on geography. 
Making Waves are exploiting their knowledge about EpiServer technology by piggy-
backing on them into a new market (subchapter 6.3.5), but they are also being 
explorative when choosing New York based on the basis what will be most fun for 
the employees. 
 
Findings related to proposition 2 
We generally find support for proposition 2 within the topic of strategic orientation, 
and the most relevant indicators are listed below: 
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● Increased formalization in the selection of customers and projects. 
● Increased connectedness through the implementation of engagement 
directors. 
● Spatial separation through the establishment of new offices in different 
markets. 
 
We will now continue with a discussion of proposition  
3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their 
relationships with new and existing customers. This 
proposition will be discussed in all subchapters of 
subchapter 7.5, and we will summarize the findings at 
the end of every subchapter where proposition 3a is 
covered. We will present a complete overview of 
proposition 3a in subchapter 8.4. 
 
Close customer relations 
As explained in subchapter 1.4.3, a company with a value shop configuration does 
not create value by transforming resources into products with a certain efficiently or 
quality (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). Instead, the value shop reviews and formulates 
a problem to be solved in close collaboration with its customers, before proceeding to 
solve the specific problem (Stabell and Fjeldstad, 1998). To achieve ambidexterity 
through a customer relationship, we believe that some architectural approaches to 
ambidexterity have to be present. This is related to Making Waves and their 
customers, but also to how they establish bonds with new customers, and how they 
maintain relationships with existing customers.  
 
It is safe to assume that every new client represents exploration to some degree, and 
that all new customers eventually become existing customers. The time and effort 
spent on maintaining a relationship with these customers is in part an exploitative 
process. When you have known customers for a long time, it is likely that you will 
deliver what they want more efficiently, making it possible for both parties to benefit 
from long customer relations. The act of balancing one’s portfolio with new and old 
customers could, for a value shop, be seen as being ambidextrous. This means 
letting some customers go when they are not worth the trouble, and obtaining new 
ones in, when capacity allows it. We have identified three indicators of architectural 
approaches to ambidexterity that are particularly closely connected to customer 
relations: formalization, connectedness, and task partitioning. 
 
Formalization 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that formalizing is about formalizing rules, procedures, job 
instructions and communications, writing them down or keeping them in records 
(Mom et al., 2007). In addition to keeping a balanced portfolio of new, existing, small 
and large customers, Making Waves has a symbolic motto, which is a way of 
formalizing the way they go about diversifying their portfolio between explorative and 
exploitative projects. Their basic guideline is that all projects should deliver fun, fame, 
and fortune. By fun they means that projects should be rewarding for the employees 
to work with. Fame means that the projects should provide recognition in the 
marketplace, or be for a very well known brand or customer. Fortune means that the 
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projects should be profitable. This is not a strict rule, and is managed by best 
judgement, which will be further discussed in subchapter 7.5.2 (concerning 
contextual approaches). But even though fun, fame, and fortune is not a strict rule, it 
has been put more to use now as the company can be picky in choosing which 
customers to work with, thus increasing formalization. 
 
Connectedness 
Subchapter 3.5.1 states that connectedness is the act of connecting unrelated parts 
of the organization together through a structure that encourages informal 
communication and knowledge sharing (Jansen et al., 2006). The formalization of 
processes has become more present as the company has grown, but as explained in 
subchapter 3.5.1, formalization must be combined with connectedness to safely 
claim that there is an increased emphasis on architectural approaches (Chang and 
Hughes, 2012). In this light, the newly established PM-Office (PMO) can be viewed 
as both formalization and an effort for increased connectedness (subchapter 6.2.5). 
Formalization is achieved merely through its establishment, and the connectedness 
through its mission, creating a better flow from new customer to project start-up. The 
two-person PMO needs to create informal contact between many stakeholders, both 
internally and in integrating customers with projects. As PMO describe it themselves, 
they are there to create a better handshake between the sales activities and the 
actual project work (subchapter 6.2.5). A lot of information is lost when transferring a 
contract from Sales to project managers, and from when the project is finished to 
when it is delivered. Some of these issues can be handled by formalizing the transfer 
process, but just as important is the personal contact, the understanding of all the 
stakeholders and the management of the transfer process itself.  
 
Task partitioning 
The last architectural approach we would like to present, is task partitioning, which 
we view to by a type of spatial separation. As explained in subchapter 3.5.1, task 
partitioning has to do with when people within a single business unit work with 
different tasks, either explorative or exploitative (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, 
McDonough and Leifer, 1983).  
 
This discussion concerns the connection between the sales office and the 
engagement directors, but since the engagement directors are not implemented 
while writing this thesis, we don’t know exactly where in the organizational structure 
they will be placed. We will place them in the same business unit as sales, where we 
believe they will end up. Placing the sales staff and the engagement officers in the 
same unit looks a lot like task partitioning, because they do different types of work. 
Sales staff employees create new leads and customers, as they keep track of 
tenders and offers and streamline the sales process. The role of the engagement 
directors is to facilitate collaboration with the customer, helping them to understand 
their own needs, and explore the possible solutions (subchapter 6.2.5). Both the 
sales staff and the engagement directors will have employees responsible for 
specific sectors of business, persons that will perform different tasks both in 
acquiring new business and nurturing the acquaintance of existing customers.   
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Findings related to proposition 3a 
We found several indicators that support proposition 3a: Value shops achieve 
ambidexterity through their relationships with new and existing customers. The 
indications are summarized in Table 7.9 below. 
 
Table 7.9 Architectural approaches regarding proposition 3a. 
Architectural approaches 
New customers  Existing customers 
• Explore with new customers. 
• Formalizing the process of obtaining 
new customers by applying specific 
criteria. 
• Both individuals in sales and the 
engagement directors work with 
acquiring new customers within the 
same market domain, but operate 
different activities. 
• Exploit with existing customers. 
• Increased connectedness by PMO 
acting as a hub for informal 
communication between all 
stakeholders in projects. 
• Both individuals in sales and the 
engagement directors works with 
nurturing the relationship with existing 
customers within the same market 
domain, but operate different activities. 
7.5.2 Contextual approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity 
through their relationships with new and existing customers. 
 
As we explained in subchapter 3.5.2, contextual 
approaches are techniques used to empowering 
employees to make conscious choices in balancing 
explorative and exploitative activities, both on behalf of 
themselves and the company (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 
2004). By applying cultural and symbolic procedures and 
processes, managers enable employees to better deal 
with the paradox of exploration and exploitation.  
 
Contextual approaches often combine tight and loose elements to create 
ambidexterity (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004). Discipline and stretch act as elements 
that restrict the mind-set of employees by providing clear standards and a collective 
identity, while support and trust loosens up the mind-set by fostering initiatives and 
including the employees in decision-making processes.  
 
In the domain of strategic orientation and achieving ambidexterity through 
relationships with new and existing customers, the contextual approaches should, 
from the theoretical point of view discussed in subchapter 3.5.2, manifest themselves 
as a combination of: 
● Clear and commonly shared goals when choosing customers and future 
strategies. 
● A strong connection between company norms and customer selection 
● Strong personal initiatives in creating and sustaining relationships with 
customers. 
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● Strong sense of being included in decisions about the composition of the 
project portfolio. 
 
Fun, fame, and fortune 
The most prominent example of shared goals and a strong connection in Making 
Waves is the customer selection slogan Fun, Fame, and Fortune. This slogan is a 
symbol used to build company culture, and in our opinion it can probably be quite 
powerful if used correctly. We experienced that employees used the slogan as a 
guiding star for customer selection (subchapter 6.3.1). It seemed to us the reason 
Making Waves worked with fun, famous, and profitable was so that they themselves 
would become a fun, famous and profitable company, in the eyes of the employees. 
But there was also an understanding that employees did not have to follow this 
slogan religiously. This relates mostly to the fortune part of the slogan. New 
customers are rarely very profitable, but new customers sooner or later become 
existing customers, which can be profitable. 
 
None of our informants were critical to the Fun, Fame, and Fortune slogan and 
related mind-set. Another strategy that seemed to be generally supported was the 
plans for international expansion (subchapter 6.3.5), which the way we see it is 
linked to the Fun, Fame, and Fortune-philosophy. Management claimed they had not 
made the choice to select New York based on calculations or analysis, but that it was 
mainly a gut decision in line with the slogan (subchapter 6.3.1). 
 
Overselling 
The issue of overselling serves as a good illustration of personal initiative in creating 
and sustaining relationships with customers (subchapter 6.3.3). The sales 
department manages sales, and the issue of overselling shows trust between all 
internal stakeholders, since the other departments continue to cooperate with Sales, 
despite the overselling issue. Making Waves sometimes bid and sell projects at too 
low of a price, which causes an occasional internal dispute, but there also seems to 
be a tacit agreement that one must oversell to be able to get the fun and famous 
projects.  
 
Overselling is also linked to the personality and personal initiative of the director of 
Sales, who describes himself as an entrepreneurial type. There is substantial amount 
of trust present from the rest of the organization in the director of Sales and his 
department, which is reciprocated by involving more than just top management in 
choosing which projects to pursue.  
 
Findings related to proposition 3a 
We have found several indicators of that Making Waves uses contextual approaches 
in relations with proposition 3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their 
relationships with new and existing customers. The indicators are summarized in 
Table 7.10 below. 
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Table 7.10 Findings on proposition 3a. 
Contextual approaches 
New customers  Existing customers 
• Common understanding and 
participation in choosing leads to 
pursue. 
• Trust to oversell fun and famous 
projects. 
• Unprofitable new customers (fun and 
fame) are transformed into profitable 
existing customers (fortune). 
• High amount of trust in making this 
transformation is possible. 
7.5.3 Management approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity 
through their relationships with new and existing customers and proposition 3b: 
When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on exploitation 
than exploration. 
 
We will first cover proposition 3a, and discuss whether 
value shops achieve ambidexterity through their customer 
relationships in light of the management approaches. 
Managers are ultimately responsible for every aspect of a 
company (subchapter 3.3.2), and a fundamental aspect 
of the management approaches is the ability of managers 
to tolerate risk (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996), adapt to 
market trends (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993) and be aware 
of competitor development (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993). 
 
There is a strong agreement among our informants that Making Waves stands out 
among their competitors; many informants see their company as almost the opposite 
of their competitors. They do not want to be viewed as a me-too-company, but as not 
me-company, something that is mentioned by several managers, and the CEO 
specifically in subchapter 6.1.7. It seems this strong sense of the uniqueness and the 
wish to be different has its origin from the top of the organization. The vision of a 
creative, competent and friendly place to work is created by, and communicated from 
management, and it resonates throughout the organization (subchapter 6.1.1). 
However, Making Waves do not stand out by which customers they choose to work 
with, but by the services they provide and the way they work, accepting risk. 
 
Trying to be different from all their competitors makes it seem as if Making Waves 
view themselves as the outsider that does everything his own way. The CEO argues 
against this image by stating that he has a lot of respect for their competitors, and 
that they try to understand and learn from their competitors’ mistakes (subchapter 
6.3.4). This shows a significant amount of adaptability and understanding of market 
trends, in addition to competitor awareness. 
 
Findings related to proposition 3a 
We find indicators to support that Making Waves uses contextual approaches related 
to proposition 3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with 
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new and existing customers, but our indicators primarily relate to how Making Waves 
studies its competitors, and not how they interact with customers. A short summary 
of our insights are presented below: 
 
● Risk - Doing the opposite of competitors. 
● Adaptability - Respect for, and learning from mistakes done by competitors. 
 
 
We will now discuss proposition 3b: When selecting 
which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more 
on exploitation than exploration. Ambidextrous leaders 
are in theory good at balancing risk and adaptability. 
Instead of looking for signs of risk tolerance and 
adaptability in how the management of Making Waves 
pursue new projects, we decided to prove that Making 
Waves is led ambidextrously by falsifying proposition 
3b. In disproving that the leaders of Making Waves let their exploitative mind set 
dominate when choosing which opportunities to pursue; we hope to show that they 
are actually ambidextrous.  
 
We start again with the empirical example of the Fun, Fame, and Fortune slogan. At 
first glance, the slogan looks like a strategy for ambidexterity, so to prove proposition 
3b right we must find empirical evidence that the leaders tend to prefer projects with 
an emphasis on quick fortune. But in our interviews we found few indicators 
supporting such a hypothesis. The closest we got to an indicator of a quick fortune-
focus was that several of the top managers believed that certain turbulent projects 
would turn out very profitable in the end, in a 5-10 years perspective (subchapter 
6.3.2). But a 5-10 years return on investment by a consultancy company seems like 
a long-term profit goal, and long-term profitability is, as explained in subchapter 2.2, 
often an indicator of exploration (O'Reilly and Tushman, 2004). 
 
Two major company decisions we showed no evidence of exploitation being the 
foundation for the decisions. The first is the acquisition of the service design 
company Zoot. The purpose of the acquisition was not to acquire more customers or 
contribute to exploiting existing knowledge in Making Waves more efficiently. It was 
to more systematically explore the combination of analogue and digital services, with 
a vision of service design evolving to something more profitable in the future. The 
second example is the strategy of opening shop in New York. Making Waves will not 
establish themselves there because the market isn’t competitive in New York, or 
simply because they want synergies with EpiServer, but because it is more exciting 
and explorational for the employees than, for instance, Houston (subchapter 6.3.1).  
 
Findings related to proposition 3b 
We find no substantial data to support proposition 3b. Instead, it seems that the CEO 
and lower management are aware of the need for balancing the explorative and 
exploitative elements in the overall pursuit of projects and possibilities. 
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7.5.4 Combinatorial approaches 
In this subchapter, we will discuss proposition 3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity 
through their relationships with new and existing customers. 
 
This subchapter is to some degree a combination of 
both the architectural and contextual approaches 
already explained in connection with proposition 3a. But 
the main additional aspect of the combination of the two 
different approaches, as we explained in subchapter 
3.5.3, is the paradox of strategic intent (Andriopoulos 
and Lewis, 2009). This nested paradox coincides well 
with the empirical theme of strategic orientation. It uses 
the holistic scope of the organization as a whole in stressing the need for both big 
profits and innovative breakthroughs, while also seeking out projects that leverage 
current skills and/or projects that create new opportunities. Strategic intent can be 
further reduced to two topics that can operate as indicators of how a company 
achieves ambidexterity through their relationship with new and existing customers: 
Cultivating a paradoxical vision (contextual) in one’s employees while at the same 
time diversifying one’s project portfolio (architectural) (Andriopoulos and Lewis, 2009). 
 
The paradoxical aspect of strategic intent within the topic of strategic orientation is 
again the Fun, Fame, and Fortune slogan. With every project supposed to contain all 
three elements and every project supposed to be multidisciplinary, the vision of the 
company seeking projects that are fun, famous and profitable, seems to be rooted in 
the individuals in the organization, so that they perceive not only Making Waves, but 
also themselves as creative and efficient individuals that enjoy high regards within 
their disciplines. This also coincides well with a juxtapositioning of the vision 
statement, mission statement and positioning statement of the company: Making 
Waves is a great place to work, that create delightful experiences, and big well-
known international brands are lining up to work with them. 
 
The paradoxical vision has to be simultaneously coupled with diversifying the project 
portfolio. There are two main indicators of Making Waves diversifying their project 
portfolio, described in chapters 7.5.1 and 7.5.2, the first being the leniency in 
enforcing the customer selection slogan, the other is the implementation of the 
engagement directors. Not every project is forced to contain all three elements. 
Some projects are just inspirational and fun, while others are described as low-
hanging fruit - easy and profitable, but boring. The project portfolio is also diversified 
along the market sector axis by the implementation of the engagement directors. 
 
Findings related to proposition 3a 
We found several indicators of Making Waves using combinatorial approaches 
related to proposition 3a: Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their 
relationships with new and existing customers. Our findings are summarized in Table 
7.11 below. 
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Table 7.11 Support for proposition 3a. 
Paradox of strategic intent 
Cultivating a paradoxical vision Diversifying project portfolio 
• The coherence between the 
customer selection slogan and 
the vision-, mission and 
positioning statement. 
• How the employees have 
internalized these paradoxical 
visions. 
• The leniency in enforcing Fun, 
Fame, and Fortune. 
• The implementation of the 
engagement directors. 
 
7.6 Summary of the discussion 
In this chapter, we have discussed our propositions within the topics of company 
culture, knowledge management, and strategic orientation. We have used the four 
main groups of approaches to ambidexterity - architectural, contextual, combinatorial, 
and management approaches - as a framework for our discussion. 
 
In the next chapter, we will summarize our findings on each proposition, and we 
would therefore like to let the propositions be in this summary, and instead 
summarize the various approaches to ambidexterity we found, without connecting 
them explicitly to the propositions. By doing this, we intend to provide an overall view 
of ambidexterity in Making Waves. 
 
As explained in chapter 3, we have created a metaphor for explaining the connection 
between the four approaches to ambidexterity, where architectural approaches are 
bricks, and contextual approaches are mortar. Combinatorial approaches are about 
combining bricks and mortar, and the management approaches represent the builder 
responsible for creating something meaningful with the bricks and mortar (Figure 7.7). 
 
Architectural approaches 
Making Waves uses several architectural approaches to ambidexterity, but not all. 
We have summarized the most important architectural approaches in the list below: 
 
● Temporal separation - Employees on projects go from an open, explorative 
phase to a closed, exploitative phase, this has not changed with increased 
company size, and seems to be the natural way of a value shop. 
● Connectedness - High share of informal communication particularly facilitated 
by the Minister of Culture and the communication platform Yammer. They 
have hired engagement directors to help connect the various business units 
better. 
● Formalization - Several roles and procedures have been formalized as 
Making Waves has grown, such as the formal role of Minister of Culture. They 
have emphasised the importance of their methodology system Wavemaker. 
They have formalized the process of obtaining new customers by applying 
specific criteria. 
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Figure 7.7 Metaphor of the approaches to ambidexterity (from subchapter 3.4.2). 
Contextual approaches 
Making Waves uses many contextual approaches to ambidexterity. We have 
summarized the most important contextual approaches in the list below: 
● Stretch - The collective bonus system encourages teamwork. Employees are 
given time to learn, giving them personal meaning. 
● Support - Managers help, rather than instruct, their employees. Employees 
have a culture of dropping what they have in their hands to help others. 
● Socialization - Employees are taught Making Waves’ vision, mission and 
norms. 
● Team building - Making Waves facilitate many social activities. 
● Autonomy - Employees are granted many liberties to make their own 
decisions. 
● Trust - An apparent level of trust in the entire company, partly due to the 
absence of a performance management system. The managers involve the 
employees in decisions. 
 
Combinatorial approaches 
We have primarily discussed the paradox of personal drivers within combinatorial 
approaches. But that Making Waves use both architectural and contextual 
approaches to ambidexterity means that they combine them. We have summarized 
the most important aspects of the paradox of personal drivers in making Waves in 
Table 7.12 below: 
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Table 7.12 Summary of the paradox of personal drivers. 
Socializing practical artists Separating work modes 
● An emphasis on mentoring, where 
experienced employees help others. 
● Time set aside for improving skills. 
● Inexperienced employees work on 
projects to learn. 
● Employees allowed to influence 
decisions about their own work.  
 
 
 
● Projects have several phases, from 
explorative to exploitative. 
● Less structural than temporal 
separation. 
● Agile methodology complicates temporal 
separation. 
 
Management approaches 
We found quite a lot on management approaches to ambidexterity, and especially 
concerning the CEO. We have summarized the most important management 
approaches in the list below: 
 
● Risk taking and risk acceptance - CEO accepts risks and allows employees to 
make choices. 
● Risk taking - Making Waves does the opposite of competitors 
● Opening behaviours - CEO accepts that employees can make risky choices 
themselves. 
● Adaptability - Making Waves establish new departments and positions when 
needed. 
● Adaptability - Management respect competitors, and learn from their mistakes.  
 
As already mentioned, we will discuss each proposition individually in chapter 8. We 
will explain our findings on each proposition, and discuss the implications of our 
findings. 
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8 Summary of propositions 
In the previous chapter, we discussed our propositions in light of both the four 
approaches to ambidexterity and the empirical categories that emerged from our 
analysis. In this chapter, we will summarize the discussion from the previous chapter 
proposition by proposition. We will present the approaches to ambidexterity that were 
relevant for each proposition in Making Waves, suggest implications of our findings, 
and propose new theory. By doing so, we hope to make it clear for the reader how 
the findings related to the different propositions has helped us in answering our main 
research question: “How does Making Waves balance exploration and exploitation?”  
 
We will review the propositions in numerical order with a short summary, an 
evaluation of the findings and a discussion of the potential implications of the findings 
related to each proposition. When evaluating our propositions we decide if we can 
support them or not, and our degree of support goes from strong support to no 
support in three consecutive steps. This means that we conclude that we can 
strongly support, partially support or not support, each proposition.  
8.1 Proposition 1a 
A value shop deliberately combines both tacit and explicit knowledge to achieve 
exploitation.  
 
A summary of all the approaches to ambidexterity (architectural, contextual, 
combinatorial, and management approaches) related to proposition 1a is listed in 
Table 8.1 below. As argued in subchapter 7.4, all measures related to tacit and 
explicit knowledge are also related to refining the existing knowledge that Making 
Waves possesses.  
 
Table 8.1 Summary of proposition 1a. 
Management approaches 
Risk taking - Choices related to Wavemaker. 
Adaptability - Establishing new departments and positions. 
Opening and closing behaviours - Creating a culture of sharing with employees that are aware of 
the trade-off between taking time off to help others and working on their own projects. 
Combining the two 
Architectural Contextual 
Tacit Explicit Tacit Explicit 
Employees working 
together in projects or 
in their department. 
Establishing a PMO 
department. 
Establishing an 
engagement director 
position. 
Confluence (wiki). 
Jira (Project manage-
ment software). 
Yammer (Social 
media platform). 
Sharing culture. 
Hybrid profiles. 
Apprenticing in 
projects. 
Making tacit 
knowledge explicit 
through systems and 
seminars. 
Vision, mission and 
design thinking 
explicitly memorized. 
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8.1.1 Evaluation of proposition 
We found examples in our empirical data of architectural approaches related to both 
tacit and explicit knowledge, and we learned that it is difficult to spread knowledge 
through systems. The management of Making Waves therefore combines both 
architectural and contextual approaches, which seems to increase the overall 
knowledge sharing and knowledge acquisition. Creating a business context that 
allows for sharing of both tacit and explicit knowledge through structures and 
strategies seems to be a difficult task, but one that Making Waves seems capable of. 
We therefore find strong support for proposition 1a.  
8.1.2 Implications 
Table 8.1 shows that we can support proposition 1a with several examples of 
architectural, contextual, combinatorial and management approaches. These 
approaches coincide with the approaches that should lead to exploitation according 
to theory from subchapter 3.5. 
 
Our findings seem to support the theories by Chang and Hughes (2012) from 
subchapter 3.5.1, that has to do with company connectedness. Connectedness turns 
out to be an important approach to ambidexterity in Making Waves, and is facilitated 
by informal and formal knowledge sharing. Chang and Hughes’ (2012) study was 
conducted on 1 000 SMEs in Scotland, and some of these companies may have a 
business environment similar to Making Waves’ here in Norway. Knowledge sharing 
may not be as relevant in value shops in other countries, but it seems logical that all 
knowledge-based value shops should prioritize knowledge sharing in some form, 
regardless of their countries of origin. 
 
In subchapter 3.5.1, we explained that Jansen et al. (2006) claimed that increased 
knowledge sharing can lead to exploitative innovation, since employees across the 
organization understand technologies better. We find no indications that knowledge 
sharing in Making Waves leads to exploitation, specifically. Knowledge sharing 
seems to be a foundation for both exploration and exploitation, being an essential 
part of driving forth any type of innovation. It is reasonable to suggest that being 
knowledgeable about the technology makes it easier to improve it, but it seems 
equally logical to us that a better understanding of technology provides a person with 
more tools to succeed in exploration as well. 
 
Exploitation has to do with getting better at what you already know how to do, and 
one would expect that both tacit and explicit knowledge would be involved in the 
process. Still, in order to find out if tacit and explicit knowledge is used to achieve 
ambidexterity one must first find evidence to support that tacit and explicit knowledge 
is used to achieve exploration. We believe that this could be an interesting topic for 
future ambidexterity research.  
 
We also find the question of whether knowledge-sharing systems work better by 
implementing social features interesting. Is a wiki system, such as Confluence, 
where information is filed and stored, most efficient for knowledge sharing, or would 
a system with a more social aspect, such as Yammer, work better? We think that the 
rise of social media has changed the way people share knowledge via systems, and 
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that it would be interesting to explore if social systems are more efficient than filing 
system for knowledge sharing. This is also something we recommend for further 
research. 
 
It became evident that the employees use the knowledge sharing systems to a 
varying degree, and that some hardly use them at all, unless specifically asked to. By 
using proper contextual approaches, Making Waves might be able to make 
employees get involved in the systems for knowledge sharing, a goal that seems 
useful for the entire organization. We therefore believe that a study of how one can 
integrate formal, seemingly architectural approaches of computer systems for 
knowledge sharing with softer, contextual approaches would be interesting. 
 
8.2 Proposition 1b 
Value shops must use contextual approaches to refine existing knowledge and 
acquire new knowledge.  
 
We created a table in subchapter 7.4.2 where we placed examples of contextual 
approaches within a theoretical model. The table (Table 8.2) is shown below.  
 
Table 8.2 Contextual approaches to knowledge management. 
Performance management Social context 
 
 
Stretch  
● Employees have time to learn new 
things 
● Collective identity 
Support  
● Culture of sharing  
● Development of hybrid profiles  
Trust  
● Hiring new people  
● Employees motivation and wishes 
important  
Socialization and team-building 
● Acquiring and integrating new firms 
8.2.1 Evaluation of proposition 
The table we used was developed based on theory presented by Gibson and 
Birkinshaw (2004), who are well renowned scholars within the field of ambidexterity. 
We created the indicators of performance management and social context ourselves 
based on several articles. But regardless of whether our indicators were spot-on, the 
relationship between the contextual approaches of performance management and 
social context is clear. And as Table 8.2 shows, we found no indicators of 
performance management being exercised in Making Waves. In fact, we learned that 
Making Waves had abandoned their failed performance system a couple of years 
ago. We therefore cannot support proposition 1b in its current form, as we only found 
partial support for it, and no indicators on the performance management side of 
Table 8.2. 
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8.2.2 Implications 
By not finding indicators of performance management, our empirical findings do not 
align with the theories by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), which means that we either 
found wrong results, that the their theories are wrong, or that their theories are not 
applicable in our case. We believe that the most likely explanation is that their 
theories are not fully applicable to Making Waves. Gibson and Birkinshaw’s (2004) 
study was conducted in manufacturing companies, and we believe that performance 
management might not be as relevant in a knowledge-intensive value shop. 
Employees in a knowledge-intensive value shop are highly educated, and given 
autonomy and responsibilities, and are probably not be as receptive to performance 
management as, for instance, factory workers at production line. In addition, the 
research was conducted in South Korea, The USA, France, Japan, India, and 
Canada, and we suspect that performance management might not be as relevant in 
Norway, where we have a tradition of flat company hierarchy. 
 
Since we couldn’t find evidence of Making Waves using performance management, 
we have revised proposition 1b to a form that we would have liked to research if we 
had the necessary time and resources. To further consider the actual importance of 
performance management, our revised proposition 1b is as follows: “Performance 
management is less important than social context when value shops use contextual 
approaches to achieve ambidexterity by refining existing knowledge and acquiring 
new knowledge.” 
 
The new proposition has to be tested with similar case studies, and in similar 
companies, to determine its strength. If the proposition is not disproved, it seems 
reasonable to assume that value shops focus on creating a social context when 
striving to refine existing and acquire new knowledge through contextual approaches, 
but without the use of performance management. It would also be interesting to do 
the same research in foreign companies to see if there are national differences 
concerning performance management. 
8.3 Proposition 2 
An increased number of employees require a value shop to adopt a more rigid 
structure, which causes an increased emphasis on architectural approaches. 
 
Proposition 2 concerns all three core empirical categories of company culture, 
knowledge management, and strategic orientation. We have created a short 
summary of the findings from each category in Table 8.3 below:  
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Table 8.3 Architectural approaches and knowledge management. 
Company culture Knowledge management Strategic orientation 
• Increased spatial 
separation by 
employees having only 
one role, some 
departments dealing 
mainly with exploration, 
and some mainly with 
exploitation. 
• Increased 
connectedness by 
explicitly saying that 
everyone can speak to 
anyone, and by 
implementing computer 
systems, like Yammer. 
• Increased formalization 
by appointing an 
official minister of 
culture, who had 
previously fulfilled the 
position by her own 
initiative. 
• Increased formalization 
and connectedness by 
updating methodology 
system 
• Structural separation is 
the cause for 
discussing merging 
departments. 
• Increased 
connectedness by 
introducing new layers 
of management in the 
form of the PMO office.  
• Increased 
connectedness due to 
the new engagement 
director position. 
 
• Increased formalization 
in selection of 
customers and 
projects. 
• Increased 
connectedness through 
implementation of 
engagement directors. 
• Spatial separation 
through establishment 
of new offices in 
different markets. 
8.3.1  Evaluation of proposition 
From Table 8.3, we can see that there are several examples of how growth 
correlates positively with architectural approaches. It seems as if more structure is a 
natural result of a company with a growing amount of employees, and that 
architectural approaches are initiated to make sure that such a company continues to 
be innovative, and especially innovative in an explorative way. Overall, we find strong 
support for proposition 2, because of the fact that Making Waves has adopted 
several architectural approaches as they have grown, and because all informants 
seemed to agree that they had to do so, indicating a natural connection between 
structure and architectural approaches to ambidexterity. 
8.3.2 Implications 
Proposition 2 is the only proposition we have discussed within all the three 
categories from the empirical data; company culture, knowledge management, and 
strategic orientation, and only within architectural approaches to ambidexterity. We 
identified several indicators of architectural approaches in Making Waves, but we did 
not find examples of all the indicators that we expected from subchapter 3.5.1, 
summarized in Figure 8.1 below. We found several examples of connectedness and 
formalization, and few examples of task partitioning. Temporal separation seems to 
be an inherent property of working with projects.  
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Figure 8.1 Overview of architectural approaches (from subchapter 3.5.1). 
 
In subchapter 3.5.1, we explained that spatial separation is supported by, among, 
others Raisch and Birkinshaw (2008) and Tushman and O’Reilly (1996). Raisch and 
Birkinshaw’s (2008) study is a collection of other studies on ambidexterity, where the 
primary empirical data has been collected from manufacturing companies. It may be 
that spatial separation is not as relevant for a value shop such as Making Waves, 
where they have strong temporal separation by default, due to their project-based 
work. 
 
The concept of task partitioning is also founded in manufacturing companies through 
a study by Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004), which we explained in subchapter 3.5.1. 
Making people within one department work with either exploration or exploitation is 
not particularly relevant for Making Waves, since people within the business units 
mostly work on projects. People within one business unit may work on either an 
exploration project or an exploitation project, but that is not defined by the business 
unit structure, but by the project they are working on. The employees working on 
exploitation projects at one time may work on exploration projects the next time, 
meaning that they are not confined to work with one type of activity within their 
business unit. It seems likely that this will be the case for other project-based value 
shops as well. 
 
Our single-case study has provided us with data on only one company, and within a 
relatively short period of time, and our data is based solely on interview data. To 
strengthen proposition 2 further, we would have to conduct a longitudinal study to 
see how Making Waves and other companies react to growth over time.  
 
We have only worked on determining whether growth and structure leads to more 
architectural approaches to ambidexterity, but a topic for further research could be 
whether growth also leads to more contextual approaches. Several informants told 
us that they felt like Making Waves had managed to maintain their culture, despite 
the rapid growth, which may indicate that Making Waves have embraced contextual 
approaches as well. For all we know, growth could lead to a more conscious 
relationship to ambidexterity in general, making companies devote resources to both 
architectural and contextual approaches.  
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8.4 Proposition 3a 
Value shops achieve ambidexterity through their relationships with new and existing 
customers. 
 
This proposition concerns all of the four different approaches for achieving 
ambidexterity within strategic positioning. It does not deal with how to achieve 
ambidexterity in an external network of new and existing customers, but how the 
relationships with new and existing customers affect the internal activities in the 
approach to achieving ambidexterity. Our findings are summarized in Table 8.4 
below. 
Table 8.4 Findings on proposition 3a. 
Proposition 3a 
Leadership approaches 
Doing the opposite of competitors – Risk 
Respect for, and learning from mistakes done by competitors - Adaptability 
Combining the two – the nested paradox of strategic intent 
Cultivating paradoxical vision Diversifying project portfolio 
The coherence between the customer 
selection slogan and the vision-, mission and 
positioning statement 
How these paradoxical visions has been 
internalized by the employees 
The leniency in enforcing fun, fame and 
fortune 
The implementation of the engagement 
directors 
Architectural approaches Contextual approaches 
New customers Existing customers New customers Existing customers 
Explore with new 
customers 
Formalizing the 
process of obtaining 
new customers by 
applying specific 
criteria 
Individuals in both 
sales and the 
engagement 
directors works with 
acquiring new 
customers within the 
same market 
domain, but operate 
different activities 
Exploit with existing 
customers 
Increased 
connectedness by 
PMO acting as a hub 
for informal 
communication 
between all 
stakeholders in 
projects 
Individuals in both 
sales and the 
engagement 
directors works with 
nurturing the 
relationship with 
existing customers 
within the same 
market domain, but 
operate different 
activities 
Common 
understanding and 
participation in 
choosing leads to 
pursue 
Trust to oversell fun 
and famous projects 
 
Unprofitable new 
customers (fun and 
fame) are 
transformed to 
profitable existing 
customers (fortune) 
High amount of trust 
that this 
transformation is 
possible 
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8.4.1 Evaluation of proposition 
We have found several examples of Making Waves achieving ambidexterity through 
their customer relations. We believe that the combinatorial approaches of cultivating 
the paradoxical vision of fun, fame, and fortune, and by strategically diversifying their 
customer portfolio are particularly important. We find strong support for proposition 
3a. 
8.4.2 Implications 
Through our discussion of proposition 3a, we found that it is difficult to determine 
what can be classified as internal and external approaches to ambidexterity, since 
the customers are directly involved in projects, and thus become part of the 
organization for some time. Santos and Eisenhardt’s (2005) study from subchapter 
3.5 is quite strict in its determination to define organizational boundaries. It does not 
seem possible to properly define Making Waves’ organizational boundaries as 
constant, but that they change all the time, depending on what Making Waves are 
working on. We believe this to be the case of all consultancy companies that do 
projects for customers, and that one should consider their organizational boundaries 
in another way than, for instance, in manufacturing companies. 
 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) claimed that companies had a tendency to look 
inwards to find solutions to the challenges they encounter, by using the knowledge 
that already exists in the organization. We have no data indicating that Making 
Waves employees tend to look inwards for internal knowledge to find solutions to 
challenges. Managers ask their employees to solve problems, and they do internal 
projects themselves, such as creating the various computer systems. But it does not 
seem that management dictates the way an employee should solve the problem he 
or she has been given. Our impression is that individual employees seek information 
both within Making Waves and from outside sources. We would have had to conduct 
another study to determine the actual ratio of internal and external knowledge that 
employees use to solve problems, but would not expect to find great differences. 
 
As we described in subchapter 1.2.1, separating product innovation and process 
innovation in service companies is difficult, as the process of delivering the product is 
part of the product itself. We believe this to be especially relevant for value shops, 
since they work closely with their customers, often on a daily basis, thus involving the 
customer directly in the entire process of creating the product. Involving the customer, 
who is an external company, blurs the border between internal and external 
approaches to ambidexterity significantly. It therefore seems logical that a value shop 
that is incapable of using customers to achieve ambidexterity would not be able to be 
ambidextrous at all. An interesting topic for further research would be to determine 
how external and internal approaches merge into one, and how important external 
companies are in achieving ambidexterity. External companies might not only involve 
customers, but also vendors, and it would be interesting to determine where the 
borders between internal and external approaches are. Removing the line between 
internal and external approaches to ambidexterity seems connected to the principle 
of open innovation that we described in subchapter 1.2.2, and it would be quite 
interesting to evaluate how those two areas relate to each other. 
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8.5 Proposition 3b 
When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on exploitation 
than exploration. 
 
The management in Making Waves is involved in making strategies for project 
selection, the daily management of project selection, and the daily running of projects. 
In interviews, informants with management positions explained that they choose 
projects based on many different criteria. Sometimes, they do projects for the sake of 
learning new technologies or to get a foot in a new segment. Other times they do 
projects that are similar to previous projects to make easy money, even though this is 
not very desirable.  
8.5.1 Evaluation of proposition 
Before conducting the interviews, we suspected that the managers were cautious 
about exploration. In our minds, a failed exploration project might look very bad to the 
customer, since it would seem like Making Waves didn’t know what they were doing. 
We therefore thought that managers feared the failure of an explorative project. They 
might not just lose money, but also lose future business. However, we found no 
evidence that management or the CEO focuses more on exploitation than 
exploration. On the contrary, many of the managers emphasized that they try to do 
new, unfamiliar projects as often as they can. Overall, management does not seem 
to prioritize exploitation over exploration, and we find no support for proposition 3b: 
When selecting which projects to pursue, leaders tend to focus more on exploitation 
than exploration. 
8.5.2 Implications 
We determined in subchapter 7.5.3 that proposition 3b does not apply to Making 
Waves, meaning that managers do not seem to prioritize exploitation. Instead, they 
seem to balance explorative and exploitative projects quite well. We also found that 
the managers, and particularly the CEO, have a particular approach to managing 
ambidexterity that only partly corresponds to the management approaches described 
in subchapter 3.5.4 and summarized in Figure 8.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 8.2 Management approaches to ambidexterity (from subchapter 3.5.4). 
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The opening and closing behaviours are defined by Rosing et al. (2011) in 
subchapter 3.5.4, and they argue that it is important to balance the two behaviours to 
achieve ambidexterity. The CEO in particular is capable of risk taking, adaptability, 
opening behaviours, closing behaviours, and a temporal ability to switch between 
opening and closing behaviours. However, we find very few indicators of closing 
behaviours. If we only had spoken to the CEO, we might have suspected him of 
playing down his own closing behaviours, but almost all the other informants claimed 
that their high level of autonomy is one of the best aspects of working in Making 
Waves, thus indicating that they are subject to managers with opening behaviours. 
What Rosing et al. (2011) actually mean by balancing opening and closing 
behaviours is not clear, but the CEO of Making Waves seems to use closing 
behaviours as little as possible. This may be because Making Waves is an 
organization that employs mostly highly educated people, and because they are able 
to see when they need to be cautious it is more important to encourage them to take 
risk.  
 
An interesting topic for future research could be whether the ability of managers to 
personally balance the paradox of exploration and exploitation, in accordance with 
how the employees work, is essential for their company’s ability to be ambidextrous. 
We strongly believe that to be the case, both based on our observations and the 
theories on management approaches to ambidexterity that we presented in 
subchapter 3.5.4. Yet, we would like to see a quantitative research of the topic. 
 
In our study, we used the Making Waves principle for project selection called fun, 
fame, and fortune quite extensively. We argued that fun is closely connected to 
exploration, and that fortune is closely connected to exploitation. While doing easy 
projects for a quick fortune can be described as exploitation, the explorative fun and 
fame-related projects also have an element of fortune to them. While redesigning Det 
Norske Teateret's profile itself cost more than it paid, there may be long-term profits 
in terms of recognition that may generate more customers. It’s easy to forget that 
exploration is about making money in the long term, and being able to see the 
potential profits of exploration might be a very important management skill for an 
ambidextrous organization.  
 
We also believe that since companies seem to use their customers to achieve 
ambidexterity (proposition 3a), their balancing of exploration and exploitation is 
determined by their market position. Making Waves is now in a position where they 
have more customer requests than they can handle, and can therefore choose 
projects based on ambidexterity criteria. But, if they had to accept every customer 
request, chance would determine whether they would be able to balance exploration 
and exploitation. 
8.6 Proposition 4 
The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. 
 
The CEO is personally involved in the daily running of Making Waves. We found that 
he uses all the management approaches to ambidexterity, and that his behaviours 
can be closely linked to the contextual approaches in Making Waves. The 
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relationship between management approaches and contextual approaches is shown 
in Figure 8.3. 
 
Figure 8.3 Management approaches and contextual approaches. 
Our impression of the CEO in Making Waves is that he has a strong personality, and 
he interacts a lot with other employees, in all layers of the hierarchy. Since contextual 
ambidexterity is about individual employees using their own judgment as to how they 
should divide their time between explorative and exploitative activities, and 
companies use behavioural mechanisms to achieve this goal, we find it very 
plausible that a CEO who has a broad contact surface with the employees have a 
great influence. Making Waves are organized with a flat hierarchy, and informal 
information sharing, with structures that allow the CEO to influence the contextual 
approaches with his or her personality. 
8.6.1 Evaluation of proposition 
We find that the leadership style of the CEO in Making Waves has a strong influence 
on the contextual approaches to ambidexterity. We do not, however, have any way of 
proposing that the effect of the contextual approaches would be less if they were 
misaligned with the CEO’s leadership style. Still, it seems reasonable that an 
interfering CEO could transform dysfunctional contextual approaches to functional 
ones by his or her presence, so there is no reason for suspecting the opposite. 
 
We therefore find that our research strongly supports that the CEOs leadership style 
influences the effect of contextual approaches, but we have no clear evidence that 
says it is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches. We can therefore only partly 
support proposition 4: The CEO’s leadership style is crucial for the effect of 
contextual approaches. It could be interesting to evaluate a proposition 4 through a 
quantitative study, by comparing companies with different management types and 
trying to determine the actual importance of the CEO’s leadership style. 
8.6.2 Implications 
We explained in subchapter 8.5.2 that the CEO seems to favour opening behaviours 
over closing behaviours, thus contradicting Rosing et al. (2011), who claim that a 
leader needs to balance opening and closing behaviours. This may be a specific 
characteristic of the CEO of Making Waves, but it may also be an indication that 
closing behaviours are not that necessary in knowledge-based value shops. 
 
It seems that the CEO is able to influence the contextual approaches in Making 
Waves by interaction with his employees. But as Making Waves is growing, we think 
it will be more difficult for the CEO to know all his employees. Making Waves 
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currently has almost 300 employees, and the question is how many they can have 
before the CEO no longer recognizes everyone. We wonder how a CEO that does 
not know his employees will affect the contextual approaches. Perhaps the CEO 
would gradually be transformed from a guy that everyone can talk to into a symbol 
that everyone could relate to? We find these questions interesting, and a topic of 
further research could therefore be how company size affects the CEO’s effect on 
contextual approaches.   
8.7 Proposition 5a 
To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
company culture. 
 
We found some indicators of Making Waves using elements from company culture to 
solve the paradox of personal drivers. Their strong company culture is important for 
socializing practical artists, particularly their mentoring of new employees, but not as 
important for separating work modes. We have summarized our findings in Table 8.5 
below. 
 
Table 8.5 The paradox of personal drivers in Making Waves. 
Socializing practical artists Separating work modes 
Making Waves puts an emphasis on mentoring, 
where experienced employees help others. 
Projects have several phases, from explorative 
to exploitative. 
 
8.7.1 Evaluation of proposition 
We found no particular strong indicators of Making Waves using its company culture 
to separate work modes, but it seems that the company culture is useful for 
socializing practical artists. We therefore cannot support proposition 5a: To solve the 
paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from company 
culture, if one interprets the proposition to mean that the company uses company 
culture for both socializing practical artists and separating work modes. We can, 
however, say that proposition 5a is part of the solution of solving the paradox of 
personal drivers. We will further evaluate proposition 5a in the next subchapter, 
together with proposition 5b. 
8.8 Proposition 5b 
To solve the paradox of personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from 
knowledge management. 
 
The nested paradox of personal drivers is solved by socializing practical artists and 
temporarily and structurally separating work modes. These are contextual and 
architectural, approaches, respectively. When comparing our empirical data to the 
theory we gathered examples of both approaches in Table 8.6.  
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Table 8.6 Examples of approaches for solving the paradox of personal drivers. 
Socializing practical artists Temporarily and structurally separating work 
modes 
• Time set aside for improving skills. 
• Goal of invoicing per cent less than 
80%. 
• New employees intern in projects. 
• Allowing employees to influence 
decisions about their own workday, as 
well as the company in general. 
• Creative profile in MW leads to a feeling 
that “everyone is creative”. 
• Less structural than temporal 
separation. 
• Employees are divided into business 
units, but most work in project teams. 
• Project manager in charge of temporally 
separating work modes. 
• Agile methodology complicating 
temporal separation. 
8.8.1 Evaluation 
The theory on nested paradoxes is a result of a study done on five product design 
companies. We were curious to find out if the paradox of personal drivers could be 
applied to non-designers as well. In our empirical data we found that all types of 
knowledge workers did in fact feel a strain between spending hours on fun projects, 
and having the willpower to work efficiently and staying within the time frame they 
were given.  
 
We found evidence that Making Waves uses elements from knowledge management 
related to both architectural approaches and contextual approaches, although there 
were few examples of them structurally separating work modes. It seems that Making 
Waves places less emphasis on structurally separating work modes, which may 
indicate that value shops use socialization and temporal separation of work modes to 
deal with the paradox of personal drivers. An explanation for this may be that the 
project-based work the company does, requires employees to work close with 
employees from other business units. Through our discussion of empirical data, we 
have developed the opinion that structurally separating work modes is not efficient, 
nor desirable for project based value shops.  
 
We therefore find only partial support for proposition 5b: To solve the paradox of 
personal drivers, the value shop must use elements from knowledge management. 
8.8.2 Implications 
Proposition 5a and 5b give the impression that a way to solve the paradox of 
personal drivers by using both company culture and knowledge management. But 
balancing practical artists and separating work modes in Making Waves does not 
appear difficult. It seems that the theory concerning the approaches for solving the 
paradox of personal drivers by Andriopoulos and Lewis (2009) is not completely 
transferable to project-based value shops. For further studies on how value shops 
solve the paradox of personal drivers, we have created a revised proposition that 
addresses value shops specifically, and removed the aspect of structurally 
separating work modes. The new proposition reads: “To solve the paradox of 
personal drivers a value shop must socialize practical artists and temporally separate 
work modes”. 
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8.9 Summary 
Through our discussion, we found strong support propositions 1a, 2, 3a, partial 
support for propositions 1b, 4, 5a, and 5b, and no support for proposition 3b. Our 
findings were mostly in line with expectations, except for proposition 3b, which we 
assumed we were going to support, due to our assumption that managers would 
prefer exploitative projects to explorative projects. 
 
In this chapter, we have summarized our findings on each proposition, and evaluated 
the implications of the discoveries. In the next chapter, which is the final chapter of 
this thesis, we will formulate an answer to our research question, explain whether we 
believe our findings can be relevant for other companies, and make theoretical 
implications based on the findings.  
 
 
  
 182 
  
 
9 Conclusion 
In the previous chapter, we presented our findings on each proposition. In this 
chapter, we will explain how our propositions have helped us answer our research 
question, and the theoretical implications they have. We will also explain whether we 
believe our findings can be relevant for other companies, and provide some practical 
advice for Making Waves. 
9.1 Answering the research question 
Our research question is “How does Making Waves balance exploration and 
exploitation?” and through the discussion of our propositions we gained insight that 
could help us formulate an overall answer to this question. We first had to confirm 
that Making Waves in fact was a value shop, something we managed to do by finding 
similarities between the company activities in the empirical data, and the theory on 
value shop configurations.  
 
In our discussion, we found that Making Waves achieves ambidexterity through their 
customer projects, because the customer projects define what the company’s 
employees work with. Making Waves relies heavily on knowledge-acquisition and 
knowledge sharing in their work, and they combine both tacit and explicit knowledge 
in their exploitative efforts. We found that as Making Waves has grown and become 
more structured, the company has had to rely on an increasing amount of 
architectural approaches. At the same time, the CEO of Making Waves is directly 
involved in the contextual approaches, which he affects through his leadership style.  
 
We have dismissed the notion that the management in Making Waves prefer 
exploitative projects to explorative projects, and found out that all types of knowledge 
workers in Making Waves can experience a strain between passion and discipline. In 
order to solve the nested paradox that this strain creates, Making Waves cultivates 
practical artists, but does not structurally separate work modes, as this is not 
desirable for a value shop. Making Waves does not use the performance 
management aspect of contextual approaches when refining existing knowledge and 
acquiring new knowledge. Finally, we have found that Making Waves does not use 
spatial separation as an architectural measure when being explorative and 
exploitative.  
 
In the theory we presented a metaphor of four approaches to ambidexterity, and we 
described ambidexterity as a house of bricks and mortar. We visualized architectural, 
contextual, combinatorial and management approaches as bricks, mortar, a wall, and 
a builder, respectively. Because of their extensive coverage in theory we expected to 
find elements from each approach in our empirical data. Although our metaphor of 
the four approaches to ambidexterity was not the focal point of our research question 
or propositions, we found evidence of all four approaches being used. An overall 
answer to our research question is therefore: Making Waves balances exploration 
and exploitation by having a management that combines both architectural and 
contextual approaches to ambidexterity.  
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9.2 Theoretical implications 
In this subchapter, we will explain how our findings might expand the current theory 
related to ambidexterity, and what this may imply for other companies. In chapter 8, 
we discussed potential implications of our thesis for existing theories, and how our 
findings can help build new theories. In this subchapter, we will present the 
implications we find most interesting.  
 
Performance management and value shops 
We found that Making Waves do not utilize performance management to a 
substantial degree, but focus on the social context of contextual approaches. It 
seems that performance management is unnecessary in a company with highly 
educated employees who are granted a high level of autonomy. Thus, we cannot 
support Gibson and Birkinshaw (2004) claim that businesses have to combine 
performance management with a social context to create ambidexterity. 
 
Spatial and temporal separation 
We found few indicators of spatial separation or a conscious use of temporal 
separation in Making Waves. To be fair, there is a strong element of temporal 
separation from start to end in each project, but all projects go through different 
stages of activities, which means that the existence of temporal separation is not a 
result of a conscious decision by the management. In our opinion, spatial separation 
makes no sense in a company where employees do not work primarily within their 
business units, but in multi-disciplinary projects. We therefore believe that the 
theories on temporal separation (Gibson and Birkinshaw, 2004, McDonough and 
Leifer, 1983) and spatial separation (Raisch and Birkinshaw, 2008, Duncan, 1976) 
are not good indicators of architectural approaches to ambidexterity in value shops. 
Formalization (Mom et al., 2007, Duncan, 1976) and connectedness (Jansen et al., 
2006) seem to be much more relevant indicators. 
 
Size and architectural approaches 
Architectural approaches have been widely discussed in relation to profit growth 
(O'Reilly and Tushman, 2004), but we have found little discourse around the 
correlation between growth in size and architectural approaches, although it is a fact 
that growth results in more structure (Ouchi, 1979). Proposition 2: An increased 
number of employees requires a value shop to adopt a more rigid structure, which 
causes an increased emphasis on architectural approaches is the proposition we find 
strongest support for. The connection between company growth and architectural 
approaches seems very logical, both to us and to the employees in Making Waves. 
We therefore find evidence that the larger a company gets, the more management 
has to emphasise architectural approaches to ambidexterity.  
 
The importance of the CEO 
We could not generalize from the original proposition 4: The CEO’s leadership style 
is crucial for the effect of contextual approaches, because the word “crucial” implies a 
direct connection between the leadership style and contextual approaches. We could 
not prove such a direct link, but we did found evidence that the CEO’s open and 
personal leadership style affected the contextual approaches. We therefore created a 
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new proposition that reads: The CEO’s leadership style strongly affects contextual 
approaches. We believe that in companies with flat structures, a CEO will strongly 
affects contextual approaches, because of his influence. This corresponds with what 
we would expect from the existing theory, where several scholars have pointed out 
the impact management can have on ambidexterity (Chang and Hughes, 2012, 
Simsek et al., 2009, Mom et al., 2007, Lubatkin et al., 2006). Having a flat structure is 
the norm in many Norwegian companies, but this is not as common in many other 
countries. This may mean that the CEO affects contextual approaches to a larger 
degree in Norway, than he would in many other countries.  
 
The importance of knowledge management 
Knowledge management is an important aspect of innovation management (Adams 
et al., 2006, Trott, 2008, Tidd and Bessant, 2011). Innovation management has to do 
with managing exploration and exploitation, which can lead to ambidexterity if 
balanced correctly. It is obvious that knowledge management plays a vital role in 
organizations that make money by solving problems, such as value shops, and 
through our study we found that acquiring and sharing knowledge is a very important 
aspect of achieving ambidexterity for Making Waves. We assume that knowledge 
management is important for all value shops that use a high level of knowledge to 
solve problems for customers. We also believe that the theoretical field of 
ambidexterity and knowledge management could benefit from cross-pollination of 
ideas.  
9.3 Topics for further research 
In this subchapter, we will recap the most interesting topics for further research, as 
outlined in chapter 8.  
 
Systems for knowledge sharing 
Systems for knowledge sharing is central in modern value shop organizations, and in 
our discussion, we discovered that many employees used a social knowledge-
sharing platform. This led us to wonder if a wiki system or a system with a more 
social aspect is most efficient for sharing knowledge. We think that the rise of social 
media has changed the way people share knowledge via systems, and that it would 
be interested to explore whether social systems are more efficient than filing system 
for knowledge sharing.  
 
Growth and contextual approaches 
We have found strong indications of that company growth leads to more architectural 
approaches to ambidexterity. But it seems plausible that company growth also leads 
to more contextual approaches, or at least an increasing need for contextual 
approaches. A value shop like Making Waves, with employees that are highly 
knowledgeable, seems to require contextual approaches to grant the employees the 
autonomy they desire. It would therefore be interesting to determine whether 
company growth leads to more contextual approaches, as well as architectural 
approaches. 
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Merging internal and external approaches 
The borders between internal and external approaches to ambidexterity are blurred 
when Making Waves work closely with customers on projects, and it would be 
interesting to determine the relative importance of external approaches to 
ambidexterity in value shops. It would also be interesting to find out more about 
where one can draw the line between external and internal approaches for value 
shops in general.  
9.4 Practical advice for Making Waves 
In this final subchapter of our thesis, we would like to provide some advice to Making 
Waves, based on our findings. This thesis is based solely on one case study of 
Making Waves, and it does not provide us with detailed enough information about 
their daily operations to give them very specific advice. We hope, however, that by 
reading this subchapter and the rest of the thesis, Making Waves will gain insight in 
the concepts of exploration, exploitation, and ambidexterity, and that such insight can 
help them evaluate their internal processes and improve themselves in some 
manner. 
 
Creativity 
From our interviews, we discovered that managers and employees in Making Waves 
have different opinions about which employees are creative. Some seem to consider 
employees working on typical exploration activities as creative, and the ones working 
with exploitation not as creative. Others claimed that all employees are creative, 
within their field of work. We believe that it would be advantageous for Making 
Waves to consider all their employees as creative, and not only the employees 
working in the design department. Having employees that view themselves as 
creative, or as practical artists, can enhance the overall creativity and push 
employees to innovate, whether it is by exploration or exploitation. Designers are 
more often seen as creative because their ideas are easy to present, and they are 
often more explorative. But both exploratory and exploitive activities lead to 
innovation, although exploration is often easier to notice, since exploitative innovation 
often leads to small changes.  
 
Project portfolio 
We found strong indications that Making Waves achieve ambidexterity through their 
customer projects. It is therefore important that Making Waves continues to have an 
appropriate mix of explorative and exploitative projects.  
 
Company culture 
Making Waves have actively maintained their unique company culture of support and 
sharing, while growing to many times their original size. At the same time, they have 
had to become more structured, and in the process they have applied many 
architectural approaches to ambidexterity. We strongly believe that as a knowledge-
based value shop, Making Waves should continue to prioritize the upkeep of their 
company culture. The company culture is closely linked to the contextual 
approaches, and from the theory and empirical data, we interpret that both culture 
and contextual approaches will be increasingly important for a company that strives 
to be innovative and achieve long-term success.   
 186 
  
 
10 References 
 
ADAMS, R., BESSANT, J. & PHELPS, R. 2006. Innovation management 
measurement: A review. International Journal of Management Reviews, 8, 
21-47. 
ALVESSON, M. & KÄRREMAN, D. 2001. Odd Couple: Making Sense of the Curious 
Concept of Knowledge Management. Journal of Management Studies, 38, 
995-1018. 
ANDERSEN, H. L., CLIFFORD, K. M. & GIÆVER, T. J. 2012. Balancing innovation 
and effectiveness in service organizations. Trondheim: NTNU. 
ANDERSON, J. C., NARUS, J. A. & NARAYANDAS, D. 2009. Business market 
management : understanding, creating, and delivering value, Upper Saddle 
River, N.J., Pearson Prentice Hall. 
ANDRIOPOULOS, C. & LEWIS, M. W. 2009. Exploitation-Exploration Tensions and 
Organizational Ambidexterity: Managing Paradoxes of Innovation. 
Organization Science, 20, 696-717. 
ATUAHENE-GIMA, K. 2005. Resolving the capability: Rigidity paradox in new 
product innovation. Journal of marketing, 61-83. 
BADEN-FULLER, C. & VOLBERDA, H. W. 1997. Strategic renewal: How large 
complex organizations prepare for the future. International Studies of 
Management & Organization, 27, 95-120. 
BAUM, J. A. C., LI, S. X. & USHER, J. M. 2000. Making the Next Move: How 
Experiential and Vicarious Learning Shape the Locations of Chains' 
Acquisitions. Administrative Science Quarterly, 45, 766-801. 
BAUMOL, W. J. 2002. The free market innovation machine: Analyzing the growth 
miracle of capitalism, Princeton university press. 
BECKMAN, C. M., HAUNSCHILD, P. R. & DAMON, J. P. 2004. Friends or 
Strangers? Firm-Specific Uncertainty, Market Uncertainty, and Network 
Partner Selection. Organization Science, 15, 259-275. 
BENNER, M. J. & TUSHMAN, M. L. 2003. Exploitation, Exploration, and Process 
Management: The Productivity Dilemma Revisited. The Academy of 
Management Review, 28, 238-256. 
BESSANT, J., LAMMING, R., NOKE, H. & PHILLIPS, W. 2005. Managing innovation 
beyond the steady state. Technovation, 25, 1366-1376. 
BICK, J. & MEDIRATTA, B. 2007. The Google Way: Give Engineers Room [Online]. 
The New York Times. Available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/21/jobs/21pre.html [Accessed 7 December 
2012]. 
BOWEN, G. 2008. Grounded theory and sensitizing concepts. International Journal 
of Qualitative Methods, 5, 12-23. 
BROADBERRY, S. 2010. Cambridge economic history of modern europe / 1870 to 
the present, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ Press. 
BRYMAN, A. 2008. Social research methods, Oxford University Press, Incorporated. 
BRYMAN, A. & BURGESS, R. G. 1999. Introduction: Qualitative Research 
Methodology - A Review. In: BRYMAN, A. & BURGESS, R. G. (eds.) 
Qualitative Research. London: Sage. 
BUTLER, D. J. A. J. 1998. <Driving Factors of Service Companies to Participate in 
Formal Standardization Processes: An Empirical Analysis.pdf>. Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin. 
CARLILE, P. R. 2004. Transferring, translating, and transforming: An integrative 
framework for managing knowledge across boundaries. Organization 
science, 15, 555-568. 
 187 
  
 
CHANG, Y.-Y. & HUGHES, M. 2012. Drivers of innovation ambidexterity in small-to 
medium-sized firms. European Management Journal, 30, 1-17. 
CHARMAZ, K. 2006. Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through 
Qualitative Analysis, SAGE Publications. 
CHEN, H. & TAYLOR, R. Exploring the impact of lean management on innovation 
capability.  Management of Engineering & Technology, 2009. PICMET 2009. 
Portland International Conference on, 2-6 Aug. 2009 2009. 826-834. 
CHESBROUGH, H. 2007. Business model innovation: it's not just about technology 
anymore. Strategy & leadership, 35, 12-17. 
CHESBROUGH, H. W. 2003. Open innovation: The new imperative for creating and 
profiting from technology, Harvard Business Press. 
CHRISTENSEN, C. M. 1997. The innovator's dilemma : when new technologies 
cause great firms to fail, Boston, Mass., Harvard Business School Press. 
CHRISTENSEN, C. M., ANTHONY, S. D. & ROTH, E. A. 2007. Seeing what's next : 
using the theories of innovation to predict industry change, Boston, Mass., 
Harvard Business School Press. 
COOK, S. D. N. & BROWN, J. S. 1999. Bridging Epistemologies: The Generative 
Dance between Organizational Knowledge and Organizational Knowing. 
Organization Science, 10, 381-400. 
DAFT, R. L. 1995. Organization theory and design, Minneapolis/St. Paul, West Pub. 
Co. 
DE WIT, B. & MEYER, R. 2010. Strategy: Process, Content, Context, Cengage 
Learning Emea Higher Education. 
DICTIONARY, O. 2013. Oxford Dictionary. Online: Oxford University Press. 
DIENER, E., CRANDALL, R. & DIENER, E. 1978. Ethics in social and behavioral 
research, University of Chicago Press Chicago. 
DUBINSKY, A. J., HOWELL, R. D., INGRAM, T. N. & BELLENGER, D. N. 1986. 
Salesforce socialization. The Journal of Marketing, 192-207. 
DUNCAN, R. B. 1976. The ambidextrous organization: Designing dual structures for 
innovation. The management of organization: Strategy and implementation, 
1, 167-188. 
EARLEY, P. C. & GIBSON, C. B. 2002. Multinational Work Teams: A New 
Perspective, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
EISENHARDT, K. & MARTIN, J. 2000. Dynamic Capabilities: What Are They? 
Strategic Management Journal, 21, 1105-1121. 
EISENHARDT, K. M. & GRAEBNER, M. E. 2007. Theory Building From Cases: 
Opportunities And Challenges. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 25-32. 
FLYVBJERG, B. 2006. Five Misunderstandings About Case-Study Research. 
Qualitative Inquiry, 12, 219-245. 
FORD, H. & CROWTHER, S. 1922. My Life and Work, Doubleday, Page & 
Company. 
FRANCIS, D. & BESSANT, J. 2005. Targeting innovation and implications for 
capability development. Technovation, 25, 171-183. 
GEIGER, S. W. & MAKRI, M. 2006. Exploration and exploitation innovation 
processes: The role of organizational slack in R&D intensive firms. The 
Journal of High Technology Management Research, 17, 97-108. 
GHOSHAL, S. & BARTLETT, C. A. 1994. Linking organizational context and 
managerial action: The dimensions of quality of management. Strategic 
Management Journal, 15, 91-112. 
GIBSON, C. B. & BIRKINSHAW, J. 2004. The Antecedents, Consequences and 
Mediating Role of Organizational Ambidexterity. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47, 209-226. 
GILBERT, C. 2005. Unbundling the Structure of Inertia: Resource versus Routine 
Rigidity. Academy of Management Journal, 48, 741-763. 
 188 
  
 
GILLEY, K. M. & RASHEED, A. 2000. Making More by Doing Less: An Analysis of 
Outsourcing and its Effects on Firm Performance. Journal of Management, 
26, 763-790. 
GODØ, H. 2008. Innovasjonsledelse: teknologiutvikling fra idé til 
forretningsplanlegging, Tapir akademisk forl. 
GRANT, R. M. & BADENFULLER, C. 2004. A knowledge accessing theory of 
strategic alliances. Journal of Management Studies, 41, 61-84. 
GUPTA, A. K., SMITH, K. G. & SHALLEY, C. E. 2006. The Interplay between 
Exploration and Exploitation. The Academy of Management Journal, 49, 693-
706. 
GUPTA, B., IYER, L. S. & ARONSON, J. E. 2000. Knowledge management: 
practices and challenges. Industrial Management & Data Systems, 100, 17-
21. 
HE, Z.-L. & WONG, P.-K. 2004. Exploration vs. Exploitation: An Empirical Test of the 
Ambidexterity Hypothesis. Organization Science, 15, 481-494. 
HELLEM, H. O. 29.01.2013 2013. RE: Director of people and processes. Type to 
CLIFFORD, K. M., GIÆVER, T. J. & ANDERSEN, H. L. 
HEROLD, D. M., JAYARAMAN, N. & NARAYANASWAMY, C. R. 2006. What is the 
Relationship between Organizational Slack and Innovation? Journal of 
Managerial Issues, 18, 372-392. 
HIPP, C. 1999. Knowledge-intensive business services in the new mode of 
knowledge production. AI & SOCIETY, 13, 88-106. 
HOBSBAWM, E. J. & WRIGLEY, C. 1999. From 1750 to the present day, New York, 
New. 
HOOIJBERG, R. 1996. A Multidirectional Approach Toward Leadership: An 
Extension of the Concept of Behavioral Complexity. Human Relations, 49, 
917-946. 
HÅKANSSON, H. & SNEHOTA, I. 1989. No business is an island: the network 
concept of business strategy. Scandinavian journal of management, 5, 187-
200. 
IMAI, M. 1986. Kaizen, the key to Japanese competitive success, New York, 
Random House Business Division. 
INKPEN, A. C. & TSANG, E. W. K. 2005. Social Capital, Networks and Knowledge 
Transfer. Academy of Management Review, 30, 146-165. 
JANNEY, J. J. & DESS, G. G. 2006. The risk concept for entrepreneurs 
reconsidered: New challenges to the conventional wisdom. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 21, 385-400. 
JANSEN, J. J., VAN DEN BOSCH, F. A. & VOLBERDA, H. W. 2006. Exploratory 
innovation, exploitative innovation, and performance: Effects of organizational 
antecedents and environmental moderators. Management science, 52, 1661-
1674. 
JANSEN, J. J. P. 2005. Ambidextrous Organizations: A Multiple-Level Study of 
Absorptive Capacity, Exploratory and Exploitative Innovation and 
Performance [Online]. Available: http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6774. 
JASMAND, C., BLAZEVIC, V. & DE RUYTER, K. 2012. Providing Service: A Study 
of Customer Service Representatives’ Ambidextrous  Behavior. Journal of 
Marketing, 76, 20-37. 
JAWORSKI, B. J. & KOHLI, A. K. 1993. Market Orientation: Antecedents and 
Consequences. Journal of Marketing, 57, 53-70. 
JENSEN, M. 1986. Agency cost of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. 
Corporate Finance, and Takeovers. American Economic Review, 76. 
KANG, S. C. & SNELL, S. A. 2009. Intellectual capital architectures and 
ambidextrous learning: a framework for human resource management. 
Journal of Management Studies, 46, 65-92. 
 189 
  
 
KIRZNER, I. 1999. Creativity and/or Alertness: A Reconsideration of the 
Schumpeterian Entrepreneur. The Review of Austrian Economics, 11, 5-17. 
KLEV, R. & LEVIN, M. 2009. Forandring som praksis, Bergen, Fagbokforl. 
KOHLI, A. K. & JAWORSKI, B. J. 1990. Market orientation: the construct, research 
propositions, and managerial implications. The Journal of Marketing, 1-18. 
KOTTER, J. P. 2001. What Leaders Really Do. Harvard Business Review. 
KRISTIANSEN, J. E., FLATEBØ, G. & MODIG, I. 2009. This is Norway : what the 
figures say, Oslo, Statistics Norway. 
KUMAR, K., BOESSO, G., FAVOTTO, F. & MENINI, A. 2012. Strategic orientation, 
innovation patterns and performances of SMEs and large companies. Journal 
of Small Business and Enterprise Development, 19, 132-145. 
LANDSTRÖM, H. 1999. Entreprenörskapets rötter, Studentlitteratur. 
LEE, K. & CHOI, D. 2010. Logical Mechanism for Allocating Resources to 
Exploitation and Exploration to Achieve Ambidexterity: Team Level Analysis. 
In: KIM, T.-H., LEE, Y.-H., KANG, B.-H. & ŚLĘZAK, D. (eds.) Future 
Generation Information Technology. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
LEI, D. & HITT, M. A. 1995. Strategic restructuring and outsourcing: The effect of 
mergers and acquisitions and LBOs on building firm skills and capabilities. 
Journal of Management, 21, 835-859. 
LEWIS, M. W. 2000. Exploring Paradox: Toward a More Comprehensive Guide. The 
Academy of Management Review, 25, 760-776. 
LIN, Z., YANG, H. & DEMIRKAN, I. 2007. The Performance Consequences of 
Ambidexterity in Strategic Alliance Formations: Empirical Investigation and 
Computational Theorizing. Management Science, 53, 1645-1658. 
LINCOLN, Y. S. & GUBA, E. G. 1985. Naturalistic inquiry, SAGE Publications, 
Incorporated. 
LOH, L. & VENKATRAMAN, N. 1992. Diffusion of information technology 
outsourcing: influence sources and the Kodak effect. Information Systems 
Research, 3, 334-358. 
LUBATKIN, M. H., SIMSEK, Z., LING, Y. & VEIGA, J. F. 2006. Ambidexterity and 
Performance in Small-to Medium-Sized Firms: The Pivotal Role of Top 
Management Team Behavioral Integration. Journal of Management, 32, 646-
672. 
LUMPKIN, G. T. & DESS, G. G. 1996. Clarifying the entrepreneurial orientation 
construct and linking it to performance. Academy of management Review, 
135-172. 
MANYIKA, J. 2008. Google’s view on the future of business: An interview with CEO 
Eric Schmidt [Online]. McKinsey Quarterly. Available: 
http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Googles_view_on_the_future_of_business
_An_interview_with_CEO_Eric_Schmidt_2229 [Accessed 7 December 2012]. 
MARABELLI, M., FRIGERIO, C. & RAJOLA, F. 2012. Ambidexterity in Service 
Organizations: Reference Models from the Banking Industry. Industry and 
Innovation, 19, 109-126. 
MARCH, J. G. 1991. Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. 
Organization Science, 2, 71-87. 
MARCH, J. G. 1995. The Future, Disposable Organizations and the Rigidities of 
Imagination. Organization, 2, 427-440. 
MARTIN, R. 2007. How successful leaders think. Harvard Business Review. 
MATTHYSSENS, P. & VANDENBEMPT, K. 2008. Moving from basic offerings to 
value-added solutions: strategies, barriers and alignment. Industrial Marketing 
Management, 37, 316-328. 
MCDONOUGH, E. F. & LEIFER, R. 1983. Research Notes. USING 
SIMULTANEOUS STRUCTURES TO COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY. 
Academy of Management Journal, 26, 727-735. 
 190 
  
 
MERRIAM, S. B. 2002. Introduction to qualitative research. Qualitative research in 
practice: Examples for discussion and analysis, 3-17. 
MILES, I. 1996. Innovation in services. In: DODGSON, M. & ROTHWELL, R. (eds.) 
The handbook of industrial innovation. E. Elgar. 
MINTZBERG, H., RAISINGHANI, D. & THEORET, A. 1976. The structure of" 
unstructured" decision processes. Administrative science quarterly, 246-275. 
MINTZBERG, H. & WATERS, J. A. 1985. Of strategies, deliberate and emergent. 
Strategic management journal, 6, 257-272. 
MIRACLEMART. 2009. Marissa Mayer at Stanford University [Online]. 
YouTube.com. Available: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=soYKFWqVVzg. 
MOM, T. J. M., VAN DEN BOSCH, F. A. J. & VOLBERDA, H. W. 2007. Investigating 
Managers' Exploration and Exploitation Activities: The Influence of Top-Down, 
Bottom-Up, and Horizontal Knowledge Inflows*. Journal of Management 
Studies, 44, 910-931. 
MORGAN, R. E. & BERTHON, P. 2008. Market Orientation, Generative Learning, 
Innovation Strategy and Business Performance Inter-Relationships in 
Bioscience Firms. Journal of Management Studies, 45, 1329-1353. 
NEMANICH, L. A. & VERA, D. 2009. Transformational leadership and ambidexterity 
in the context of an acquisition. The Leadership Quarterly, 20, 19-33. 
NEU, W. A. & BROWN, S. W. 2008. Manufacturers forming successful complex 
business services: Designing an organization to fit the market. International 
Journal of Service Industry Management, 19, 232-251. 
NOHRIA, N. & GULATI, R. 1996. Is Slack Good or Bad for Innovation? The Academy 
of Management Journal, 39, 1245-1264. 
NONAKA, I. 1994. A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation. 
Organization Science, 5, 14-37. 
O'REILLY, C. A., III & TUSHMAN, M. L. 2004. The Ambidextrous Organization. 
Harvard Business Review. 
O’REILLY, C. A., III & TUSHMAN, M. L. 2008. Ambidexterity as a dynamic capability: 
Resolving the innovator's dilemma. Research in organizational behavior, 28, 
185-206. 
OLIVA, R. & KALLENBERG, R. 2003. Managing the transition from products to 
services. International Journal of Service Industry Management, 14, 160-172. 
OSTERWALDER, A. & PIGNEUR, Y. 2010. Business Model Generation: A 
Handbook for Visionaries, Game Changers, and Challengers, Wiley. 
OUCHI, W. G. 1979. A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational 
Control Mechanisms. Management Science, 25, 833-848. 
PARK, S. H., CHEN, R. & GALLAGHER, S. 2002. Firm resources as moderators of 
the relationship between market growth and strategic alliances in 
semiconductor start-ups. Academy of Management Journal, 527-545. 
PIRES, C. P., SARKAR, S. & CARVALHO, L. 2008. Innovation in services – how 
different from manufacturing? The Service Industries Journal, 28, 1339-1356. 
POOLE, M. S. & VAN DE VEN, A. H. 1989. Using Paradox to Build Management and 
Organization Theories. The Academy of Management Review, 14, 562-578. 
PORTER, M. E. 1985. Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior 
Performance, New York, The Free Press. 
PROBST, G., RAISCH, S. & TUSHMAN, M. L. 2011. Ambidextrous leadership: 
Emerging challenges for business and HR leaders. Organizational Dynamics, 
40, 326-334. 
PURANAM, P., SINGH, H. & ZOLLO, M. 2006. Organizing for Innovation: Managing 
the Coordination-Autonomy Dilemma in Technology Acquisitions. Academy of 
Management Journal, 49, 263-280. 
PURANAM, P. & SRIKANTH, K. 2007. What they know vs. what they do: how 
acquirers leverage technology acquisitions. Strategic Management Journal, 
28, 805-825. 
 191 
  
 
RAISCH, S. & BIRKINSHAW, J. 2008. Organizational Ambidexterity: Antecedents, 
Outcomes, and Moderators. Journal of Management, 34, 375-409. 
RAISCH, S., BIRKINSHAW, J., PROBST, G. & TUSHMAN, M. L. 2009. 
Organizational Ambidexterity: Balancing Exploitation and Exploration for 
Sustained Performance. Organization Science, 20, 685-695. 
ROSENKOPF, L. & NERKAR, A. 2001. Beyond local search: boundaryspanning, 
exploration, and impact in the optical disk industry. Strategic Management 
Journal, 22, 287-306. 
ROSING, K., FRESE, M. & BAUSCH, A. 2011. Explaining the heterogeneity of the 
leadership-innovation relationship: Ambidextrous leadership. The Leadership 
Quarterly, 22, 956-974. 
ROTHAERMEL, F. T. & DEEDS, D. L. 2004. Exploration and exploitation alliances in 
biotechnology: a system of new product development. Strategic Management 
Journal, 25, 201-221. 
RYNES, S. & GEPHART JR, R. 2004. From the editors. Academy of Management 
Journal, 47, 454-462. 
SANTOS, F. M. & EISENHARDT, K. M. 2005. Organizational boundaries and 
theories of organization. Organization Science, 16, 491-508. 
SCHUMPETER, J. A. 1934. The theory of economic development: An inquiry into 
profits, capital, credit, interest, and the business cycle. University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign's Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical 
Research Reference in Entrepreneurship. 
SEARLE, J. R. 2006. Social ontology: Some basic principles. Anthropological 
Theory, 6, 12-29. 
SIMSEK, Z., HEAVEY, C., VEIGA, J. F. & SOUDER, D. 2009. A typology for aligning 
organizational ambidexterity's conceptualizations, antecedents, and 
outcomes. Journal of Management Studies, 46, 864-894. 
SKORSTAD, E. 2002. Organisasjonsformer : kontinuitet eller forandring?, Oslo, 
Gyldendal akademisk. 
SMITH, W. K. & LEWIS, M. W. 2011. Toward a theory of paradox: A dynamic 
equilibrium model of organizing. Academy of Management Review, 36, 381-
403. 
SMITH, W. K. & TUSHMAN, M. L. 2005. Managing Strategic Contradictions: A Top 
Management Model for Managing Innovation Streams. Organization Science, 
16, 522-536. 
SORENSEN, C. E., WILLIAMSON, S. T. & LEWIS, D. L. 2006. My forty years with 
Ford, Detroit, Wayne State University Press. 
STABELL, C. B. & FJELDSTAD, Ø. D. 1998. Configuring value for competitive 
advantage: on chains, shops, and networks. Strategic management journal, 
19, 413-437. 
STAKE, R. E. 1995. The Art of Case Study Research, SAGE Publications. 
STRAUSS, A. & CORBIN, J. M. 1998. Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques 
and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory, SAGE Publications. 
TIDD, J. 2001. Innovation management in context: environment, organization and 
performance. International Journal of Management Reviews, 3, 169-183. 
TIDD, J. & BESSANT, J. 2011. Managing Innovation: Integrating Technological, 
Market and Organizational Change, Wiley. 
TROTT, P. 2008. Innovation management and new product development, Financial 
Times Prentice Hall. 
TUSHMAN, M., SMITH, W. K., WOOD, R. C., WESTERMAN, G. & O’REILLY, C. 
2010. Organizational designs and innovation streams. Industrial and 
Corporate Change, 19, 1331-1366. 
TUSHMAN, M. L. & O'REILLY, C. A., III 1996. The Ambidextrous Organization: 
Managing Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change. California Management 
Review, 38, 8-8. 
 192 
  
 
TUSHMAN, M. L., SMITH, W. K. & BINNS, A. 2011. The Ambidextrous CEO. 
Harvard Business Review, 89, 74-80, 136. 
VAN LOOY, B., MARTENS, T. & DEBACKERE, K. 2005. Organizing for continuous 
innovation: On the sustainability of ambidextrous organizations. Creativity and 
Innovation Management, 14, 208-221. 
VANDERMERWE, S. & RADA, J. 1989. Servitization of business: adding value by 
adding services. European Management Journal, 6, 314-324. 
WAVES, M. 2013. Vår historie [Online]. Available: http://makingwaves.no/Om-
oss/Var-historie/ [Accessed 15-05-2013 2013]. 
WEBSTER, J. & WATSON, R. T. 2002. Analyzing the past to prepare for the future: 
Writing a literature review. Mis Quarterly, 26. 
WEIGELT, C. & SARKAR, M. 2012. Performance implications of outsourcing for 
technological innovations: managing the efficiency and adaptability trade
off. Strategic Management Journal, 33, 189-216. 
WOMACK, J. P. & JONES, D. T. 1996. Beyond Toyota: how to root out waste and 
pursue perfection. Harvard Business Review. 
YIN, R. K. 2009. Case study research : design and methods, Los Angeles, Calif., 
Sage Publications. 
ZHOU, J. & GEORGE, J. M. 2003. Awakening employee creativity: The role of leader 
emotional intelligence. The Leadership Quarterly, 14, 545-568. 
 
 
  
 193 
  
 
11 Appendix 
11.1  Appendix 1: Interview invitation 
Deltakelse på intervju 
Vi er tre studenter som skriver masteroppgave om hvordan bedrifter balanserer 
effektivisering og nyskaping, og ønsker å snakke med deg om ditt arbeid i Making 
Waves. Hensikten med dette intervjuet er å se hvordan du oppfatter dine egne 
arbeidsoppgaver og arbeidsoppgavene til dem rundt deg.  
 
Intervjuet krever ingen forberedelser fra din side, og kommer til å handle om detalje-
informasjon om tekniske sider ved arbeidet ditt. Informasjonen vi samler blir 
behandlet konfidensielt, og vi kommer til å anonymisere deg i oppgaven. 
Vi setter stor pris på at du deltar! 
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11.2  Appendix 2: Interview introduction 
Introduksjon 
Hensikten med dette intervjuet er å se hvordan du oppfatter dine egne 
arbeidsoppgaver og arbeidsoppgavene til dem rundt deg. Oppgaven vår handler om 
forholdet mellom nyskaping og effektivisering i bedrifter, og vi ønsker å se på 
hvordan dere jobber. Det finnes ingen “riktig” eller “gal” måte å jobbe på, og 
hensikten med denne studien er ikke å avdekke svakheter eller styrker i Making 
Waves. Vi ønsker å se hvordan dere jobber og sammenligne resultatet med hvordan 
faglitteratur tror at bedrifter jobber. Mesteparten av faglitteraturen om forholdet 
mellom nyskaping og effektivisering handler om produksjonsbedrifter, for eksempel 
bilprodusenter, og vi ønsker å se om noen av de samme prinsippene viser seg hos 
dere, som er en servicebedrift mer enn en produsent av fysiske varer. 
 
Vi vil gjerne at du prater om hvordan du jobber generelt, og hvordan du forholder deg 
til det større miljøet som utgjør Making Waves. Vi vil gjerne bruke opptaker for å få 
med detaljer uten å måtte skrive for mye, men opptakene blir ikke offentliggjort. Vi 
skal kun bruke dem til å skrive korrekte opplysninger etterpå, og vi kommer til å 
anonymisere deg i oppgaven. 
 
Hvis vi skal skrive noe som vi ønsker å refere til deg personlig med, vil vi selvfølgelig 
sende det til deg på epost først, slik at du kan godkjenne det. Høres det greit ut? 
 
Har du noen spørsmål? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Med vennlig hilsen 
 
 
 
 
Tharald Giæver            Helge Lundsvoll Andersen   Kari 
Clifford 
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11.3  Appendix 3: Interview guide #1 
Til ansatte som ikke er medlem av ledergruppen 
 
Din stilling 
Hvis du helt kort kan starte med å fortelle om hvem du er, utdanningsbakgrunn, 
annen arbeidserfaring osv. Kan du si mer om stillingen din her hos Making Waves, 
tittel, offisielle ansvarsområder og hvor lenge du har hatt stillingen. 
 
Hva bruker du arbeidstiden din til? 
● Hvordan foreløper en typisk dag eller uke? 
● Hvordan vil du beskrive måten du jobber på? 
 
Kunne du forklart litt mer inngående om din stilling, hva er viktig for deg (å oppnå) i 
jobben din?  
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver har høyest prioritet? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver liker du best? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver skulle du ønske å bruke mer tid på? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver skulle du ønske å bruke mindre tid på? 
 
Hvilke andre i selskapet samarbeider du tettest med, og hvordan samarbeider dere? 
 
Making Waves 
Kan du fortelle noe om historien om Making Waves? 
● Kan du beskrive en hendelse/situasjon/endring du mener har hatt stor 
påvirkning på hva slags selskap Making Waves er i dag? 
● I hvilken grad har disse hendelsene bidratt til dagens organisering? 
● I hvilken grad har disse hendelsene bidratt til utformingen av 
arbeidsprosesser/metode? 
 
Kjenner du til visjonen til Making Waves? Hva legger du i den visjonen? 
 
Hvordan vil du beskrive Making Waves sin strategi? 
● Hvordan føler du at dere følger strategien? 
 
Exploration and exploitation 
Kan du beskrive en typisk prosess for et prosjekt helt fra før salg til etter leveranse? 
● Hvordan går dere frem når dere starter et prosjekt? 
● Hvordan samarbeider dere med kunden? 
● Kan du beskrive innsalgsprosessen? 
 
La oss si at dere tar på dere et nytt oppdrag som ligner på et tidligere oppdrag. Hvor 
mye gjennbruker dere av det gamle oppdraget? 
● Hvordan forholder dere dere til å kutte kostnader? 
● Hva gjør dere for å effektivisere driften? 
● Var opprettelsen av en avdeling i Polen et tiltak for å få ned kostnader? 
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Hva legger du i å jobbe kreativt? 
● Hvordan klarer Making Waves å fornye seg? 
● Er det spesifikke personer som jobber kreativt og med fornyelse, eller alle? 
● Har kreative arbeidsprosesser ledet til utviklingen av nye produkter, tjenester 
eller nye interne arbeidsprosesser? 
 
Arkitektonisk 
Hvordan varierer arbeidsoppgavene dine over tid? 
 
Hender det at du skifter faste oppgaver? 
● Blir du oppfordret til å bytte roller i bedriften? 
 
Hvilke typer tjenester er det dere selger? 
● Kan du beskrive hver tjeneste nærmere? 
● Har dere et bevisst forhold til fordelingen av type tjenester? 
 
Kontekstuell 
Kan du fortelle om en gang du følte at du gjorde en spesielt god jobb for Making 
Waves? 
 
Hva preger arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves? 
● Hvordan skiller arbeidsmiljøet seg i Making Waves fra andre selskaper? Antar 
du? 
● Holder man seg mest sammen med de i sin avdeling? til lunsj osv? 
● Hvordan foregår internkommunikasjon? Formell og uformell? 
● Vil du beskrive arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves som prestasjonsfokusert? 
● Hvordan vil du beskrive forholdet ditt til rutiner? 
 
Hvem i selskapet spør du om råd i vanskelige situasjoner? 
● Et problem du ikke finner løsning på? Prioritering av arbeidsoppgaver inn mot 
en deadline? 
● Kollegaer, hvem? 
● Overordnede, hvem? 
● Hvordan er støtten i arbeidsmiljøet rundt å ta egne beslutninger i krevende 
sammenhenger? 
 
Hvordan er samarbeidsklimaet i Making Waves? 
● Har du noen kollegaer du vet du samarbeider bedre med enn andre? 
● Er det de samme du samarbeider godt med faglig som du liker å tilbringe tid 
med i sosiale settinger også? 
● Har du fått noen nære venner gjennom jobben i Making Waves som du 
tilbringer mye tid sammen med på fritid? 
 
Ledelse  
Hvem er din nærmeste leder? 
 
Hvilken myndighet har du generelt til å ta beslutninger? 
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● Blir det oppfordret til å ta risiko eller til å forholde seg til et sett med regler i 
forbindelse med viktige beslutninger? 
 
Hvordan ønsker du å bli ledet? 
● Kan du gi et eksempel på godt lederskap? 
 
Hvordan blir du ledet i dag? 
 
Hvordan ønsker du å lede andre? 
 
Avsluttende spørsmål 
Som en avslutning på intervjuet ønsker vi at du forteller litt om hva du ser for deg i 
framtiden til Making Waves, i hvilken retning selskapet vil utvikle seg. 
 
Hvordan er bransjen i endring?  
● Hva ser dere på hos konkurrenter? 
 
Hvor er Making Waves om fem år? 
● Hvilke karakteristikker beskriver selskapet best da? 
● Hvor lønnsomt er selskapet? Hvordan har dere oppnådd dette? 
● Hvor nyskapende er selskapet? Hvordan har dere oppnådd dette? 
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11.4  Appendix 4: Interview guide #2 Top management 
 
Til CEO og andre medlemmer av ledergruppen 
 
Din stilling 
Hvis du helt kort kan starte med å fortelle om hvem du er, utdanningsbakgrunn, 
annen arbeidserfaring osv. Kan du si mer om stillingen din her hos Making Waves, 
tittel, offisielle ansvarsområder og hvor lenge du har hatt stillingen. 
 
Kunne du forklart litt mer inngående om din stilling, hva er viktig for deg (å oppnå) i 
jobben din?  
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver har høyest prioritet? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver liker du best? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver skulle du ønske å bruke mer tid på? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver skulle du ønske å bruke mindre tid på? 
 
Hvilke andre i selskapet samarbeider du tettest med, og hvordan samarbeider dere? 
 
Kunne du fortalt litt mer om hva din funksjon som leder i selskapet innebærer?  
● Hvordan foreløper en typisk dag eller uke? 
 
Om Making Waves 
 
CEO og direktør for People&Processes: 
Kan du fortelle litt om bakgrunnen for og historien til Making Waves? 
● Hva var ambisjonen i oppstarten? 
● Hvilke hendelser har vært avgjørende i utviklingen av selskapet? 
● I hvilken grad har motivasjonen for å starte og/eller drive selskapet i 
hovedvekt vært på å benytte nye arbeidsmetoder og lage helt nye 
(revolusjonerende) produkter, eller vært på å jobbe smartere og mer effektivt 
enn konkurrentene. 
 
Andre ledere: 
Kan du beskrive en hendelse/situasjon/endring du mener har hatt stor påvirkning på 
hva slags selskap Making Waves er i dag? 
● I hvilken grad har disse hendelsene bidratt til dagens organisering? 
● I hvilken grad har disse hendelsene bidratt til utformingen av 
arbeidsprosesser/metode? 
 
Kjenner du til visjonen til Making Waves? Hva legger du i den visjonen? 
 
Hvordan vil du beskrive Making Waves sin strategi? 
● Hvordan manifisterer den seg i din hverdag? 
 
Exploration and exploitation 
Kan du beskrive en typisk prosess for et prosjekt helt fra før salg til etter leveranse? 
● Hvordan går dere frem når dere starter et prosjekt? 
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● Hvordan samarbeider dere med kunden? 
● Kan du beskrive innsalgsprosessen? 
 
La oss si at dere tar på dere et nytt oppdrag som ligner på et tidligere oppdrag. Hvor 
mye gjennbruker dere av det gamle oppdraget? 
● Hvordan forholder dere dere til å kutte kostnader? 
● Hva gjør dere for å effektivisere driften? 
● Var opprettelsen av en avdeling i Polen et tiltak for å få ned kostnader? 
 
Hva legger du i å jobbe kreativt? 
● Hvordan klarer Making Waves å fornye seg? 
● Er det spesifikke personer som jobber kreativt og med fornyelse, eller alle? 
● Har kreative arbeidsprosesser ledet til utviklingen av nye produkter, tjenester 
eller nye interne arbeidsprosesser? 
 
Har det fra ledelsens side blitt satt i gang prosjekter for å utvikle nye produkter, 
tjenester eller arbeidsprosesser uavhengig av spesifikke oppdrag fra kunder? 
 
Arkitektonisk 
Hvordan varierer arbeidsoppgavene dine over tid? 
 
Hva er bakgrunnen for inndeling i avdelinger? (CEO og direktør for 
People&Prosesses) 
● Hvordan har dette forandret seg over tid?  
● Ser ut som dere har strukturert avdelingene etter arbeidsoppgaver. Hvorfor 
det? 
 
Hender det at de ansatte skifter faste oppgaver? 
● Oppfordrer dere de ansatte til å bytte roller i bedriften? 
 
Hvilke typer tjenester er det dere selger? 
● Kan du beskrive hver tjeneste nærmere? 
● Har dere et bevisst forhold til fordelingen av type tjenester? 
 
Kontekstuell 
Hva preger arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves? 
● Hvordan skiller arbeidsmiljøet seg i Making Waves fra andre selskaper? Antar 
du? 
● Holder man seg mest sammen med de i sin avdeling? til lunsj osv? 
● Hvordan foregår internkommunikasjon? Formell og uformell? 
● Vil du beskrive arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves som prestasjonsfokusert? 
 
Hvem i selskapet spør du om råd i vanskelige situasjoner? 
● Et problem du ikke finner løsning på? Prioritering av arbeidsoppgaver inn mot 
en deadline 
● Kollegaer, hvem? 
● Overordnede, hvem? 
 200 
  
 
● Hvordan er støtten i arbeidsmiljøet rundt å ta egne beslutninger i krevende 
sammenhenger? 
 
Hvordan er samarbeidsklimaet i Making Waves? 
● Har du noen kollegaer du vet du samarbeider bedre med enn andre? 
● Er det de samme du samarbeider godt med faglig som du liker å tilbringe tid 
med i sosiale settinger også? 
● Har du fått noen nære venner gjennom jobben i Making Waves som du 
tilbringer mye tid sammen med på fritid? 
 
Ledelse 
Hvordan blir oppgaver delegert i Making Waves? 
● Hvem delegerer til hvem? 
● Sender toppledelsen spesifikke oppgaver langt ned i systemet? 
 
Hvilken myndighet har du generelt til å ta beslutninger? 
● Blir det oppfordret til å ta risiko eller til å forholde seg til et sett med regler i 
forbindelse med viktige beslutninger? 
 
Hvordan ønsker du å bli ledet? 
● Kan du gi et eksempel på godt lederskap? 
 
Hvordan blir du ledet i dag? 
 
Hvordan ønsker du å lede andre? 
 
Hvilken myndighet har ansatte generelt til å ta beslutninger? 
● Blir det oppfordret til å ta risiko eller til å forholde seg til et sett med regler? 
 
Avsluttende spørsmål 
Som en avslutning på intervjuet ønsker vi at du forteller litt om hva du ser for deg i 
framtiden til Making Waves, i hvilken retning selskapet vil utvikle seg. 
 
Hvordan er bransjen i endring?  
● Hva ser dere på hos konkurrenter? 
 
Hvor er Making Waves om fem år? 
● Hvilke karakteristikker beskriver selskapet best da? 
● Hvor lønnsomt er selskapet? Hvordan har dere oppnådd dette? 
● Hvor nyskapende er selskapet? Hvordan har dere oppnådd dette? 
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11.5  Appendix 5: Interview guide #3 
 
Din stilling 
Hvis du helt kort kan starte med å fortelle om hvem du er, utdanningsbakgrunn, 
annen arbeidserfaring osv. Kan du si mer om stillingen din her hos Making Waves, 
tittel, offisielle ansvarsområder og hvor lenge du har hatt stillingen. 
  
Hva bruker du arbeidstiden din til? 
● Hvordan foreløper en typisk dag eller uke? 
● Hvordan vil du beskrive måten du jobber på? 
  
Kunne du forklart litt mer inngående om din stilling, hva er viktig for deg (å oppnå) i 
jobben din? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver har høyest prioritet? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver liker du best? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver skulle du ønske å bruke mer tid på? 
● Hvilke arbeidsoppgaver skulle du ønske å bruke mindre tid på? 
  
Hvilke andre i selskapet samarbeider du tettest med, og hvordan samarbeider dere? 
  
Making Waves 
Kjenner du til visjonen til Making Waves? Hva legger du i den visjonen? 
  
Hvordan vil du beskrive Making Waves sin strategi? 
● Hvordan føler du at dere følger strategien? 
  
Exploration and exploitation 
La oss si at dere tar på dere et nytt oppdrag som ligner på et tidligere oppdrag. Hvor 
mye gjenbruker dere av det gamle oppdraget? 
● Hvordan forholder dere dere til å kutte kostnader? 
● Hva gjør dere for å effektivisere driften? 
  
Hva legger du i å jobbe kreativt? 
● Er det spesifikke personer som jobber kreativt og med fornyelse, eller alle? 
● Føler du at du jobber kreativt? 
  
Arkitektonisk 
Hvordan varierer arbeidsoppgavene dine over tid? 
  
Hender det at du skifter faste oppgaver? 
● Blir du oppfordret til å bytte roller i bedriften? 
  
Hvilke typer tjenester er det dere selger? 
● Kan du beskrive hver tjeneste nærmere? 
● Har dere et bevisst forhold til fordelingen av type tjenester? 
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Kontekstuell 
  
Kan du fortelle om en gang du følte at du gjorde en spesielt god jobb for Making 
Waves? 
  
Hva preger arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves? 
● Hvordan skiller arbeidsmiljøet seg i Making Waves fra andre selskaper? Antar 
du? 
● Holder man seg mest sammen med de i sin avdeling? til lunsj osv? 
● Hvordan foregår internkommunikasjon? Formell og uformell? 
● Vil du beskrive arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves som prestasjonsfokusert? 
● Hvordan vil du beskrive forholdet ditt til rutiner? 
  
Hva er negativt med arbeidsmiljøet i Making Waves? 
  
Hvem i selskapet spør du om råd i vanskelige situasjoner? 
● Et problem du ikke finner løsning på? Prioritering av arbeidsoppgaver inn mot 
en deadline? 
● Kollegaer, hvem? 
● Overordnede, hvem? 
● Hvordan er støtten i arbeidsmiljøet rundt å ta egne beslutninger i krevende 
sammenhenger? 
  
Hvordan er samarbeidsklimaet i Making Waves? 
● Har du noen kollegaer du vet du samarbeider bedre med enn andre? 
● Er det de samme du samarbeider godt med faglig som du liker å tilbringe tid 
med i sosiale settinger også? 
● Har du fått noen nære venner gjennom jobben i Making Waves som du 
tilbringer mye tid sammen med på fritid? 
  
Ledelse 
Hvem er din nærmeste leder? 
  
Hvilken myndighet har du generelt til å ta beslutninger? 
● Blir det oppfordret til å ta risiko eller til å forholde seg til et sett med regler i 
forbindelse med viktige beslutninger? 
  
Hvordan ønsker du å bli ledet? 
● Kan du gi et eksempel på godt lederskap? 
  
Hvordan blir du ledet i dag? 
  
Hvordan ønsker du å lede andre? 
  
Avsluttende spørsmål 
Som en avslutning på intervjuet ønsker vi at du forteller litt om hva du ser for deg i 
framtiden til Making Waves, i hvilken retning selskapet vil utvikle seg. 
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I hvilken grad ser dere på konkurrenter når dere planlegger fremtiden til MW? 
  
Hvor er Making Waves om fem år? 
● Hvilke karakteristikker beskriver selskapet best da? 
● Hvor lønnsomt er selskapet? Hvordan har dere oppnådd dette? 
● Hvor nyskapende er selskapet? Hvordan har dere oppnådd dette? 
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11.6  Appendix 6: Informant specific questions 
 
Informant #14 
Kan du beskrive et typisk prosjekt du kan ha i strategirådgiverjobben fra start til slutt? 
  
Har du blitt påminnet om at det er timer som teller? 
  
I hvilken grad føler du at du gjør oppgaver i prosjekter som du synes er gøy, men 
som ikke er direkte etterspurt av kunden? 
  
Hvordan har strategirådgivingen endret seg? 
● Fra enkle nettsider til full pakke. 
● Hvordan blir jobben i fremtiden? 
 
Informant #15 
Føler du at du holder deg teknisk oppdatert? 
● Hvor mye tid får du til å oppdatere deg på det tekniske? 
  
I hvor stor grad gjør du ting du synes er kult/gøy i prosjekter, selv om ikke kunden 
har etterspurt det spesifikt? 
  
Bestemmer man selv at man skal gå fra åpen til lukket fase eller blir dette styrt 
utenfra? 
 
Informant #16 
Mange i MW omtaler mennesker som "ressurser". Hva tenker du om det? 
  
Hva er samarbeidet ditt med [informant #18]? 
  
Har du blitt påminnet om at det er timer som teller? 
  
I hvilken grad føler du at du gjør oppgaver i prosjekter som du synes er gøy, men 
som ikke er direkte etterspurt av kunden? 
 
Hvordan liker folk i MW de formelle systemene for kommunikasjon? 
● Intranett 
● The Wave 
  
Har du formelle mål du skal nå i rollen som kulturminister? 
  
Hvordan kombinerer du de to stillingene dine? 
 
Informant #17 
Du hadde en diskusjon med [informant #4] på møtet mandag. Hva kan du si om den? 
  
Hva synes du om formelle systemer for kommunikasjon? 
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Hvordan går dere frem når dere skal selge inn et prosjekt til en kunde? 
 
Vi har hørt fra andre at det tydeligvis er en del som føler at prosjekter ganske ofte blir 
oversolgt, at man ikke klarer levere innenfor de rammene som er solgt inn. Hva 
tenker du om det? 
  
Blir ansatte påminnet om at det er timer som teller? 
 
Informant #18 
Hva er viktigst når det gjelder organisering. Oppdeling i fagdisipliner via 
forretningsenheter eller oppdeling i prosjekt basert på utfyllende kompetanse? 
  
Mennesker blir ofte omtalt som "ressurser" hos dere. Hvorfor? 
  
Hvordan skiller du mellom formell og uformell kommunikasjon? 
  
Hva ser dere etter i nyansettelser? 
● Ansetter dere utelukkende på individuelle karakteristikker, eller bygger dere 
en gruppe? 
  
Hvordan håndterte dere overtagelsen av Zoot? 
  
Kan du fortelle om en gang dere har vært nødt til å sparke noen? 
● Hvorfor ble den ansatte sparket? 
  
Har dere et saksbehandlingssystem for personalsaker? 
  
Hvilket samarbeid har du med [informant #16]? 
  
Har du spesielle personer du snakker med for å få inntrykk i hva som skjer på 
arbeidsplassen? 
 
 
 
 
 
